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The external dimensions of Norway’s new policy for the north and the strategy 
underpinning it are the focus of this study. First, Norway’s long-standing secu-
rity and sovereignty interests in Northern ocean areas are examined. Second, 
the vision of a Northern energy province, and the prospect of achieving a sense 
of shared interests and community in the region are investigated. Third, do-
mestic forces behind Russian sovereigntism are looked into, including examples 
of diverging and converging security and energy interests in Northwest Rus-
sia. Finally, the study seeks to determine the significance of the High North as 
geopolitical space for Russia, and how this may infuse unsettled disputes with 
additional meaning. 
Norway’s High North policy rests on two main external orientations: one 
is to intensify and broaden relations with Russia in the North; the other is to cre-
ate a greater understanding in Western partners and allies for Norway’s position 
on the unsettled sovereignty issues in the region. While the ambitions fuelling 
Norway’s political strategy for the North are still high, the realisation is seeping 
in that substantial advances in cooperation in the North may call for a greater 
sense of community than is currently the case. The study also suggests that state 
identity and interests in the North are pervasive, and may hinder more binding 
cooperation, functional integration and regime compliance.   
Whereas security was previously the overarching contextual reality of the 
High North, firmly keeping issues of sovereign rights within legal confines, this 
may now have been inverted. Questions of territorial sovereignty seem to be 
gaining in geopolitical significance. A greater awareness of energy as a means to 
exert state power affects relations between Russia and the West, including Nor-
way. Although bilateral cooperation with Russia within practical enforcement in 
and regulation of ocean areas is steadily progressing, the chances remain remote 
of finally solving the most difficult issues of sovereignty. The High North Policy 
may not be as at fault as the high expectations and ambitions associated with it. 
It could be time to bring the politics of sovereignty more to the fore.
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A SHIFT IN THE HIGH NORTH pOLICy
International politics have never revealed, 
nor do they today, a habitual recognition 
among states of a community of interests 
overriding their separate interest, comparable 
to that which normally binds individuals 
within the state.1
Top of the world – top of the agenda
Upon taking office in autumn 2005, the Stoltenberg Government (II) immedi-
ately singled out the High North as a foreign policy area of concern. The new 
Government’s policy platform included developing a cohesive strategy for the 
High North which was denoted to be “Norway’s most important strategic target 
area in the years to come.”2 In his inaugural parliamentary address, the prime 
minister announced the intention to assert Norway’s interests in the High North 
and intensify efforts to exercise Norwegian sovereignty.3 
Since then, the strategic importance of the High North and its centrality 
to the Government (“top of the world – top of the agenda”) has been reiterated 
by the foreign minister many times at home and abroad. Spurred by policy dec-
larations, a sense of new strategic beginnings for the region has emerged. The 
presentation of the Government’s final version of the High North Strategy in 
December 2006 marked a shift:5 from shaping the vision, to directing attention 
 This study results from a research project at the Norwegian Institute for Defence 
Studies in 2006–2007. It is based on open sources and interviews. I am indebted to    
Sven Holtsmark, Kjell Inge Bjerga, Lene Kristoffersen, Kjetil Skogrand, Paal Sigurd 
Hilde and Anna Therese Klingstedt. 
 
1 Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power”, in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the 
Theory of International Politics, eds Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), p. 17.  
2 Prime Minister’s Office, “Soria Moria Declaration on International Policy”, 13 
October 2005 [online 12 Jan 2009], pp. 1–6.
3 Ibid, “Inaugural Address to the Storting”, 19 October 2005.
 Jonas Gahr Støre, foreign minister “The High North – top of the world – top of the 
agenda”, speech at Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 
15 June 2006.
5 MFA (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), “The Norwegian Government’s High 
North Strategy”, presented in Tromsø on 1 December 2006 by Prime Minister Jens 
Stoltenberg, English abstract.
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to the specifics of international cooperation in the North in general and relations 
with Russia in particular.6 
The petroleum resources of the ocean areas of the High North are central 
to the policy and the strategy underpinning it. The High North Policy reflects 
the historical and geographical journey northwards of Norwegian energy policy, 
from the North Sea to the Barents Sea. It also reflects the inward journey of 
energy towards the centre of Norwegian foreign policy. This is not only because 
energy is important to Norway’s economy, but also because of the centrality of 
oil and gas to international relations.7 Finally, it coincides with Russia’s drive to 
develop off-shore oil and gas in the Barents Sea. 
It is through close cooperation with Russia that the policy’s energy poten-
tial may be fully released. The Norwegian Government’s strategy for the High 
North is a national undertaking in addition to a foreign policy-initiative. I shall 
focus on aspects of the latter; on how interests of security, sovereignty and coop-
eration may govern relations between states in the North, and between Norway 
and Russia in particular. My basic question is whether energy cooperation may 
help ease residual security tensions and resolve sovereignty issues. My intention 
is not to contest the general assumption that cooperation between states leads 
to better mutual understanding and a greater awareness of shared interests, op-
portunities and challenges. My point of departure is, rather, that there is a close 
relationship between international economic and security affairs, and that this 
is tightly interlinked with economic aspects of sovereignty.8 As the Norwegian 
strategy for the High North seems to bank on the inherent value of cooperation, 
a critical view emphasising the effects of security and sovereignty interests may 
offer additional insights. 
“More than just foreign policy …”
Foreign affairs are ultimately a question of practical policy-making. Indeed, 
“Norway’s policy towards Russia is based on pragmatism, interests and co-
operation.”9 This statement from the Government’s High North strategy is the 
point of departure for my analysis. A policy that is interest-based, pragmatic 
6 I shall in the following use ‘Russia’ when speaking of the ‘Russian Federation’.
7 MFA, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy”, pp. 11–12. See also 
Dieter Helm, “The Return of Energy Policy” in The New Energy Paradigm, ed. Dieter 
Helm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 1–8.
8 For a thorough theoretical investigation, see Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy. 
Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), pp. 13–2, 22.
9 MFA, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy”, p. 18.
and cooperation-oriented raises questions about its success criteria. The open-
endedness of this policy formulation is likely due to the complexities of the 
special international context of the High North. Though geographically on the 
European periphery, the High North is nonetheless of key geostrategic impor-
tance to Russia, and increasingly so to the West as well. The new paradigm of in-
terdependence based on shared energy interests, and a new awareness of scarce 
resources, could propel the High North to the world’s centre stage.10 
My intention is to analyse the relationship between interdependence and 
cooperation, security and power, and sovereignty and identity, and how these in-
terrelate with perceptions of state interests. What are these interests in material 
terms, and how are they structured socially through collective identity forma-
tion? Values and interests inform and define policy preferences; indeed, the dy-
namics of interests and values, and the crossover between foreign and domestic 
policy, are, or so I would claim, largely captured in the strategy’s foreword, in 
which the prime minister says: 
This is more than just foreign policy, and more than just domestic policy. It is 
a question of our ability to continue our tradition of responsible management 
of resources, predictable exercise of sovereignty, and close cooperation with our 
neighbours, partners and allies. But it is also a question of a broad, long-term 
mobilisation our own strengths and resources in the development of the entire 
northern part of our country. We are not talking about a project for the High 
North alone, but a project for the whole country and for the whole of northern 
Europe, with consequences for the whole continent.11
The post-modern turn of the prime minister’s words brings to mind the difficulty 
of distinguishing between the inside and outside of foreign policy.12 While clear-
ly oriented towards the rationality of international cooperation, does the High 
North policy have too little regard for the realities of security, and is it too silent 
on sovereignty issues, in particular regarding Svalbard? As interests are so cen-
tral to Norway’s policy for the High North, and to understand and deal with the 
10 On the new energy paradigm and interdependence, see Helm, “The New Energy 
Paradigm”, in The New Energy Paradigm, ed. Dieter Helm (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 9–35. See also Bjørn Brunstad et al., Big Oil Playground, 
Russian Bear preserve or European Periphery? The Russian Barents Sea Region 
towards 2015 (Delft: Eburon ECON Analysis, 200).
11 MFA, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy”, foreword by Prime 
Minister Jens Stoltenberg, p. 5. (Emphasis added.)
12 See R.B.J. Walker, Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1993] 1995), p. 125.
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been met with apprehension by Western partners and allies, as well as Russia.1 
Several have voiced concern, hinting that Norway is using the responsibilities 
evoked by international law to veil its own national interests. Thus, a smooth 
transition from security flank to a frontier of cooperation is not entirely evident. 
Norway needs to engage with Russia on a series of issues of interest to the two 
states. Such engagement is in Norway’s self-interest. But the new drive for bi-
lateral cooperation occurs at what may seem an inopportune moment; at a time 
of general regression in Russia’s political relations with the West, and of rising 
concern about authoritarianism inside Russia. At the same time, the outlook 
for energy cooperation is changing due to falling oil prices and the steep global 
economic downturn. 
This raises questions about the changing character of the political and 
economic context of the North. As the context changes, the formulation and 
pursuit of interests may change too. The relationship between security and sov-
ereignty remains intimate if not straightforward.15 Three sets of questions for 
further inquiry stand out: first, how relations in the High North, in particular 
with Russia, are shaped by energy cooperation; second, how processes intrinsic 
to the development of Russian society itself may influence the formulation of 
interests and values, and define Russia’s approaches to cooperation; third, how 
petroleum may imbue the High North with geopolitical significance and shape 
the scope for bringing issues of sovereignty in the High North from a legal onto 
a more political track
Analytical approach and overview
Two years after the launch of the strategy for the High North, it is apparently 
taking a more domestic turn, with comparatively less attention given to its in-
ternational orientations. There are two possible explanations: either that the 
external aims of the High North policy are largely on the road to realisation; or 
that it has been realised that their fulfilment lies further away than anticipated. 
If the latter is the case, the following investigation of security, sovereignty and 
cooperation interest may indicate some of the obstacles. 
1 See MFA, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy”, p. 9. “Partners 
and allies” denotes NATO and/or EU member states. The strategy also refers to 
“neighbours”; this would denote Russia primarily, and the Nordic states (who are 
“partners and allies” too). I shall also use these terms this way.
15 See Alexander Gourevitch, “National insecurities: the new politics of the American 
national interest”, in Politics without Sovereignty. A Critique of Contemporary 
International Relations, eds Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe, Alexander 
Gourevitch (London: University College London Press, 2007), pp. 58–76.
raft of questions other states will ask about this policy, making them the main 
axis of the study seems appropriate. A strategic flank during the Cold War, the 
High North was primarily defined in terms of security interests and secondarily 
by legal claims to the resources in the sea or on the seabed. Cooperation was 
random and driven by practical need. In the post-Cold War era, the shared inter-
ests and the opportunities offered by cooperation in the region are more evident, 
yet still challenging and far from self-evident. Whereas security along the strate-
gic flank was an overriding interest shared by the Western security community 
during the Cold War, interests in the area’s natural resources are predominantly 
national. Today, the relationship between security and sovereignty has in a sense 
been inverted, with sovereignty issues gaining primacy. 
In most of its salient aspects, the High North policy has a bearing on 
Norway’s bilateral relations with Russia: energy, the climate and Russia are 
emerging as the key external forces behind it.13 For all its regional and global 
motivations, Norway’s new policy initiative for the North is essentially about 
Russia. This does not mean that regional and global aspects of international 
relations are irrelevant. They have a direct bearing on the bilateral policy and 
its chances of success, and they shape the overall contextual reality within 
which the asymmetrical relationship between Norway and Russia plays out. 
This asymmetry manifests itself in several ways: in the material difference in 
political, economic and military power; and in the social aspects of foreign-
policy interests commensurate with small versus great power identities. Though 
unequal in power and foreign-policy outlooks, Norway and Russia are none-
theless equal under international law. This symmetry is an important part of 
the interest-driven contextual reality in the High North. But how do interests 
relate to context? The High North has been radically transformed – from a fro-
zen zone of conflict, kept in check by the bipolar security regime, to a zone of 
fledgling, but potentially far-reaching, cooperation. The polar ice-cap melting is 
also transforming the area physically. The disappearance of the security overlay 
combined with the increasing value and accessibility of natural resources may 
lead to a race for the North’s resources. The continental shelves of the Arctic are 
among the very last parts of the world yet to be divided into territorial domains. 
This challenges regional security, as sovereign claims to natural resources are 
known to spark disagreement and conflict. Indeed, Norway’s policy initiative 
for the North has not only drawn international interest and acclaim; it has also 
13 Geir Westgaard, “Norwegian Policy in the High North – the Russian Dimension”, 5th 
Russian-Norwegian Oil and Gas Conference, Kirkenes, 30 January 2007.
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further inquiry stand out: first, how relations in the High North, in particular 
with Russia, are shaped by energy cooperation; second, how processes intrinsic 
to the development of Russian society itself may influence the formulation of 
interests and values, and define Russia’s approaches to cooperation; third, how 
petroleum may imbue the High North with geopolitical significance and shape 
the scope for bringing issues of sovereignty in the High North from a legal onto 
a more political track
Analytical approach and overview
Two years after the launch of the strategy for the High North, it is apparently 
taking a more domestic turn, with comparatively less attention given to its in-
ternational orientations. There are two possible explanations: either that the 
external aims of the High North policy are largely on the road to realisation; or 
that it has been realised that their fulfilment lies further away than anticipated. 
If the latter is the case, the following investigation of security, sovereignty and 
cooperation interest may indicate some of the obstacles. 
1 See MFA, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy”, p. 9. “Partners 
and allies” denotes NATO and/or EU member states. The strategy also refers to 
“neighbours”; this would denote Russia primarily, and the Nordic states (who are 
“partners and allies” too). I shall also use these terms this way.
15 See Alexander Gourevitch, “National insecurities: the new politics of the American 
national interest”, in Politics without Sovereignty. A Critique of Contemporary 
International Relations, eds Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe, Alexander 
Gourevitch (London: University College London Press, 2007), pp. 58–76.
raft of questions other states will ask about this policy, making them the main 
axis of the study seems appropriate. A strategic flank during the Cold War, the 
High North was primarily defined in terms of security interests and secondarily 
by legal claims to the resources in the sea or on the seabed. Cooperation was 
random and driven by practical need. In the post-Cold War era, the shared inter-
ests and the opportunities offered by cooperation in the region are more evident, 
yet still challenging and far from self-evident. Whereas security along the strate-
gic flank was an overriding interest shared by the Western security community 
during the Cold War, interests in the area’s natural resources are predominantly 
national. Today, the relationship between security and sovereignty has in a sense 
been inverted, with sovereignty issues gaining primacy. 
In most of its salient aspects, the High North policy has a bearing on 
Norway’s bilateral relations with Russia: energy, the climate and Russia are 
emerging as the key external forces behind it.13 For all its regional and global 
motivations, Norway’s new policy initiative for the North is essentially about 
Russia. This does not mean that regional and global aspects of international 
relations are irrelevant. They have a direct bearing on the bilateral policy and 
its chances of success, and they shape the overall contextual reality within 
which the asymmetrical relationship between Norway and Russia plays out. 
This asymmetry manifests itself in several ways: in the material difference in 
political, economic and military power; and in the social aspects of foreign-
policy interests commensurate with small versus great power identities. Though 
unequal in power and foreign-policy outlooks, Norway and Russia are none-
theless equal under international law. This symmetry is an important part of 
the interest-driven contextual reality in the High North. But how do interests 
relate to context? The High North has been radically transformed – from a fro-
zen zone of conflict, kept in check by the bipolar security regime, to a zone of 
fledgling, but potentially far-reaching, cooperation. The polar ice-cap melting is 
also transforming the area physically. The disappearance of the security overlay 
combined with the increasing value and accessibility of natural resources may 
lead to a race for the North’s resources. The continental shelves of the Arctic are 
among the very last parts of the world yet to be divided into territorial domains. 
This challenges regional security, as sovereign claims to natural resources are 
known to spark disagreement and conflict. Indeed, Norway’s policy initiative 
for the North has not only drawn international interest and acclaim; it has also 
13 Geir Westgaard, “Norwegian Policy in the High North – the Russian Dimension”, 5th 
Russian-Norwegian Oil and Gas Conference, Kirkenes, 30 January 2007.
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The policy’s emphasis on Russia makes it seem appropriate to place devel-
opments in Russia at the centre of the study. On the face of it, Norwegian and 
Russian interests in the High North may look fairly similar: core material inter-
ests are political freedom of action, military security and control over natural 
resources in maritime areas. Both states seek to optimise the opportunities for 
their national petroleum industries. Norway’s strong penchant for international 
rule of law and multilateralism is not solely due to a greater affinity for idea-
tional policies, but rooted in a kind of small-state realism that is highly sensitive 
to the politics of international law.16 Great power realism, understandably, takes 
other forms. The crux here is how we understand what, for instance, Alexander 
Wendt speaks of as the social construction of power politics.17 Material interests 
may look similar, but are socially structured, and therefore differ. As such, inter-
national anarchy needs to be understood in view of how it is structured in both 
ideational and material terms.18 Structural realism focuses on the distribution of 
power among the units of the system; that is, the states. While this is helpful in 
many ways, it may deflect attention from what is equally evident; that relations 
within the anarchical society of states are ultimately reducible to human under-
standings.19 States’ interests may in fact mean little or nothing if not interpreted, 
defined and pursued by (states-)men and women. Interests are reproduced and 
shaped by identity. They may be long-standing, but is it true to assume that such 
ideational factors are “persistent”?20 As associated with constructivist, and con-
16 See for instance Christian Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law”, in The 
Politics of International Law, ed. Christian Reus-Smit (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 200), pp. 1–.
17 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of             
Power Politics”, International Organization, vol. 6, no. 2 (1992): 391–25. 
18 Alexander Wendt,  Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). See also Wendt, “The state as a person in international 
theory”, Review of International Studies, vol. 30, no. 2 (200): 289–316.
19 See Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y; 
London: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 1–33; Robert H. Jackson,  The Global 
Covenant. Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
[2000] 2005); Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of 
International Relations. A Contemporary Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in 
World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave, [1977] 2002); Barry Buzan, From International 
to World Society. English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200).
20 On Russian interests, see Alfred J. Rieber, “How Persistent are Persistent Factors?” 
in Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century and the Shadow of the Past, 
ed. Robert Legvold (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 
205–278. Francis Fukuyama, “The Ambiguity of ‘National Interest’”, in Rethinking 
Russia’s National Interests, ed. Stephen Sestanovich, Significant Issues Series, vol. XVI, 
no. 1 (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 199), pp. 10–23, 
199. 
structivist-inclined international society theory, identity and interests are shared 
as well as particular to individual states. The distinction between national and 
shared international identity and interests may in fact be blurry and dynamic. 
Interests are closely related to values and values to norms; they underpin formal 
rules and shape acceptable patterns of international practice, and they form in-
stitutions. Sovereignty, for instance, is as much a social reality as it is a bedrock 
institution of international society.21 
Sovereignty interests in the resource-rich areas of the North are of both a 
practical-political and socio-cultural nature, and so too are the approaches to 
interdependence and cooperation between states. Small states and great powers, 
as a rule of thumb, have different preferences concerning how to manage inter-
dependence. The general problem with interdependence is that it is unevenly dis-
tributed; “some states are more interdependent than others”, so to speak. Again, 
size matters; some states will want to reduce insecurity by shying away from 
dependencies, while others feel that functional interdependencies augment their 
security. This acknowledgement is helpful when seeking to understand how a 
policy can simultaneously be pragmatic and interest-based, or even portrayed as 
21 The term “international society” is mostly associated with the extensive work within 
the English School Theory, see Bull, The Anarchical Society; Buzan, From International 
to World Society; Kalevi J. Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns. Institutional Change in 
International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200); Martin Wight, 
International Theory. The Three Traditions of Martin Wight, eds Gabriele Wight and 
Brian Porter, Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Continuum, [1991] 
2002). See also Robert H. Jackson, “Boundaries and International Society”, in 
International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, ed. B. 
A. Roberson, (London: Continuum, [1998] 2002), pp. 156–172; Stephen D. Krasner,          
Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999) 
and Krasner (ed.), Problematic Sovereignty. Contested Rules and Political Possibilities 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Daniel Philpott,  Revolutions in 
Sovereignty. How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2001); John Williams, The Ethics of Territorial Borders. 
Drawing Lines in the Shifting Sand (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). On legal 
issues, Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International 
Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ([1989] 2005).
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The policy’s emphasis on Russia makes it seem appropriate to place devel-
opments in Russia at the centre of the study. On the face of it, Norwegian and 
Russian interests in the High North may look fairly similar: core material inter-
ests are political freedom of action, military security and control over natural 
resources in maritime areas. Both states seek to optimise the opportunities for 
their national petroleum industries. Norway’s strong penchant for international 
rule of law and multilateralism is not solely due to a greater affinity for idea-
tional policies, but rooted in a kind of small-state realism that is highly sensitive 
to the politics of international law.16 Great power realism, understandably, takes 
other forms. The crux here is how we understand what, for instance, Alexander 
Wendt speaks of as the social construction of power politics.17 Material interests 
may look similar, but are socially structured, and therefore differ. As such, inter-
national anarchy needs to be understood in view of how it is structured in both 
ideational and material terms.18 Structural realism focuses on the distribution of 
power among the units of the system; that is, the states. While this is helpful in 
many ways, it may deflect attention from what is equally evident; that relations 
within the anarchical society of states are ultimately reducible to human under-
standings.19 States’ interests may in fact mean little or nothing if not interpreted, 
defined and pursued by (states-)men and women. Interests are reproduced and 
shaped by identity. They may be long-standing, but is it true to assume that such 
ideational factors are “persistent”?20 As associated with constructivist, and con-
16 See for instance Christian Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law”, in The 
Politics of International Law, ed. Christian Reus-Smit (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 200), pp. 1–.
17 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of             
Power Politics”, International Organization, vol. 6, no. 2 (1992): 391–25. 
18 Alexander Wendt,  Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). See also Wendt, “The state as a person in international 
theory”, Review of International Studies, vol. 30, no. 2 (200): 289–316.
19 See Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y; 
London: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 1–33; Robert H. Jackson,  The Global 
Covenant. Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
[2000] 2005); Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of 
International Relations. A Contemporary Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in 
World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave, [1977] 2002); Barry Buzan, From International 
to World Society. English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200).
20 On Russian interests, see Alfred J. Rieber, “How Persistent are Persistent Factors?” 
in Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century and the Shadow of the Past, 
ed. Robert Legvold (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 
205–278. Francis Fukuyama, “The Ambiguity of ‘National Interest’”, in Rethinking 
Russia’s National Interests, ed. Stephen Sestanovich, Significant Issues Series, vol. XVI, 
no. 1 (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 199), pp. 10–23, 
199. 
structivist-inclined international society theory, identity and interests are shared 
as well as particular to individual states. The distinction between national and 
shared international identity and interests may in fact be blurry and dynamic. 
Interests are closely related to values and values to norms; they underpin formal 
rules and shape acceptable patterns of international practice, and they form in-
stitutions. Sovereignty, for instance, is as much a social reality as it is a bedrock 
institution of international society.21 
Sovereignty interests in the resource-rich areas of the North are of both a 
practical-political and socio-cultural nature, and so too are the approaches to 
interdependence and cooperation between states. Small states and great powers, 
as a rule of thumb, have different preferences concerning how to manage inter-
dependence. The general problem with interdependence is that it is unevenly dis-
tributed; “some states are more interdependent than others”, so to speak. Again, 
size matters; some states will want to reduce insecurity by shying away from 
dependencies, while others feel that functional interdependencies augment their 
security. This acknowledgement is helpful when seeking to understand how a 
policy can simultaneously be pragmatic and interest-based, or even portrayed as 
21 The term “international society” is mostly associated with the extensive work within 
the English School Theory, see Bull, The Anarchical Society; Buzan, From International 
to World Society; Kalevi J. Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns. Institutional Change in 
International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200); Martin Wight, 
International Theory. The Three Traditions of Martin Wight, eds Gabriele Wight and 
Brian Porter, Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Continuum, [1991] 
2002). See also Robert H. Jackson, “Boundaries and International Society”, in 
International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, ed. B. 
A. Roberson, (London: Continuum, [1998] 2002), pp. 156–172; Stephen D. Krasner,          
Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999) 
and Krasner (ed.), Problematic Sovereignty. Contested Rules and Political Possibilities 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Daniel Philpott,  Revolutions in 
Sovereignty. How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2001); John Williams, The Ethics of Territorial Borders. 
Drawing Lines in the Shifting Sand (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). On legal 
issues, Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International 
Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ([1989] 2005).
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“pragmatic realism”.22 When crafting its policies for the North and for relations 
with Russia, the Norwegian Government does not only have to have a good 
understanding of Norway’s own interests, but needs to understand well Rus-
sia’s interests and those of its Western partners and allies too. The culture of the 
international system can take different forms, depending on whether states view 
each other as friends, enemies or rivals.23 I shall translate this process of identity 
formation into interests of cooperation, security and sovereignty respectively. 
The analysis will be guided by three corresponding considerations: of energy 
cooperation; of security perceptions; and of the geopolitics of sovereignty. These 
considerations broadly structure the study. Each of the following chapters is in 
two sections, allowing me first to discuss the particular set of interests that is 
under scrutiny, and second to approach them from an empirical angle. 
In the second and third chapters I shall look further into the Norwegian 
High North policy and try to understand it in terms of continuity and change. 
First, I shall present a recent history of the interests underpinning Norway’s 
policy for the North. Second, I shall try to determine whether today’s policy is 
a new policy or a reformulation of yesterday’s, but for the new security situa-
tion. In chapter four and five I shall discuss the prospects of energy coopera-
tion. To do this I need to grasp the vision and realities of the “energy province” 
in the North. One question is whether the thrust towards energy cooperation 
in the North may be taking Norway into unknown degrees of bilateralisation 
with Russia, and whether this may affect Norway’s relations with Western allies 
and partners. Such relations with the West may depend on external aspects of 
22 Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre makes the claim that Norway’s policy towards 
Russia is guided by “pragmatic realism”: “Perspectives on Foreign Policy and 
Energy”, address to StatoilHydro’s Leadership Forum (G-500), Stavanger, 18 June, 
2007. On realism, neorealism and offensive realism, see Edward H. Carr, The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, [1939] 196); 
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
revised by Kenneth Thompson, (New York: McGraw-Hill, [198] 1993); Kenneth 
N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); John J. 
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). 
For a constructivist view on security and securitisation, see Barry Buzan, People, States 
and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd 
edition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Buzan, From International to World Society, 
pp. 176–20, 187, and Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers. World 
Politics in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 200); Barry Buzan, Ole 
Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1998). Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Power. The Structure of 
International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
23 Alexander Wendt, “Social Theory as Cartesian science: an auto-critique from a 
quantum perspective”, in Constructivism and International Relations. Alexander 
Wendt and his critics, eds Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (New York: Routledge, 
2006), pp. 181–219.
the wider regional structuring of energy policies and interdependencies. I shall 
also ask whether energy cooperation may open new perspectives on outstanding 
sovereignty issues. To this end, I shall try to outline the main interests and per-
spectives of major actors in the High North. In chapter six and seven I continue 
exploring aspects of sovereignty in light of the reappearance of security as an 
important factor in Russian internal and external politics. The analytical focus is 
on how energy underpins perceptions of how security may be achieved. To this 
end, I shall use the earlier Putin regime’s formulation of a “triad of national val-
ues”: sovereign democracy, economic strength and military might. To add em-
pirical weight to the discussion, I shall check my findings by looking at instances 
when Russian military security and energy interests seem to coincide or collide 
in the North, and ask how issues are resolved. In chapter eight my interest is in 
how Russia looks at the High North in terms of its geostrategic interests for the 
Arctic as a whole, and how matters of identity and “strength” may influence its 
outlook on outstanding issues of territorial sovereignty. This leads to the consid-
eration of political aspects of unresolved and disputed issues of delimitation and 
jurisdiction of maritime areas. I shall ask under which conditions they are most 
likely to be settled bilaterally between Norway and Russia. With this in mind 
I shall ask if the High North dialogue could profit from a more political turn 
concerning issues of sovereignty. In chapter nine, I shall make some concluding 
remarks about the High North policy and seek to provide answers to the ques-
tions outlined above. 
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“pragmatic realism”.22 When crafting its policies for the North and for relations 
with Russia, the Norwegian Government does not only have to have a good 
understanding of Norway’s own interests, but needs to understand well Rus-
sia’s interests and those of its Western partners and allies too. The culture of the 
international system can take different forms, depending on whether states view 
each other as friends, enemies or rivals.23 I shall translate this process of identity 
formation into interests of cooperation, security and sovereignty respectively. 
The analysis will be guided by three corresponding considerations: of energy 
cooperation; of security perceptions; and of the geopolitics of sovereignty. These 
considerations broadly structure the study. Each of the following chapters is in 
two sections, allowing me first to discuss the particular set of interests that is 
under scrutiny, and second to approach them from an empirical angle. 
In the second and third chapters I shall look further into the Norwegian 
High North policy and try to understand it in terms of continuity and change. 
First, I shall present a recent history of the interests underpinning Norway’s 
policy for the North. Second, I shall try to determine whether today’s policy is 
a new policy or a reformulation of yesterday’s, but for the new security situa-
tion. In chapter four and five I shall discuss the prospects of energy coopera-
tion. To do this I need to grasp the vision and realities of the “energy province” 
in the North. One question is whether the thrust towards energy cooperation 
in the North may be taking Norway into unknown degrees of bilateralisation 
with Russia, and whether this may affect Norway’s relations with Western allies 
and partners. Such relations with the West may depend on external aspects of 
22 Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre makes the claim that Norway’s policy towards 
Russia is guided by “pragmatic realism”: “Perspectives on Foreign Policy and 
Energy”, address to StatoilHydro’s Leadership Forum (G-500), Stavanger, 18 June, 
2007. On realism, neorealism and offensive realism, see Edward H. Carr, The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, [1939] 196); 
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
revised by Kenneth Thompson, (New York: McGraw-Hill, [198] 1993); Kenneth 
N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); John J. 
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). 
For a constructivist view on security and securitisation, see Barry Buzan, People, States 
and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd 
edition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Buzan, From International to World Society, 
pp. 176–20, 187, and Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers. World 
Politics in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 200); Barry Buzan, Ole 
Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1998). Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Power. The Structure of 
International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
23 Alexander Wendt, “Social Theory as Cartesian science: an auto-critique from a 
quantum perspective”, in Constructivism and International Relations. Alexander 
Wendt and his critics, eds Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (New York: Routledge, 
2006), pp. 181–219.
the wider regional structuring of energy policies and interdependencies. I shall 
also ask whether energy cooperation may open new perspectives on outstanding 
sovereignty issues. To this end, I shall try to outline the main interests and per-
spectives of major actors in the High North. In chapter six and seven I continue 
exploring aspects of sovereignty in light of the reappearance of security as an 
important factor in Russian internal and external politics. The analytical focus is 
on how energy underpins perceptions of how security may be achieved. To this 
end, I shall use the earlier Putin regime’s formulation of a “triad of national val-
ues”: sovereign democracy, economic strength and military might. To add em-
pirical weight to the discussion, I shall check my findings by looking at instances 
when Russian military security and energy interests seem to coincide or collide 
in the North, and ask how issues are resolved. In chapter eight my interest is in 
how Russia looks at the High North in terms of its geostrategic interests for the 
Arctic as a whole, and how matters of identity and “strength” may influence its 
outlook on outstanding issues of territorial sovereignty. This leads to the consid-
eration of political aspects of unresolved and disputed issues of delimitation and 
jurisdiction of maritime areas. I shall ask under which conditions they are most 
likely to be settled bilaterally between Norway and Russia. With this in mind 
I shall ask if the High North dialogue could profit from a more political turn 
concerning issues of sovereignty. In chapter nine, I shall make some concluding 
remarks about the High North policy and seek to provide answers to the ques-
tions outlined above. 
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The recent history of Norwegian policy for the North
In this section I shall canvass Norway’s recent foreign-policy history in the 
North, in particular how interests of security, sovereignty and cooperation have 
guided Norway’s policy-making during the Cold War. Although Norway’s cur-
rent interest in political, economic and commercial ties with Russia manifests it-
self in a steadily deeper bilateralisation of relations, regional cooperation efforts 
are still vulnerable to historical role perceptions. The legacy of former hostilities 
may hinder cooperation, as may the present déjà vu of political tension between 
Russia and the West. 
Throughout the Cold War, the strategic imperatives of the US and the USSR 
influenced a range of Norway’s foreign policy and security interests. Avoiding 
any bilateralisation of security matters with the USSR was prioritised, as was 
keeping regional tension generally low.2 While this enabled security, it also re-
stricted the scope for bilateral cooperation. Issues were either left unresolved or 
their management was dictated by external security factors. Instead of compre-
hensive solutions to matters of sovereignty and jurisdiction, selective and practi-
cal arrangements were put in place. The stakes became higher in the early 1970s 
when an awareness of the value of the petroleum deposits off Norway’s coast 
gradually grew.25 By coincidence, securing national jurisdiction over the natural 
resources on the shelf became a priority for Norway at the very time when the 
High North was moving towards hypermilitarisation and attaining geostrategic 
significance as a security flank.26 This was also when the international society 
2 Johan Jørgen Holst, Norsk Sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv. Analyse (I). 
Dokumentasjon (II) [Norwegian security policy. A strategic perspective. Analysis 
(I). Documentation (II)] (Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1967); Arne Olav 
Brundtland, “Den nye sovjetiske nordpolitikken og mulige norske svar” [The new 
Soviet policy for the North and possible Norwegian responses], Internasjonal politikk, 
no. 2-3 (1988): 95–133. 
25 Johan Jørgen Holst, “Sovjetunionen som faktor i norsk utenrikspolitikk:         
Forutsetninger og utviklingsmuligheter” [The Soviet Union as a factor in Norwegian 
foreign policy: Conditions and possible developments], Internasjonal Politikk, no. 3b 
(1982): 719–71.
26 Anders C. Sjaastad, John Kristen Skogan,      Politikk og sikkerhet i Norskehavsområdet. 
Om de enkelte land og våre felles problemer [Politics and security in the Norwegian 
Sea area. About the individual countries and our common problems] (Oslo: Dreyer, 
1975); Johan Jørgen Holst, “Lilliputs and Gulliver: Small States in a Great-Power 
Alliance”, in Nato’s Northern Allies. The National Security Policies of Belgium, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, ed. Gregory Flynn (Totowa: Rowman & 
Allanheld, 1985).
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hensive solutions to matters of sovereignty and jurisdiction, selective and practi-
cal arrangements were put in place. The stakes became higher in the early 1970s 
when an awareness of the value of the petroleum deposits off Norway’s coast 
gradually grew.25 By coincidence, securing national jurisdiction over the natural 
resources on the shelf became a priority for Norway at the very time when the 
High North was moving towards hypermilitarisation and attaining geostrategic 
significance as a security flank.26 This was also when the international society 
2 Johan Jørgen Holst, Norsk Sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv. Analyse (I). 
Dokumentasjon (II) [Norwegian security policy. A strategic perspective. Analysis 
(I). Documentation (II)] (Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1967); Arne Olav 
Brundtland, “Den nye sovjetiske nordpolitikken og mulige norske svar” [The new 
Soviet policy for the North and possible Norwegian responses], Internasjonal politikk, 
no. 2-3 (1988): 95–133. 
25 Johan Jørgen Holst, “Sovjetunionen som faktor i norsk utenrikspolitikk:         
Forutsetninger og utviklingsmuligheter” [The Soviet Union as a factor in Norwegian 
foreign policy: Conditions and possible developments], Internasjonal Politikk, no. 3b 
(1982): 719–71.
26 Anders C. Sjaastad, John Kristen Skogan,      Politikk og sikkerhet i Norskehavsområdet. 
Om de enkelte land og våre felles problemer [Politics and security in the Norwegian 
Sea area. About the individual countries and our common problems] (Oslo: Dreyer, 
1975); Johan Jørgen Holst, “Lilliputs and Gulliver: Small States in a Great-Power 
Alliance”, in Nato’s Northern Allies. The National Security Policies of Belgium, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, ed. Gregory Flynn (Totowa: Rowman & 
Allanheld, 1985).
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of states commenced in earnest the long process of establishing the new Law of 
the Sea.27
Security, sovereignty and cooperation interests
From the 1970s onwards, with the rising significance of assuring property rights 
to the natural resources in ocean areas, Norway’s already precarious security 
situation on the northern flank became more complex. Security and sovereignty 
interests coincided temporally and spatially with efforts to establish comprehen-
sive jurisdiction over resources. From this came a sense of double vulnerability. 
Norway’s ability to assert its sovereignty was not only complicated by security 
considerations, but also by a lack of international recognition for its rights to 
exercise authority and enforce jurisdiction. Norway’s dilemma was that it could 
not evade the enforcement responsibilities that accompanied its novel sovereign 
rights without risking its sovereign claims; but nor could it enforce too rigor-
ously and heavy-handedly as this might have provoked a security backlash. It 
is reasonable to regard the recent High North policy as an initiative to try to 
bring Norway out of this longstanding dilemma by striking a balance between 
the direct and bilateral pursuit of national interests via international alliances 
and multilateral institutions.
Traditionally, Norway’s foreign relations have balanced on an Atlantic, a 
European and a Nordic pillar. In the words of former foreign minister Holst, 
“[Norway] has doggedly refused to choose between them, but rather attempted 
to orchestrate, reconcile and mediate the competing perspectives and interests 
involved.”28 The Nordic direction was always the weaker one because it was not 
credible in terms of security, though today Nordic relations seem to have been 
revitalised. Concerning a security framework, Norway has pursued an Atlantic 
and European double anchorage.29 Policy choices were largely prescribed by the 
double fear of marginalisation and domination. The solution to the quandary 
was to seek security in Alliance diplomacy and portray Norway as a nation with 
an independent foreign-policy role and identity. NATO provided both a safe ref-
27 The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was convened 
in New York in 1973, and ended nine years later with the adoption in 1982 of a 
constitution for the seas – the United Nations on the Law of the Sea Convention 
(LOSC). See Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder 1965–1995, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie [Oil 
Age 1965–1995, Norwegian foreign policy history] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 
pp. 279–290.
28 Johan Jørgen Holst, European Security. A View from the North, NUPI Report, no. 
38 (Oslo: NUPI, 1990), p. 9.
29 Olav Riste, Norway’s foreign relations: a history (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 
p. 287, quoting Holst, former defence minister (Defence Ministry press release, no. 2, 
1993).
uge and a security platform from which Norway could reach out and “engage” 
and generally attempt to nudge things along towards peaceful coexistence in 
the region.30 This urge to balance was grasped by US ambassador to Norway, 
Lithgow Osborn, who as early as 195 foresaw that “[N]orway’s foreign policy 
would (..) be pro British-American as far as they dare, pro Soviet as far as they 
must, and pro UN as far as they can…”31 What made Norway interesting to the 
superpowers at the time was the strategic importance of the oceans, as he who 
dominated the seas off Norway’s coast controlled the maritime approaches to 
and from the Kola Peninsula. This in itself made Norway’s hold over Svalbard 
and general security situation precarious, which was made yet more precarious 
by the USSR’s concerns that the northernmost part of Norway could be used as 
a staging area to attack the Kola region. The Soviet Union developed a policy 
seeking to “deny” any NATO forces the right of presence in the area.32 
To allay some of the Soviet Union’s security concerns, Norway imposed 
on itself a set of national restrictions on Allied use of its territory for military 
purposes and rigid observance of the non-militarisation proviso of the Svalbard 
Treaty. In an exchange of a series of diplomatic notes with the Soviet Union in 
the winter of 199, before Norway’s NATO membership had been formalised, 
Norway reassured the USSR about its intention not to allow NATO bases on 
its territory in times of peace. This intense series of exchanges started with a de-
marche from the Soviet Union’s ambassador on 29 January 199. In its response 
of 1 February, the Norwegian Government declared its intention not to allow 
any foreign powers to establish military bases on its territory unless Norway 
was under attack or threatened by attack, and underlined that Norway did not 
harbour any hostile intentions towards the Soviet Union, nor would it allow the 
use of its territory for any politics of such intent.33 In its response of 5 February, 
the Soviet Union, conceding to the inevitability of Norway’s NATO member-
ship, proposed establishing a bilateral non-aggression pact “in case the Norwe-
gian Government (..) has any doubts about the good neighbourly intentions of 
the Soviet Union towards Norway (..)”3 Norway declined on the grounds that 
the NATO Treaty was predicated on the non-aggression principles enshrined in 
30 Holst, “Lilliputs and Gulliver”, p. 283. 
31 Quoted in Haakon Lie, Skjebneår, 1945–1950 [Years of destiny, 195–1950] (Oslo: 
Tiden, 1985), p. 8.
32 See Kjetil Skogrand, Alliert i krig og fred [Allied in war and peace], Norsk 
forsvarshistorie 190–1970 [Norwegian Defence history], vol.  (Bergen: Eide, 
200), p. 198, and Sven G. Holtsmark, “Norge og Sovjetunionen – bilaterisering og 
fellesstyre” [Norway and the Soviet Union – bilateralisation and condominium] in 
Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk med NATO gjennom 50 år, eds Chris Prebensen and Nils 
Skarland (Oslo: Den norske atlanterhavskomité, 1999).
33 For the full exchange of diplomatic notes, see Holst,         Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk … (II), 
pp 65–72.
3 Ibid, p. 67–69.  
OF_1_2009_innhold.indd   16 26-02-09   12:14:37
OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty 171/2009 NOr�e�IaN fOreI�N �O�Icy IN t�e �I�� NOrt�      
of states commenced in earnest the long process of establishing the new Law of 
the Sea.27
Security, sovereignty and cooperation interests
From the 1970s onwards, with the rising significance of assuring property rights 
to the natural resources in ocean areas, Norway’s already precarious security 
situation on the northern flank became more complex. Security and sovereignty 
interests coincided temporally and spatially with efforts to establish comprehen-
sive jurisdiction over resources. From this came a sense of double vulnerability. 
Norway’s ability to assert its sovereignty was not only complicated by security 
considerations, but also by a lack of international recognition for its rights to 
exercise authority and enforce jurisdiction. Norway’s dilemma was that it could 
not evade the enforcement responsibilities that accompanied its novel sovereign 
rights without risking its sovereign claims; but nor could it enforce too rigor-
ously and heavy-handedly as this might have provoked a security backlash. It 
is reasonable to regard the recent High North policy as an initiative to try to 
bring Norway out of this longstanding dilemma by striking a balance between 
the direct and bilateral pursuit of national interests via international alliances 
and multilateral institutions.
Traditionally, Norway’s foreign relations have balanced on an Atlantic, a 
European and a Nordic pillar. In the words of former foreign minister Holst, 
“[Norway] has doggedly refused to choose between them, but rather attempted 
to orchestrate, reconcile and mediate the competing perspectives and interests 
involved.”28 The Nordic direction was always the weaker one because it was not 
credible in terms of security, though today Nordic relations seem to have been 
revitalised. Concerning a security framework, Norway has pursued an Atlantic 
and European double anchorage.29 Policy choices were largely prescribed by the 
double fear of marginalisation and domination. The solution to the quandary 
was to seek security in Alliance diplomacy and portray Norway as a nation with 
an independent foreign-policy role and identity. NATO provided both a safe ref-
27 The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was convened 
in New York in 1973, and ended nine years later with the adoption in 1982 of a 
constitution for the seas – the United Nations on the Law of the Sea Convention 
(LOSC). See Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder 1965–1995, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie [Oil 
Age 1965–1995, Norwegian foreign policy history] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 
pp. 279–290.
28 Johan Jørgen Holst, European Security. A View from the North, NUPI Report, no. 
38 (Oslo: NUPI, 1990), p. 9.
29 Olav Riste, Norway’s foreign relations: a history (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 
p. 287, quoting Holst, former defence minister (Defence Ministry press release, no. 2, 
1993).
uge and a security platform from which Norway could reach out and “engage” 
and generally attempt to nudge things along towards peaceful coexistence in 
the region.30 This urge to balance was grasped by US ambassador to Norway, 
Lithgow Osborn, who as early as 195 foresaw that “[N]orway’s foreign policy 
would (..) be pro British-American as far as they dare, pro Soviet as far as they 
must, and pro UN as far as they can…”31 What made Norway interesting to the 
superpowers at the time was the strategic importance of the oceans, as he who 
dominated the seas off Norway’s coast controlled the maritime approaches to 
and from the Kola Peninsula. This in itself made Norway’s hold over Svalbard 
and general security situation precarious, which was made yet more precarious 
by the USSR’s concerns that the northernmost part of Norway could be used as 
a staging area to attack the Kola region. The Soviet Union developed a policy 
seeking to “deny” any NATO forces the right of presence in the area.32 
To allay some of the Soviet Union’s security concerns, Norway imposed 
on itself a set of national restrictions on Allied use of its territory for military 
purposes and rigid observance of the non-militarisation proviso of the Svalbard 
Treaty. In an exchange of a series of diplomatic notes with the Soviet Union in 
the winter of 199, before Norway’s NATO membership had been formalised, 
Norway reassured the USSR about its intention not to allow NATO bases on 
its territory in times of peace. This intense series of exchanges started with a de-
marche from the Soviet Union’s ambassador on 29 January 199. In its response 
of 1 February, the Norwegian Government declared its intention not to allow 
any foreign powers to establish military bases on its territory unless Norway 
was under attack or threatened by attack, and underlined that Norway did not 
harbour any hostile intentions towards the Soviet Union, nor would it allow the 
use of its territory for any politics of such intent.33 In its response of 5 February, 
the Soviet Union, conceding to the inevitability of Norway’s NATO member-
ship, proposed establishing a bilateral non-aggression pact “in case the Norwe-
gian Government (..) has any doubts about the good neighbourly intentions of 
the Soviet Union towards Norway (..)”3 Norway declined on the grounds that 
the NATO Treaty was predicated on the non-aggression principles enshrined in 
30 Holst, “Lilliputs and Gulliver”, p. 283. 
31 Quoted in Haakon Lie, Skjebneår, 1945–1950 [Years of destiny, 195–1950] (Oslo: 
Tiden, 1985), p. 8.
32 See Kjetil Skogrand, Alliert i krig og fred [Allied in war and peace], Norsk 
forsvarshistorie 190–1970 [Norwegian Defence history], vol.  (Bergen: Eide, 
200), p. 198, and Sven G. Holtsmark, “Norge og Sovjetunionen – bilaterisering og 
fellesstyre” [Norway and the Soviet Union – bilateralisation and condominium] in 
Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk med NATO gjennom 50 år, eds Chris Prebensen and Nils 
Skarland (Oslo: Den norske atlanterhavskomité, 1999).
33 For the full exchange of diplomatic notes, see Holst,         Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk … (II), 
pp 65–72.
3 Ibid, p. 67–69.  
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the United Nations Charter. A bilateral “pact” confirming the two states’ non-
hostile intent against each other was therefore not “needed”.35 This decision was 
an early demarcation of the extent of Norway’s bilateralisation of relations with 
the then Soviet Union, and came in the wake of a condominium initiative for the 
Svalbard archipelago, rather forcefully proposed by Moscow some years ear-
lier. Thus, credible Allied security guarantees combined with a non-threatening 
military posture were encapsulated in a Norwegian security policy that sought 
to balanced deterrence with reassurance towards the USSR.36 This undoubtedly 
made a political virtue out of a geographical reality, but the policy also opened 
up a field of action on which Norway could shape a limited, but distinct, policy 
towards the Soviet Union. 
SMALL STATE REALISM 
A world order based on multilateralism and strong international institutions, 
with a central role accorded to the UN, was what Norway wanted. But moving 
in that direction was only realistic while relying on the US and NATO. The strat-
egy was to work for a rule-based international order while seeking ”protection 
in numbers”.37 On a rhetorical level, the UN was spoken of as the cornerstone 
of Norway’s foreign policy. But in terms of security policy, the real cornerstone 
was trans-Atlantic military security. Nonetheless, Norway persistently resisted 
becoming too deeply entangled in the West’s adversarial politics against the 
Soviet Union, while seeking to keep well clear of neighbouring Soviet Russia’s 
gravitation pull and propensity to politicise, securitise and bilateralise issues. In 
the 1970s, Norway’s policy for the north was in certain ways comparable to the 
Ost-Politik of the Federal Republic of Germany.38 There was a difficult balance 
to strike: deterrence stopping short of provocation, and reassurance not mis-
taken for appeasement.39 Safeguarding the political and economic freedom of 
action was regarded as a prime national interest. By necessity more than virtue, 
small state realism incorporates a fair share of idealism.
Even during the most difficult periods of the Cold War, Norwegian govern-
ments and policymakers were careful to maintain a dialogue and engage with 
the Soviet Union. Realism and engagement continued to exist side by side, al-
though with shifting intensity and changing weight. Norway’s current propen-
sity to engage with Russia is rooted in Norway’s ambition to be a bridge-builder 
35 Ibid, 69–70. 
36 Holst, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk … (I), pp. 31–35.  
37 Holst, European Security, p. 9. 
38 Holst, “Norsk havretts- og nordpolitikk” [Norwegian policy for the Law of the Sea 
and the North], in Norsk utenrikspolitikk [Norwegian Foreign Policy], eds Johan 
Jørgen Holst, Daniel Heradstveid (Oslo: Tano, 1985), pp. 365–366
39 Holst, “Lilliputs and Gulliver”, p. 261.
and facilitator of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union. The realist instinct 
led Norway to seek succour in the NATO Alliance, while minimising the scope 
of bilateralism and making sure that engagement and cooperation were rooted 
in international law or treaties. Thus, Norway’s Foreign Minister Lyng on a visit 
to Moscow in 1966 told Foreign Minister Gromyko that “one look at the globe 
was sufficient to understand” that Norway’s security was tied to the Atlantic 
and the Western sea powers. He then went on to say that Norway sought good 
and peaceful relations with the neighbouring Soviet Union. “These were his two 
main messages.”0 
Realism generally held pragmatic impulses in check, but there were excep-
tions. At a meeting in Moscow in 19 with Foreign Minister Trygve Lie, Soviet 
Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, without any forewarning, demanded a 
full revision of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty.1 He insisted on a return to the pre-
1920 “no state’s land” situation, insisting that Bear Island be ceded to the Soviet 
Union and the Svalbard archipelago placed under a Russo-Norwegian condo-
minium.2 Recognising Svalbard’s strategic significance to the USSR, Norway 
drew up a proposal for a bilateral arrangement with the Soviet Union concern-
ing joint military utilisation of the islands: this was supposed to be a “positive 
contribution to the establishment of peace and security in the world in accord-
ance with the proposals of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.”3 The reply was 
that the arrangement did not go far enough to satisfy the interests of the USSR. 
However, the Soviets did not push the matter; only in 196 was it broached 
again by Molotov. Finally, in 197 the Norwegian parliament rejected the Soviet 
demand. A lesson from this case is that the USSR’s interests in Svalbard were 
first and foremost political, and that pragmatism could have drawn Norway 
into a bilateral reality on Svalbard from which it would have been very difficult 
to withdraw. However, as Trygve Mathisen notes, while the initial Norwegian 
reaction may look “unduly compliant”, it is impossible to tell how Moscow 
would have reacted at that time to a stiffer Norwegian attitude. Since, Norway 
has carefully sought to avoid any bilateralisation of Svalbard issues, or any So-
viet attempts to undermine the Svalbard Treaty. 
Aspects of condominium thinking by the Russians may have been lurk-
ing in the background when in the summer of 1977 Norway was coaxed into 
0 Dagfinn Stenseth, Vitne til historie [Witness to history] (Oslo: Damm, 2001), p. 139.
1 Trygve Lie, Hjemover [Homebound] (Oslo: Tiden, 1958), pp. 155, 156–161: In 
his memoirs, Lie describes how the Soviet demand “[w]as unexpectedly, not to say 
brutally, thrown upon us, between two or three o’clock in the morning.” 
2 Trygve Mathisen, Svalbard in the Changing Arctic (Oslo: Gyldendal, 195), pp. 
6–60, 7.
3 Ibid, p. 51.
 Ibid, p. 53.
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the United Nations Charter. A bilateral “pact” confirming the two states’ non-
hostile intent against each other was therefore not “needed”.35 This decision was 
an early demarcation of the extent of Norway’s bilateralisation of relations with 
the then Soviet Union, and came in the wake of a condominium initiative for the 
Svalbard archipelago, rather forcefully proposed by Moscow some years ear-
lier. Thus, credible Allied security guarantees combined with a non-threatening 
military posture were encapsulated in a Norwegian security policy that sought 
to balanced deterrence with reassurance towards the USSR.36 This undoubtedly 
made a political virtue out of a geographical reality, but the policy also opened 
up a field of action on which Norway could shape a limited, but distinct, policy 
towards the Soviet Union. 
SMALL STATE REALISM 
A world order based on multilateralism and strong international institutions, 
with a central role accorded to the UN, was what Norway wanted. But moving 
in that direction was only realistic while relying on the US and NATO. The strat-
egy was to work for a rule-based international order while seeking ”protection 
in numbers”.37 On a rhetorical level, the UN was spoken of as the cornerstone 
of Norway’s foreign policy. But in terms of security policy, the real cornerstone 
was trans-Atlantic military security. Nonetheless, Norway persistently resisted 
becoming too deeply entangled in the West’s adversarial politics against the 
Soviet Union, while seeking to keep well clear of neighbouring Soviet Russia’s 
gravitation pull and propensity to politicise, securitise and bilateralise issues. In 
the 1970s, Norway’s policy for the north was in certain ways comparable to the 
Ost-Politik of the Federal Republic of Germany.38 There was a difficult balance 
to strike: deterrence stopping short of provocation, and reassurance not mis-
taken for appeasement.39 Safeguarding the political and economic freedom of 
action was regarded as a prime national interest. By necessity more than virtue, 
small state realism incorporates a fair share of idealism.
Even during the most difficult periods of the Cold War, Norwegian govern-
ments and policymakers were careful to maintain a dialogue and engage with 
the Soviet Union. Realism and engagement continued to exist side by side, al-
though with shifting intensity and changing weight. Norway’s current propen-
sity to engage with Russia is rooted in Norway’s ambition to be a bridge-builder 
35 Ibid, 69–70. 
36 Holst, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk … (I), pp. 31–35.  
37 Holst, European Security, p. 9. 
38 Holst, “Norsk havretts- og nordpolitikk” [Norwegian policy for the Law of the Sea 
and the North], in Norsk utenrikspolitikk [Norwegian Foreign Policy], eds Johan 
Jørgen Holst, Daniel Heradstveid (Oslo: Tano, 1985), pp. 365–366
39 Holst, “Lilliputs and Gulliver”, p. 261.
and facilitator of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union. The realist instinct 
led Norway to seek succour in the NATO Alliance, while minimising the scope 
of bilateralism and making sure that engagement and cooperation were rooted 
in international law or treaties. Thus, Norway’s Foreign Minister Lyng on a visit 
to Moscow in 1966 told Foreign Minister Gromyko that “one look at the globe 
was sufficient to understand” that Norway’s security was tied to the Atlantic 
and the Western sea powers. He then went on to say that Norway sought good 
and peaceful relations with the neighbouring Soviet Union. “These were his two 
main messages.”0 
Realism generally held pragmatic impulses in check, but there were excep-
tions. At a meeting in Moscow in 19 with Foreign Minister Trygve Lie, Soviet 
Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, without any forewarning, demanded a 
full revision of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty.1 He insisted on a return to the pre-
1920 “no state’s land” situation, insisting that Bear Island be ceded to the Soviet 
Union and the Svalbard archipelago placed under a Russo-Norwegian condo-
minium.2 Recognising Svalbard’s strategic significance to the USSR, Norway 
drew up a proposal for a bilateral arrangement with the Soviet Union concern-
ing joint military utilisation of the islands: this was supposed to be a “positive 
contribution to the establishment of peace and security in the world in accord-
ance with the proposals of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.”3 The reply was 
that the arrangement did not go far enough to satisfy the interests of the USSR. 
However, the Soviets did not push the matter; only in 196 was it broached 
again by Molotov. Finally, in 197 the Norwegian parliament rejected the Soviet 
demand. A lesson from this case is that the USSR’s interests in Svalbard were 
first and foremost political, and that pragmatism could have drawn Norway 
into a bilateral reality on Svalbard from which it would have been very difficult 
to withdraw. However, as Trygve Mathisen notes, while the initial Norwegian 
reaction may look “unduly compliant”, it is impossible to tell how Moscow 
would have reacted at that time to a stiffer Norwegian attitude. Since, Norway 
has carefully sought to avoid any bilateralisation of Svalbard issues, or any So-
viet attempts to undermine the Svalbard Treaty. 
Aspects of condominium thinking by the Russians may have been lurk-
ing in the background when in the summer of 1977 Norway was coaxed into 
0 Dagfinn Stenseth, Vitne til historie [Witness to history] (Oslo: Damm, 2001), p. 139.
1 Trygve Lie, Hjemover [Homebound] (Oslo: Tiden, 1958), pp. 155, 156–161: In 
his memoirs, Lie describes how the Soviet demand “[w]as unexpectedly, not to say 
brutally, thrown upon us, between two or three o’clock in the morning.” 
2 Trygve Mathisen, Svalbard in the Changing Arctic (Oslo: Gyldendal, 195), pp. 
6–60, 7.
3 Ibid, p. 51.
 Ibid, p. 53.
OF_1_2009_innhold.indd   19 26-02-09   12:14:37
0 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty
negotiating practical regulations for a temporary bilateral regime, instead of 
a proper delimitation of the shelf in the Barents Sea. Norway was then on the 
threshold of declaring a 200-mile exclusionary economic zone. Realising that a 
proper delimitation treaty was still out of reach, Norway wished to settle urgent 
issues concerning the fisheries in the Barents Sea with the Soviet Union before 
establishing the economic zone. In 1978, an intermediate practical arrangement 
for the fisheries in “an adjoining area” in the Barents Sea was reached between 
Norway and the Soviet Union.5 The agreement was not supposed to prejudice 
the outcome of formal negotiations on the delimitation of the Barents Sea shelf. 
It has been renewed annually since 1978. Two other interrelated premises were 
central to the agreement. First, it was based on mutual recognition of the sov-
ereign equality of the two states in the zone. Second, the states were to practice 
their sovereign rights in the zone individually and not jointly, so as not to leave 
the impression of a condominium arrangement. This meant that the jurisdic-
tion within the zone was to be divided by so-called “split jurisdiction” and be 
parallel.6 This was solved by agreeing to desist from policing national fishery 
regulations on the other party’s vessels, and to individually licence and monitor 
third-party fishing vessels. The shape and extension of the zone was debated by 
Norway and Russia. The latter wanted a more extended zone than the former. 
Primarily, Norway wanted it drawn close to the triangular lines of the disputed 
area or, secondarily, that the extensions be symmetrical on each side. Russia 
favoured one full zone in the form of a box, supposedly because this would 
“mask any impression of conflict”.7 In the final compromise, Norway had to 
make concessions to Russia. With the “grey zone” agreement, many felt that 
Norway’s Russia policy had come closer to bilateralisation and a de facto con-
dominium than was advisable, and argued that the negotiators had been guided 
more by pragmatism than political prudence.8
5 Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, Marine management in disputed areas. The case of 
the Barents Sea (London: Routledge, 1992). The agreement was informally named the 
‘Grey Zone Agreement’. The full and formal name of the arrangement is: “Agreement 
on an Interim Practical Arrangement for Fishing in an Adjoining Area in the Barents 
Sea”. Cf. 1978 Overenskomster med fremmede stater [Agreements with Foreign 
States] (36), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway. Translation from Churchill and 
Ulfstein, Marine management …, p. 162.
6 Per Tresselt, “Norsk-sovjetiske forhandlinger om avgrensning av kontinentalsokler 
og økonomiske soner” [Norwegian-Russian negotiations on the delimitation of 
continental shelves and economic zones], Internasjonal politikk, no. 2-3 (1988): 90. 
7 Tamnes, Oljealder …, p. 297.
8 At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, internal criticism was 
harshest. See for instance the former state secretary at the Ministry of Defence, Johan 
Jørgen Holst, who wrote a critical memo: “Grey zones and grey thoughts” in Tamnes, 
Oljealder …, p. 299.
The condominium idea resurfaced when Prime Minister Ryzhkov visited 
Oslo in January 1988. He forwarded a Russian proposal to turn the grey zone 
and the overlapping claims to the shelf into a Norwegian-Soviet zone of confi-
dence: a special economic zone for the joint and equitable exploitation of natu-
ral resources, based on equal shares of investments and revenue. The idea was 
argued in the spirit of Secretary General Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk on 1 
October 1987 about the new perspectives of peaceful cooperation in the north.9 
The special economic zone was meant to “cover both parts of the disputed area 
and undisputed areas of both parties.”50 Norway rejected the proposal, arguing 
that it would not enter into a cooperative arrangement and thus risk sidelining 
the main issue, namely a formal delimitation. This reasoning was linked to the 
policy principle of avoiding condominium situations with the Soviet Union. On 
practical grounds it was argued that such arrangements elsewhere in the world 
had not worked well.51 The High North had no escape from its accidental role 
as a regional security flank. Legal questions concerning the status of ocean areas 
around Svalbard and in the Barents Sea, combined with the promises of future 
large-scale economic activity in the areas, it was feared, would adversely affect 
security.52 Norway generally sought to minimise the politicisation of unsettled 
sovereignty issues by keeping them strictly within the realm of international 
law, where power asymmetries are less influential and the security element less 
overwhelming. Effectively, Norway’s use of international law was a policy of 
de-securitisation. However, the strategy was complicated by the coincidental 
geographical overlap of the bilaterally disputed ocean areas, and the northern 
flank of the global bipolar security divide. 
THE pOLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Security was, thus, an inescapable underlying political factor throughout the 
restructuring of the international Law of the Sea. Discussions about economic 
zones and the extension of the continental shelf have to be understood in light 
of the naval powers’ need for freedom of movement for their warships. With 
the huge build-up of Soviet naval forces in the 1970s, Moscow first became 
interested in the principle of the freedom of the seas as a means of project-
9 Brundtland, “Den nye sovjetiske nordpolitikken …”      
50 Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, p. 68.
51 Ibid.
52 Kim Traavik and Willy Østreng, “Security and Ocean Law: Norway and the Soviet 
Union in the Barents Sea”, Ocean Development and International Law Journal, vol. , 
no.  (1977): 353.
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negotiating practical regulations for a temporary bilateral regime, instead of 
a proper delimitation of the shelf in the Barents Sea. Norway was then on the 
threshold of declaring a 200-mile exclusionary economic zone. Realising that a 
proper delimitation treaty was still out of reach, Norway wished to settle urgent 
issues concerning the fisheries in the Barents Sea with the Soviet Union before 
establishing the economic zone. In 1978, an intermediate practical arrangement 
for the fisheries in “an adjoining area” in the Barents Sea was reached between 
Norway and the Soviet Union.5 The agreement was not supposed to prejudice 
the outcome of formal negotiations on the delimitation of the Barents Sea shelf. 
It has been renewed annually since 1978. Two other interrelated premises were 
central to the agreement. First, it was based on mutual recognition of the sov-
ereign equality of the two states in the zone. Second, the states were to practice 
their sovereign rights in the zone individually and not jointly, so as not to leave 
the impression of a condominium arrangement. This meant that the jurisdic-
tion within the zone was to be divided by so-called “split jurisdiction” and be 
parallel.6 This was solved by agreeing to desist from policing national fishery 
regulations on the other party’s vessels, and to individually licence and monitor 
third-party fishing vessels. The shape and extension of the zone was debated by 
Norway and Russia. The latter wanted a more extended zone than the former. 
Primarily, Norway wanted it drawn close to the triangular lines of the disputed 
area or, secondarily, that the extensions be symmetrical on each side. Russia 
favoured one full zone in the form of a box, supposedly because this would 
“mask any impression of conflict”.7 In the final compromise, Norway had to 
make concessions to Russia. With the “grey zone” agreement, many felt that 
Norway’s Russia policy had come closer to bilateralisation and a de facto con-
dominium than was advisable, and argued that the negotiators had been guided 
more by pragmatism than political prudence.8
5 Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, Marine management in disputed areas. The case of 
the Barents Sea (London: Routledge, 1992). The agreement was informally named the 
‘Grey Zone Agreement’. The full and formal name of the arrangement is: “Agreement 
on an Interim Practical Arrangement for Fishing in an Adjoining Area in the Barents 
Sea”. Cf. 1978 Overenskomster med fremmede stater [Agreements with Foreign 
States] (36), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway. Translation from Churchill and 
Ulfstein, Marine management …, p. 162.
6 Per Tresselt, “Norsk-sovjetiske forhandlinger om avgrensning av kontinentalsokler 
og økonomiske soner” [Norwegian-Russian negotiations on the delimitation of 
continental shelves and economic zones], Internasjonal politikk, no. 2-3 (1988): 90. 
7 Tamnes, Oljealder …, p. 297.
8 At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, internal criticism was 
harshest. See for instance the former state secretary at the Ministry of Defence, Johan 
Jørgen Holst, who wrote a critical memo: “Grey zones and grey thoughts” in Tamnes, 
Oljealder …, p. 299.
The condominium idea resurfaced when Prime Minister Ryzhkov visited 
Oslo in January 1988. He forwarded a Russian proposal to turn the grey zone 
and the overlapping claims to the shelf into a Norwegian-Soviet zone of confi-
dence: a special economic zone for the joint and equitable exploitation of natu-
ral resources, based on equal shares of investments and revenue. The idea was 
argued in the spirit of Secretary General Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk on 1 
October 1987 about the new perspectives of peaceful cooperation in the north.9 
The special economic zone was meant to “cover both parts of the disputed area 
and undisputed areas of both parties.”50 Norway rejected the proposal, arguing 
that it would not enter into a cooperative arrangement and thus risk sidelining 
the main issue, namely a formal delimitation. This reasoning was linked to the 
policy principle of avoiding condominium situations with the Soviet Union. On 
practical grounds it was argued that such arrangements elsewhere in the world 
had not worked well.51 The High North had no escape from its accidental role 
as a regional security flank. Legal questions concerning the status of ocean areas 
around Svalbard and in the Barents Sea, combined with the promises of future 
large-scale economic activity in the areas, it was feared, would adversely affect 
security.52 Norway generally sought to minimise the politicisation of unsettled 
sovereignty issues by keeping them strictly within the realm of international 
law, where power asymmetries are less influential and the security element less 
overwhelming. Effectively, Norway’s use of international law was a policy of 
de-securitisation. However, the strategy was complicated by the coincidental 
geographical overlap of the bilaterally disputed ocean areas, and the northern 
flank of the global bipolar security divide. 
THE pOLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Security was, thus, an inescapable underlying political factor throughout the 
restructuring of the international Law of the Sea. Discussions about economic 
zones and the extension of the continental shelf have to be understood in light 
of the naval powers’ need for freedom of movement for their warships. With 
the huge build-up of Soviet naval forces in the 1970s, Moscow first became 
interested in the principle of the freedom of the seas as a means of project-
9 Brundtland, “Den nye sovjetiske nordpolitikken …”      
50 Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, p. 68.
51 Ibid.
52 Kim Traavik and Willy Østreng, “Security and Ocean Law: Norway and the Soviet 
Union in the Barents Sea”, Ocean Development and International Law Journal, vol. , 
no.  (1977): 353.
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ing sea power.53 In this period, the two superpowers were still dependent on 
bringing their submarine nuclear deterrent through the GIUK narrows.5 The 
combination of the Cold War in the north in the 1970s and uncertainties about 
the development of the new Law of the Sea at the time, gave Norway reason 
not to overplay its hand. From the Norwegian perspective, it was desirable to 
nudge the international Law of the Sea Convention further in the direction it 
was painstakingly taking, and avoid provoking reactions from the great powers, 
in particular the Soviet Union.
It would, however, be misleading to read the development of the Law of 
the Sea as a consequence of security considerations and high politics alone. The 
coastal states, constituting a large, albeit fragmented, group at the UN Confer-
ences of the Law of the Sea, were not without influence.55 And as coastal states, 
Norway and the Soviet Union had overlapping legal interests in the extension 
of the continental shelf and the establishment of exclusionary economic zones. 
A tenet of the Law of the Sea is the right and duty of coastal states to manage 
resources. A core reason for restructuring the international Law of the Sea was 
the need to provide coastal states with the necessary instruments to execute ef-
fective stewardship to deal with the common concern of humankind and avoid 
a “tragedy of the commons”.56 The US wanted to curtail coastal states’ legal 
entitlement to the shelf, and proposed a regime based on international trustee-
ship of the shelf at depths exceeding 200 metres. Had the American line won 
53 W. E. Butler, “Grotius’ Influence in Russia”, in Hugo Grotius and International 
Relations, eds Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (Oxford: 
Clarendon, [1990] 2002), pp. 257–266.
5 On Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom, see John Kristen Skogan and Arne 
Brundtland, eds, Soviet Sea Power in Northern Waters, Studies in Contemporary 
Maritime Policy and Strategy Series (London: Pinter, 1990).
55 On political aspects of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, see J.J. Logue, “The 
Revenge of John Selden: The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Light of 
Hugo Grotius’ Mare Liberum”, Grotiana New Series, vol. 3 (1982), and Logue, “A 
Stubborn Dutchman: The Attempt to Revive Grotius’ Common Property Doctrine in 
and after the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea”, International 
Law and the Grotian Heritage Commemorative colloquium, The Hague on 8 April 
1983 on the occasion of the fourth centenary of the birth of Hugo Grotius (Hague: 
T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 1985); Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. 
The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial 
Lectures (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 512; see Carl August 
Fleischer, “Folkeretten og norsk ressursforvaltning i nord – Norge i geopolitikkens 
brennpunkt” [The Law of the Sea and Norwegian resource management in the North 
– Norway in the focal point of geopolitics], in Svalbard – vårt nordligste Norge 
[Svalbard – our most northern Norway] th ed. (Oslo: Akademiforlaget, 2006) on the 
relationship between international law and power.
56 Wilhelm. G. Grewe, Michael Byers, Epochs of International Law (New York: De 
Gruyter, 2000), pp. 721, 722–725. Carl August Fleischer, “The New International Law 
of the Sea and Svalbard”, paper presented at the Norwegian Academy of Science and         
Letters 150th Anniversary Symposium, 25 January, 2007, p. 1.  
through, the regime for the continental shelf would have looked different today. 
It would have been impossible to argue that the shelf around Svalbard is part 
of Norway’s continuous mainland shelf.57 This serves to explain the apprehen-
sion with which Norway meets attempts to reopen the provisions of the modern 
Law of the Sea. Irrespective of governments in office, the line has consistently 
been that the body of law contained in the Law of the Sea is broadly conceived 
and robust enough to tackle the challenges of security, sovereign rights, territo-
rial delimitation, access to resources, environmental issues and so on. Rather, 
states should concentrate their efforts on how to strengthen enforcement capac-
ity, compliance and political commitment in order to steward ocean areas at the 
level of the standards invoked by the law.58
The question of the delimitation of the Barents Sea shelf was raised be-
fore the formal introduction of exclusionary economic zones in the international 
Law of the Sea. In all probability, the Soviet Union had formulated its overall in-
terests in the Svalbard archipelago and historical claims in the Barents Sea even 
before the maritime zones around Svalbard became an issue.59 One must assume 
that Moscow was early aware of the desirability of connecting the two issues.60 
Developments in the international Law of the Sea may have led approaches to be 
adjusted and legal arguments to be sharpened, but have probably not changed 
the USSR’s and later Russia’s principled positions in fundamental ways. The 
Norwegian impression at the time was that Moscow was determinedly focusing 
on maximising its share of the Barents Sea shelf.61 The law of the 200-mile Ex-
clusive Economic Zone was passed in 1976.62 In the Barents Sea, the economic 
zone overlapped with the then USSR’s zone. In the southern Barents Sea, this 
added to the problem of overlapping claims to the shelf. Negotiations on the 
delimitation of the shelf were still at a very early stage; an informal meeting had 
been held in Oslo in 1970 and the first round of formal negotiations (usually re-
ferred to only as “consultations” to play down expectations) took place in Mos-
57 Fleischer, “Folkeretten og norsk ressursforvaltning …”.      
58 This was also the line taken in response to a recent paper by the European Union High 
Representative and European Commission on “Climate Change and International 
Security”, which suggested the “need to revisit existing rules of international law, 
particularly the Law of the Sea, as regards the resolution of territorial and border 
disputes”, see Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to 
the European Council, S113/08, 1 March 2008, p. . 
59 Re. the Molotov incident in Moscow in 19; referred to in Lie, Hjemover, Mathisen, 
Svalbard in the Changing Arctic, and Holtsmark, “Norge og Sovjetunionen …”
60 Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, pp. 85, 17–153, argue Soviet 
Union/Russian interests in obtaining a comprehensive solution. See also Holst, “ 
Sovjetunionen som faktor …”: 739.
61 Traavik and Østreng, “Security and Ocean Law”: 365, 367.
62 Law on Exclusive Economic Zone, 17 December 1976 (entered into force 1 January 
1977).
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ing sea power.53 In this period, the two superpowers were still dependent on 
bringing their submarine nuclear deterrent through the GIUK narrows.5 The 
combination of the Cold War in the north in the 1970s and uncertainties about 
the development of the new Law of the Sea at the time, gave Norway reason 
not to overplay its hand. From the Norwegian perspective, it was desirable to 
nudge the international Law of the Sea Convention further in the direction it 
was painstakingly taking, and avoid provoking reactions from the great powers, 
in particular the Soviet Union.
It would, however, be misleading to read the development of the Law of 
the Sea as a consequence of security considerations and high politics alone. The 
coastal states, constituting a large, albeit fragmented, group at the UN Confer-
ences of the Law of the Sea, were not without influence.55 And as coastal states, 
Norway and the Soviet Union had overlapping legal interests in the extension 
of the continental shelf and the establishment of exclusionary economic zones. 
A tenet of the Law of the Sea is the right and duty of coastal states to manage 
resources. A core reason for restructuring the international Law of the Sea was 
the need to provide coastal states with the necessary instruments to execute ef-
fective stewardship to deal with the common concern of humankind and avoid 
a “tragedy of the commons”.56 The US wanted to curtail coastal states’ legal 
entitlement to the shelf, and proposed a regime based on international trustee-
ship of the shelf at depths exceeding 200 metres. Had the American line won 
53 W. E. Butler, “Grotius’ Influence in Russia”, in Hugo Grotius and International 
Relations, eds Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (Oxford: 
Clarendon, [1990] 2002), pp. 257–266.
5 On Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom, see John Kristen Skogan and Arne 
Brundtland, eds, Soviet Sea Power in Northern Waters, Studies in Contemporary 
Maritime Policy and Strategy Series (London: Pinter, 1990).
55 On political aspects of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, see J.J. Logue, “The 
Revenge of John Selden: The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Light of 
Hugo Grotius’ Mare Liberum”, Grotiana New Series, vol. 3 (1982), and Logue, “A 
Stubborn Dutchman: The Attempt to Revive Grotius’ Common Property Doctrine in 
and after the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea”, International 
Law and the Grotian Heritage Commemorative colloquium, The Hague on 8 April 
1983 on the occasion of the fourth centenary of the birth of Hugo Grotius (Hague: 
T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 1985); Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. 
The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial 
Lectures (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 512; see Carl August 
Fleischer, “Folkeretten og norsk ressursforvaltning i nord – Norge i geopolitikkens 
brennpunkt” [The Law of the Sea and Norwegian resource management in the North 
– Norway in the focal point of geopolitics], in Svalbard – vårt nordligste Norge 
[Svalbard – our most northern Norway] th ed. (Oslo: Akademiforlaget, 2006) on the 
relationship between international law and power.
56 Wilhelm. G. Grewe, Michael Byers, Epochs of International Law (New York: De 
Gruyter, 2000), pp. 721, 722–725. Carl August Fleischer, “The New International Law 
of the Sea and Svalbard”, paper presented at the Norwegian Academy of Science and         
Letters 150th Anniversary Symposium, 25 January, 2007, p. 1.  
through, the regime for the continental shelf would have looked different today. 
It would have been impossible to argue that the shelf around Svalbard is part 
of Norway’s continuous mainland shelf.57 This serves to explain the apprehen-
sion with which Norway meets attempts to reopen the provisions of the modern 
Law of the Sea. Irrespective of governments in office, the line has consistently 
been that the body of law contained in the Law of the Sea is broadly conceived 
and robust enough to tackle the challenges of security, sovereign rights, territo-
rial delimitation, access to resources, environmental issues and so on. Rather, 
states should concentrate their efforts on how to strengthen enforcement capac-
ity, compliance and political commitment in order to steward ocean areas at the 
level of the standards invoked by the law.58
The question of the delimitation of the Barents Sea shelf was raised be-
fore the formal introduction of exclusionary economic zones in the international 
Law of the Sea. In all probability, the Soviet Union had formulated its overall in-
terests in the Svalbard archipelago and historical claims in the Barents Sea even 
before the maritime zones around Svalbard became an issue.59 One must assume 
that Moscow was early aware of the desirability of connecting the two issues.60 
Developments in the international Law of the Sea may have led approaches to be 
adjusted and legal arguments to be sharpened, but have probably not changed 
the USSR’s and later Russia’s principled positions in fundamental ways. The 
Norwegian impression at the time was that Moscow was determinedly focusing 
on maximising its share of the Barents Sea shelf.61 The law of the 200-mile Ex-
clusive Economic Zone was passed in 1976.62 In the Barents Sea, the economic 
zone overlapped with the then USSR’s zone. In the southern Barents Sea, this 
added to the problem of overlapping claims to the shelf. Negotiations on the 
delimitation of the shelf were still at a very early stage; an informal meeting had 
been held in Oslo in 1970 and the first round of formal negotiations (usually re-
ferred to only as “consultations” to play down expectations) took place in Mos-
57 Fleischer, “Folkeretten og norsk ressursforvaltning …”.      
58 This was also the line taken in response to a recent paper by the European Union High 
Representative and European Commission on “Climate Change and International 
Security”, which suggested the “need to revisit existing rules of international law, 
particularly the Law of the Sea, as regards the resolution of territorial and border 
disputes”, see Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to 
the European Council, S113/08, 1 March 2008, p. . 
59 Re. the Molotov incident in Moscow in 19; referred to in Lie, Hjemover, Mathisen, 
Svalbard in the Changing Arctic, and Holtsmark, “Norge og Sovjetunionen …”
60 Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, pp. 85, 17–153, argue Soviet 
Union/Russian interests in obtaining a comprehensive solution. See also Holst, “ 
Sovjetunionen som faktor …”: 739.
61 Traavik and Østreng, “Security and Ocean Law”: 365, 367.
62 Law on Exclusive Economic Zone, 17 December 1976 (entered into force 1 January 
1977).
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cow only in 197.63 In principle similar to the economic zone, a fisheries zone 
was established around the island of Jan Mayen and a protection zone around 
the Svalbard archipelago (the Fisheries Protection Zone). All in all, the zones 
cover some 2.2 million square kilometres, almost seven times the area of main-
land Norway. These are vast areas to control and in which to exercise author-
ity for a small nation. Under international law, Norway is accorded rights and 
responsibilities with regard to jurisdiction over the resources in the zones. If the 
newly acquired jurisdiction were not credibly enforced, Norway’s legal claims 
could be weakened. If enforced without delicate regard for the USSR’s inter-
ests, Norway’s security situation could be negatively affected. In turn, this could 
weaken the political foundation for Norway’s claims. Norway’s way around the 
dilemma was to establish a non-discriminatory regime for the Fisheries Protec-
tion Zone around Svalbard, comparable to the regime invoked by the Svalbard 
Treaty itself.6 What was political prudence to some, looked like legal folly to 
others. Critics of the Fisheries Protection Zone speak of it as an economic zone 
that dare not say its name, or as an “illegitimate child of the Exclusive Economic 
Zone”.65 Their point is that Norway has painted itself into a corner. What once 
seemed, and probably was, a good idea has irrevocably brought challenges of its 
own. By seeking security in pragmatism, Norway limited its own range of politi-
cal options in the High North, but also managed to constrain Russia’s. 
Norway’s preference for international law to guide relations in the High 
North was essentially a political choice. It testifies to the political nature of the 
development of the modern Law of the Sea, and to what Reus-Smit calls the “two 
faces” of the politics of international law: while politics informs and disciplines 
law, law is also constitutive of politics.66 The end of the Cold War altered the ex-
ternal security setting, but has not really brought the bilateral delimitation issue 
and the questions of the status of the maritime areas around Svalbard any closer 
to resolution. As early as 1987, Gorbachev had in the unprecedented “Mur-
mansk Speech” suggested wide-ranging measures, including security ones, with 
a view to closer relations and confidence-building in the north.67 A main reason 
63 Cf. Tresselt, “Norsk-sovjetiske forhandlinger …”. In 1967 Norway first proposed          
starting negotiations on delimitation of the shelf (pp. 77–79).
6 MFA, “Svalbard and the Surrounding Maritime Areas. Background and legal issues 
– Frequently asked questions” by Rolf Einar Fife (Director General, Legal Affairs 
Department), High North Study Tour, 2007, p 23.
65 Quote from Ivan Kristoffersen, “Skrått blikk” [A sideways view], presentation at the 
2006 Sea Power Seminar no. 10, Ulvik, 31 August–2 September 2006.
66 On the two faces of international law, see Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International 
Law”, pp. 1, 23.
67 The Soviet invitation to broader international cooperation in the North was part 
of Gorbachev’s “New Political Thinking”, see Brundtland, “Den nye sovjetiske 
nordpolitikken …”
for this was Moscow’s gradual acceptance of a compromise boundary, running 
somewhere between the Soviet Union’s sector line position and Norway’s equi-
distant, or median line, position.68 This turn of events was by no means evident, 
and initially only applied to the northernmost part of the disputed areas. It did 
not initially include the middle and southern parts, the latter being the most 
valuable from a resource perspective. For a brief period, new momentum was 
brought to the negotiations. By 1992, however, it was exhausted. There was a 
lull from 1993 to 1996,69 largely coinciding with the considerable trials Russia 
was undergoing in this period of painful changes, accompanied by its increasing 
sense of being a weakened great power. 
Continuity and change
With the demise of the Soviet Union, Norway saw an opportunity for the small-
er state to play a bigger role. During a parliamentary foreign-policy hearing in 
1989, Norway’s foreign minister voiced the Government’s intention to seize the 
political initiative in the north: 
By the beginning of 1989 we will face a greater chance than before of build-
ing international confidence and reducing disagreement. It is of our foremost 
responsibilities to assist in making a reality of this possibility. (...) Experiences 
advocate prudence, but not passivity. (...) Foreign policy is today less a question 
of relations between states than of how states relate to common opportunities 
and problems. (...) Old contentions have not vanished, but many have receded 
into the background. New contentions may arise. But the gravest danger lies in 
not seizing this opportunity to give events a push in the right direction. (...) Our 
main contribution to the development of greater confidence and security in East-
West relations is through our policy for the northern areas.70 
These still preliminary ideas were later developed in the 1989 parliamentary 
foreign-policy report.71 Many and complex trends in international society were 
68 According to Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, a Soviet official had 
secretly come to Norway in December 1988 to inform the Norwegian Government 
that the Soviet Union was “willing to accept a modified version of the sector line as the 
boundary in the northernmost part of the disputed area.” (p. 68).
69 Tresselt, “Norsk-sovjetiske forhandlinger…” 
70 Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg 13 January 1989, foreign policy hearing at the 
Storting, Forhandlinger i Stortinget nr. 150 (pp. 2233–223), quote pp. 2233–2235. 
(Author’s emph. and transl.) 
71 Riste, Norway’s foreign relations, p. 288: “[A] major report to the Storting which is 
sometimes referred to as ‘the bible’ of Norwegian foreign policy.”
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cow only in 197.63 In principle similar to the economic zone, a fisheries zone 
was established around the island of Jan Mayen and a protection zone around 
the Svalbard archipelago (the Fisheries Protection Zone). All in all, the zones 
cover some 2.2 million square kilometres, almost seven times the area of main-
land Norway. These are vast areas to control and in which to exercise author-
ity for a small nation. Under international law, Norway is accorded rights and 
responsibilities with regard to jurisdiction over the resources in the zones. If the 
newly acquired jurisdiction were not credibly enforced, Norway’s legal claims 
could be weakened. If enforced without delicate regard for the USSR’s inter-
ests, Norway’s security situation could be negatively affected. In turn, this could 
weaken the political foundation for Norway’s claims. Norway’s way around the 
dilemma was to establish a non-discriminatory regime for the Fisheries Protec-
tion Zone around Svalbard, comparable to the regime invoked by the Svalbard 
Treaty itself.6 What was political prudence to some, looked like legal folly to 
others. Critics of the Fisheries Protection Zone speak of it as an economic zone 
that dare not say its name, or as an “illegitimate child of the Exclusive Economic 
Zone”.65 Their point is that Norway has painted itself into a corner. What once 
seemed, and probably was, a good idea has irrevocably brought challenges of its 
own. By seeking security in pragmatism, Norway limited its own range of politi-
cal options in the High North, but also managed to constrain Russia’s. 
Norway’s preference for international law to guide relations in the High 
North was essentially a political choice. It testifies to the political nature of the 
development of the modern Law of the Sea, and to what Reus-Smit calls the “two 
faces” of the politics of international law: while politics informs and disciplines 
law, law is also constitutive of politics.66 The end of the Cold War altered the ex-
ternal security setting, but has not really brought the bilateral delimitation issue 
and the questions of the status of the maritime areas around Svalbard any closer 
to resolution. As early as 1987, Gorbachev had in the unprecedented “Mur-
mansk Speech” suggested wide-ranging measures, including security ones, with 
a view to closer relations and confidence-building in the north.67 A main reason 
63 Cf. Tresselt, “Norsk-sovjetiske forhandlinger …”. In 1967 Norway first proposed          
starting negotiations on delimitation of the shelf (pp. 77–79).
6 MFA, “Svalbard and the Surrounding Maritime Areas. Background and legal issues 
– Frequently asked questions” by Rolf Einar Fife (Director General, Legal Affairs 
Department), High North Study Tour, 2007, p 23.
65 Quote from Ivan Kristoffersen, “Skrått blikk” [A sideways view], presentation at the 
2006 Sea Power Seminar no. 10, Ulvik, 31 August–2 September 2006.
66 On the two faces of international law, see Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International 
Law”, pp. 1, 23.
67 The Soviet invitation to broader international cooperation in the North was part 
of Gorbachev’s “New Political Thinking”, see Brundtland, “Den nye sovjetiske 
nordpolitikken …”
for this was Moscow’s gradual acceptance of a compromise boundary, running 
somewhere between the Soviet Union’s sector line position and Norway’s equi-
distant, or median line, position.68 This turn of events was by no means evident, 
and initially only applied to the northernmost part of the disputed areas. It did 
not initially include the middle and southern parts, the latter being the most 
valuable from a resource perspective. For a brief period, new momentum was 
brought to the negotiations. By 1992, however, it was exhausted. There was a 
lull from 1993 to 1996,69 largely coinciding with the considerable trials Russia 
was undergoing in this period of painful changes, accompanied by its increasing 
sense of being a weakened great power. 
Continuity and change
With the demise of the Soviet Union, Norway saw an opportunity for the small-
er state to play a bigger role. During a parliamentary foreign-policy hearing in 
1989, Norway’s foreign minister voiced the Government’s intention to seize the 
political initiative in the north: 
By the beginning of 1989 we will face a greater chance than before of build-
ing international confidence and reducing disagreement. It is of our foremost 
responsibilities to assist in making a reality of this possibility. (...) Experiences 
advocate prudence, but not passivity. (...) Foreign policy is today less a question 
of relations between states than of how states relate to common opportunities 
and problems. (...) Old contentions have not vanished, but many have receded 
into the background. New contentions may arise. But the gravest danger lies in 
not seizing this opportunity to give events a push in the right direction. (...) Our 
main contribution to the development of greater confidence and security in East-
West relations is through our policy for the northern areas.70 
These still preliminary ideas were later developed in the 1989 parliamentary 
foreign-policy report.71 Many and complex trends in international society were 
68 According to Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, a Soviet official had 
secretly come to Norway in December 1988 to inform the Norwegian Government 
that the Soviet Union was “willing to accept a modified version of the sector line as the 
boundary in the northernmost part of the disputed area.” (p. 68).
69 Tresselt, “Norsk-sovjetiske forhandlinger…” 
70 Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg 13 January 1989, foreign policy hearing at the 
Storting, Forhandlinger i Stortinget nr. 150 (pp. 2233–223), quote pp. 2233–2235. 
(Author’s emph. and transl.) 
71 Riste, Norway’s foreign relations, p. 288: “[A] major report to the Storting which is 
sometimes referred to as ‘the bible’ of Norwegian foreign policy.”
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identified, described and analysed with a view to determining the consequences 
for Norwegian foreign policy. 72 The main question was how to profit regionally 
from the new and favourable security conditions, and to initiate a policy that 
would prevent re-securitisation. It was recognised at the time that it was not the 
strength, but rather the weakness of Russia that was the challenge to regional 
security. In 1993, Norway seized the core elements of Gorbachev’s initiative 
in Murmansk five years earlier and launched the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, 
fashioned after the Baltic Sea State Cooperation agreement. Institution-building 
across Europe’s northern states became the answer to the problem of handling 
Russia in the region, and gave rise to romanticised sentiments such as the “Bar-
ents spirit”73 and “Baltic feeling”.7 Essentially, security was the main reason 
for cooperating on other issues: the idea was to work on minor issues of mu-
tual concern and handle security “by crowding it out”.75 It soon became clear 
that there were in fact many challenging issues to work on, many of which are 
revisited in Norway’s High North Strategy.76 Nonetheless, even if cooperation 
through regionalisation were, ever so indirectly, expected to facilitate resolving 
outstanding sovereignty issues, hopes have been disillusioned. 
A Norwegian foreign minister in the 1970s summed up Norway’s policy 
for the North in three main points: to win recognition and support for Norway’s 
interpretations of international law with regard to the status of ocean areas, the 
shelf and Svalbard; continued low political and security tension in the north; and 
build the policy for the North on a platform of national political unity.77 Just 
over thirty years later, these goals still guide Norway’s policy for the North. The 
political and security situation has advanced considerably, but is still a concern. 
As to international recognition of Norway’s legal claims to the maritime zones 
around Svalbard and the delimitation of the Barents Sea shelf, the situation 
is largely unaltered. Norway’s interests in sovereign rights provide the current 
High North policy with distinct continuity. The same applies to the underlying 
72 Foreign Policy Report No. 11 to the Storting (St.meld. 11, 1989–90), 11 August 1989: 
“On development trends in the international society and their effects on Norwegian 
foreign policy.” Riste, Norway’s foreign relations, p. 288.
73 Jon Mikal Kvistad, The Barents spirit: A bridge-building project in the wake of the 
cold war, Forsvarsstudier, no. 2 (Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1995).
7 Mare Kukk, Sverre Jervell and Pertti Joenniemi eds, The Baltic Sea Area – A region in 
the making (Oslo: Europa-programmet; Karlskrona: The Baltic Institute, 1992).
75 Ole Wæver, “The Baltic Sea: A Region after Post-Modernity?” in Neo-Nationalism 
or Regionality. The Restructuring of Political Space around the Baltic Rim, ed. Pertti 
Joenniemi, NordREFO, no. 5 (Stockholm: NordREFO, 1997), p. 309. 
76 An assessment of this policy, some fifteen years after 1989, is summed up in the Report 
to the Storting of April 2005: Foreign Policy Report no. 30 (200-2005), 15 April 
2005. 
77 Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund, referred in Brundtland, “Den nye sovjetiske          
nordpolitikken …”: 130.
acknowledgement that Norway’s interests in the High North cannot be fully 
satisfied unless there is a considerable degree of cooperation with Russia. A 
page has been turned in regional relations in the north. More than four decades 
of hostility have been followed by nearly twenty years of increased cooperation 
and Western rapprochement with Russia. The Nordic states have joined forces 
in an attempt to make Russia depart from power relations and turn to regional 
integration. For Norway, two challenges remain unresolved: first, that of shap-
ing the new bilateral relations with Russia now that the traditional security 
perspective no longer provides the overlaying framework; second, how to work 
with Russia with a view to settling issues over sovereignty, while in parallel 
working internationally for recognition of Norway’s legal views. 
The most difficult issues affect the interests of Norway’s Western partners 
too. It is conceivable that international sympathy for Norway’s views may abate 
over time. This acknowledgement was an important premise for the renewed 
Norwegian focus on the High North. It was feared that Norway’s claims of sov-
ereign rights in the north would be weakened in step with the amelioration of 
Western countries’ relations with Russia, in particular as a result of the quickly 
developing energy interdependence between Russia and the United States. At 
the turn of the millennium, the spectre of marginalisation in the north again 
seemed to be looming. When the Norwegian High North Strategy was eventu-
ally formulated, the international tide had again turned. Russia’s relations with 
the US and the EU are yet again strained. This may be helpful for Norway in 
some respects, but also complicate matters. One year before Russia planted its 
flag on the seabed of the North Pole, Norway’s prime minister, Jens Stoltenberg, 
at the formal launching of the High North Strategy, boasted that “Norway [was] 
growing bigger in the High North”.78 Both, mainly symbolic, gestures demon-
strate how exclusionary aspects of sovereignty still hold sway in the politics of 
international law. Nevertheless, there is a growing sense of urgency with regard 
to finding new solutions to the new resource-related interdependencies in the 
Arctic region. Great powers, however, are disposed to viewing notions of over-
riding shared interests with apprehension, as a Trojan horse, when such ideas 
stem from ideationally inclined smaller states. 
78 MFA, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy”.
OF_1_2009_innhold.indd   26 26-02-09   12:14:39
OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty 71/2009 NOr�e�IaN fOreI�N �O�Icy IN t�e �I�� NOrt�      
identified, described and analysed with a view to determining the consequences 
for Norwegian foreign policy. 72 The main question was how to profit regionally 
from the new and favourable security conditions, and to initiate a policy that 
would prevent re-securitisation. It was recognised at the time that it was not the 
strength, but rather the weakness of Russia that was the challenge to regional 
security. In 1993, Norway seized the core elements of Gorbachev’s initiative 
in Murmansk five years earlier and launched the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, 
fashioned after the Baltic Sea State Cooperation agreement. Institution-building 
across Europe’s northern states became the answer to the problem of handling 
Russia in the region, and gave rise to romanticised sentiments such as the “Bar-
ents spirit”73 and “Baltic feeling”.7 Essentially, security was the main reason 
for cooperating on other issues: the idea was to work on minor issues of mu-
tual concern and handle security “by crowding it out”.75 It soon became clear 
that there were in fact many challenging issues to work on, many of which are 
revisited in Norway’s High North Strategy.76 Nonetheless, even if cooperation 
through regionalisation were, ever so indirectly, expected to facilitate resolving 
outstanding sovereignty issues, hopes have been disillusioned. 
A Norwegian foreign minister in the 1970s summed up Norway’s policy 
for the North in three main points: to win recognition and support for Norway’s 
interpretations of international law with regard to the status of ocean areas, the 
shelf and Svalbard; continued low political and security tension in the north; and 
build the policy for the North on a platform of national political unity.77 Just 
over thirty years later, these goals still guide Norway’s policy for the North. The 
political and security situation has advanced considerably, but is still a concern. 
As to international recognition of Norway’s legal claims to the maritime zones 
around Svalbard and the delimitation of the Barents Sea shelf, the situation 
is largely unaltered. Norway’s interests in sovereign rights provide the current 
High North policy with distinct continuity. The same applies to the underlying 
72 Foreign Policy Report No. 11 to the Storting (St.meld. 11, 1989–90), 11 August 1989: 
“On development trends in the international society and their effects on Norwegian 
foreign policy.” Riste, Norway’s foreign relations, p. 288.
73 Jon Mikal Kvistad, The Barents spirit: A bridge-building project in the wake of the 
cold war, Forsvarsstudier, no. 2 (Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1995).
7 Mare Kukk, Sverre Jervell and Pertti Joenniemi eds, The Baltic Sea Area – A region in 
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NEW pOLICy – OR AN OLD pOLICy FOR A NEW ERA?
The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy is an enabling framework, 
a way to further Norway’s interests in the north. In his foreword to the strat-
egy, the prime minister uses the key words presence, activity and knowledge 
to capture its purpose as well as method. Ambitions are high:. “[T]his is more 
than just foreign policy, and more than just domestic policy” – and the govern-
ment shall act as “prime mover and facilitator”.79 The strategy has two external 
orientations: to establish an international dialogue about the opportunities and 
challenges of the region, and to strengthen relations with Russia. The aim of the 
latter is twofold; to deal more effectively with Russia on pressing economic is-
sues in the North, and, in so doing, to overhaul and infuse the bilateral political 
agenda with more substance. A “new dimension of Norwegian foreign policy” 
has opened:80 yet the strategy’s main goals have a familiar ring; 
exercise authority in the High North in a credible, consistent and predict-
able way
be at the forefront of international efforts to develop knowledge in and 
about the High North
be the best steward of the environment and natural resources in the High 
North
provide a suitable framework for the further development of petroleum ac-
tivities in the Barents Sea
strengthen cooperation with Russia.81
Declared as interest-based, the new Norwegian foreign policy heralds a more 
assertive and coherent approach to issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction in the 
ocean areas of the North. It undoubtedly seeks to engage Russia in practical co-
operation, in particular in petroleum development at sea and on land. The tacit 
implication is that success in energy cooperation and a general strengthening 
of relations with Russia may help in making headway on difficult questions of 
sovereignty. This would certainly serve Norway’s overall security interests too. 
Possibly, the “new” dimension lies less in the formulations of interest per se, and 
79 MFA, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy”, pp. 3–.
80 Ibid, part 1, p. 5.
81 Two other goals pertain to indigenous peoples and people-to-people-cooperation, ibid, 
pp. 6–7.
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more in the adoption of new strategic approaches to achieve them. A way of as-
sessing this further is by tracing the policy from its naissance to formulation. 
Crafting the new policy 
By attempting to make practical policy out of a post-modern notion of shared 
understanding and values, in a region that has only recently emerged from a 
strained security situation, the High North policy could break new ground and, 
perhaps, old paradigms. In the following, I shall relate the main content of de-
velopments leading up to the formulation of the policy – how issues were defined 
and policy crafted. The feeling of a lack of direction and that something needed 
to be done in the North had emerged before the turn of the millennium, but the 
defining policy moments came in 2002−05. 
THE STARTING pOINT – THE ORHEIM COMMISSION
In March 2003, the Bondevik II Government asked the Orheim Commission to 
assess the opportunities and challenges of the High North and make policy rec-
ommendations. The resulting white paper made the overall claim that national 
and international perceptions of the High North were changing rapidly.82 Not 
only were new opportunities emerging, but they needed to be seized urgently; 
otherwise Norway would lose out on its interests. The report concluded that 
Norway’s main challenge was to reposition itself within a new emerging con-
stellation of powers, interests and processes, in a context in which reliance on 
traditional alliances could prove difficult.83 
Developing its argument on the premise of increasing international inter-
est in the petroleum resources of the north, the Orheim Commission called for 
a comprehensive policy for the North. The commission advocated more atten-
tion to business development, sustainable resource management, research and 
higher education, and public administration. Better coordination was needed. 
Considerable budget allocations were proposed through an ambitious public-
private financing scheme. The commission’s vision was for Norway to place the 
High North at the vanguard of sustainable development; make the ocean areas 
a place where respect for culture and nature should inspire industrial innovation 
82 NOU 2003: 32, “Mot Nord�� Utfordringer og muligheter i nordområdene” [To the            
North�� Challenges and opportunities in the High North], White Book to the Ministry            
of Foreign Affairs, 8 December 2003 
83 NOU 2003: 32, pp. 9–11. 
and cooperation among nations.8 Their proposed way forward was through the 
active exploitation of natural resources, forward-leaning foreign policy-making 
and strict environmental standards and regulations. 
One of the commission’s key proposals was to conclude a comprehensive 
agreement on the Barents Sea with Russia. The agreement could be open-ended 
as to participation, but would have to build on an early conclusion of the Bar-
ents Sea shelf delimitation negotiations. Settling this issue was, according to 
the commission, the single most important problem that needed to be resolved 
to develop cooperation based on mutual commitments with Russia in the Bar-
ents Sea. With this in mind, they proposed the bilateral Barents Sea Agreement. 
The idea was to stimulate practical cooperation in several areas, stopping short 
only of joint jurisdiction. This agreement could build on the overall successful 
bilateral cooperation within fish resource management and be extended to in-
clude the petroleum industry, exchange programmes within research and higher 
education, and the development of environmental standards and monitoring 
systems. Concrete proposals to invite Russia to join the civilian sea traffic moni-
toring centre in Vardø and the “Barents Sea on-screen” project have since been 
initiated. 
As to multilateral frameworks, the commission advised directing more at-
tention to the Arctic Council. It was mindful that NATO could still play a role 
in the High North, and clearly saw the EU as an emerging actor in the region. 
But in both cases the commission considered that the trans-Atlantic and Euro-
pean structures were only of limited use to Norway’s causes, since individual 
partners and allies had reservations about Norway’s positions on sovereignty is-
sues regarding Svalbard. Moreover, the commission was apprehensive about the 
closer energy relations between the US, European countries and Russia and the 
consequences this might have for Norway’s future political field of action in the 
North. Their remedy was for Norway to compensate by developing closer bilat-
eral relations with Russia itself. Finally, the commission was split as to Barents 
Region cooperation, with only a minority awarding it a future significant role in 
the political development vis-à-vis Russia in the North. Cooperation with Russia 
had always been most successful when bilateral, the majority of the commission 
concluded.85 This marked a departure from the prevailing trend of packing bi-
lateral interests into multilateral frameworks and of letting security and military 
considerations define Norway’s room for manoeuvre in the North. Thus, this 
8 Olav Orheim, “Nye utfordringer og muligheter i nordområdene” [New challenges 
and opportunities in the northern areas], printed résumé, Oslo Military Society, 23 
February 200, p. 2.
85 Ibid, p. 3.
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conclusion came to reflect the one dimension lacking in Orheim Commission’s 
report: that of security policy. The commission settled on the “Barents agree-
ment” with Russia as the mainstay of its policy initiative for the North, based on 
a premise that has still not materialised: that of a delimitation settlement. 
The national security debate – Relevant Force 
The new Strategic Concept of the Norwegian Armed Forces (2005–2008) called 
attention to the changing nature of military security in the north.86 Its point 
of departure was that Norway’s security in the future had to be obtained in 
new ways and through greater participation in international frameworks. It 
thus sought to clarify the interlinkages between regional and global dimensions 
of Norwegian security. It argued that the distinction between national and in-
ternational security was diffuse, and that the national security focus needed 
to widen and encompass global challenges as well. Increased interdependence 
between states and regions, and between hard and soft security, necessitated a 
more comprehensive view of the referent objects of security: namely the state, 
society and the individual. The concept held that the new security environment 
was characterised by “seamless transitions between the national and the interna-
tional levels, and between peace, crisis, armed conflict and war”.87 The practical 
consequence of this was that Norwegian defence and security policy needed to 
aim beyond national defence narrowly defined, and engage more strategically at 
the international level. 
The strategic concept contributed to an ongoing national debate about 
the inter-connectedness of regional and global security. But it was criticised for 
failing to address in more detail how military power in times of peace might 
translate into political influence and enhance regional stability, with Norway’s 
changing security needs in the north particularly in mind.88 The general thrust of 
the strategic concept was, however, to argue in favour of the already ongoing re-
orientation of Norway’s defence structure. Focus was shifted from the specified 
threat of invasion in the north towards an unspecified threat emanating from 
international terrorism or intrastate/interstate conflicts somewhere distant. This 
gave further momentum to an ongoing domestic debate about how to prioritise 
the dwindling resources of the Norwegian armed forces, which had already em-
86 Relevant Force, Ministry of Defence, October 200.
87 Ibid, p. 26, para. 6.    
88 See Jacob Børresen,   Forsvar uten trussel. Det norske forsvarets rolle og funksjon etter 
den kalde krigen [Defence without threat. The role and function of the Norwegian       
Armed Forces since the Cold War] (Oslo: Abstrakt, 2005), pp. 33–37.
barked on far-reaching reforms and significant spending cuts. By advocating the 
need for less defence infrastructure and force presence in Northern Norway, the 
concept was seemingly out of step with general political sentiments and at odds 
with the political thrust of the Orheim Commission. A sense that the concept 
was neglecting to consider a northern security policy dimension for Norway also 
led to further criticism and debate. 
MFA report: Opportunities and Challenges in the North
Based on the work of the Orheim Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) prepared its own report on behalf of the government for parliament (Re-
port to the Storting).89 In the report, the two external orientations (i.e. “pillars”) 
of the future High North policy are clearly stated: first, establish High North 
dialogues with Western partners and allies; second, further develop bilateral 
cooperation with Russia. Although the first pillar does not, as such, exclude 
multilateral approaches, it is first and foremost bilateral dialogues the foreign 
ministry has in mind. The report states clearly that in practical policy, combin-
ing individual High North dialogues with developing relations with Russia will 
be challenging.90 It thus recognises a tension between the two pillars. By exten-
sion, a similar tension is incorporated into the High North policy itself.
Rejecting the majority view of the Orheim Commission, the Bondevik II 
government concluded that the Barents Region Cooperation could indeed play 
an important role in the High North policy. The Government stated that it in-
tended to evaluate, strengthen and increase the effectiveness of the Barents co-
operation. This continued emphasis on regional multilateralisation in the North 
was in all evidence predicated on more prudent considerations than those of the 
Orheim Commission as to what it is realistic to achieve bilaterally with Russia. 
The “new” High North policy was to be coordinated under the aegis of the for-
eign ministry, one of whose state secretaries would be assigned this task. More-
over, the ministry would establish and head an inter-ministerial working group 
on the High North. In addition, the Government would appoint a national ex-
pert commission. Apart from these measures, what was listed in the report was 
largely a rewriting of what was already being done or in planning.91 Thus, in 
terms of “measures and solutions”, the report did not really bring about much 
89 Report to the Storting no. 30 (200-2005), author’s transl.
90 Ibid, p. 33.
91 Ibid, pp. 8–9, 10–21.
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conclusion came to reflect the one dimension lacking in Orheim Commission’s 
report: that of security policy. The commission settled on the “Barents agree-
ment” with Russia as the mainstay of its policy initiative for the North, based on 
a premise that has still not materialised: that of a delimitation settlement. 
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to widen and encompass global challenges as well. Increased interdependence 
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more comprehensive view of the referent objects of security: namely the state, 
society and the individual. The concept held that the new security environment 
was characterised by “seamless transitions between the national and the interna-
tional levels, and between peace, crisis, armed conflict and war”.87 The practical 
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gave further momentum to an ongoing domestic debate about how to prioritise 
the dwindling resources of the Norwegian armed forces, which had already em-
86 Relevant Force, Ministry of Defence, October 200.
87 Ibid, p. 26, para. 6.    
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barked on far-reaching reforms and significant spending cuts. By advocating the 
need for less defence infrastructure and force presence in Northern Norway, the 
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with the political thrust of the Orheim Commission. A sense that the concept 
was neglecting to consider a northern security policy dimension for Norway also 
led to further criticism and debate. 
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(MFA) prepared its own report on behalf of the government for parliament (Re-
port to the Storting).89 In the report, the two external orientations (i.e. “pillars”) 
of the future High North policy are clearly stated: first, establish High North 
dialogues with Western partners and allies; second, further develop bilateral 
cooperation with Russia. Although the first pillar does not, as such, exclude 
multilateral approaches, it is first and foremost bilateral dialogues the foreign 
ministry has in mind. The report states clearly that in practical policy, combin-
ing individual High North dialogues with developing relations with Russia will 
be challenging.90 It thus recognises a tension between the two pillars. By exten-
sion, a similar tension is incorporated into the High North policy itself.
Rejecting the majority view of the Orheim Commission, the Bondevik II 
government concluded that the Barents Region Cooperation could indeed play 
an important role in the High North policy. The Government stated that it in-
tended to evaluate, strengthen and increase the effectiveness of the Barents co-
operation. This continued emphasis on regional multilateralisation in the North 
was in all evidence predicated on more prudent considerations than those of the 
Orheim Commission as to what it is realistic to achieve bilaterally with Russia. 
The “new” High North policy was to be coordinated under the aegis of the for-
eign ministry, one of whose state secretaries would be assigned this task. More-
over, the ministry would establish and head an inter-ministerial working group 
on the High North. In addition, the Government would appoint a national ex-
pert commission. Apart from these measures, what was listed in the report was 
largely a rewriting of what was already being done or in planning.91 Thus, in 
terms of “measures and solutions”, the report did not really bring about much 
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new or daring politics – or so at least was the main thrust of the reactions to the 
report, including the ensuing parliamentary debate.
As to the political High North dialogues, the Government singled out the 
United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Canada and the European 
Union for participation. This was due to their individual interests, including 
expected future interests, in energy and other natural resources, the climate, en-
vironment and sustainable development in the north. Notably, the Nordic coun-
tries in general, and Iceland in particular, were not listed among these frontline 
potential “partners and allies” of the High North policy initiative. The stated 
intention of the dialogues was, on the one hand, to better know and understand 
the viewpoints and positions of individual interested states and of the EU as a 
whole, and, on the other, for the other states to achieve a greater understanding 
of Norway’s positions and priorities in the north. To achieve better management 
of the ocean areas under Norwegian jurisdiction, the Government signalled it 
favoured comprehensive, ecosystem-based approaches to resource management 
and has sought to enlist its Western partners and allies in this. 
Perspectives on economic and industrial cooperation, in particular within 
energy, featured in the report’s treatment of Russia. Developing the petroleum 
fields in the Barents Sea could open new possibilities for cooperation between 
Norwegian and Russian oil and gas majors. The Government stated that it 
would work actively with a view to achieving Norwegian commercial participa-
tion. Cooperation within extracting oil and gas in the Norwegian sector was 
also mentioned. Furthermore, the report listed opportunities for cooperation on 
environmental matters, on Russian nuclear facilities and installations, on safety 
at sea and mutual protection from oil spills. The report emphasised bilateral 
engagement within research and development, with a view to joint activities on 
resource management, climate security and environmental protection. Research 
activities should include joint activities on Svalbard too, the report said. Getting 
Russia to recognise the importance of credible control of the resources could, 
the report seemed to say between the lines, downplay the political significance to 
Russia of accepting Norwegian jurisdiction in ocean areas. Regarding delimita-
tion in the Barents Sea, the Government restated its intention to work towards 
a satisfactory solution with Russia, underlining that this was a matter of prior-
ity. Apart from mentioning that Russia (and Iceland) disagreed with Norway’s 
claims, the report was silent about how to deal with Russia on the outstanding 
bilateral questions of the status of the fisheries zone and the shelf around Sval-
bard.92 
92 Ibid, pp. 23–2, 33–35.
pARLIAMENTARy DEbATE AbOUT THE REpORT
While the work of the Orheim Commission was well received, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affair’s report did not fully satisfy the expectations of the Norwegian 
parliament.93 Whereas the majority of the parliamentary Standing Foreign Af-
fairs Committee shared the Government’s analysis of developments in the north, 
it was dissatisfied with the political measures proposed in the report. The ma-
jority’s statement concluded that the report was the mere beginning of Norway’s 
efforts to place the High North on the international agenda. 
Thus, there were high expectations to be met when the opposition came 
into power only few months later. To better grasp the policy that finally emerged, 
I shall list the main aspects of the Foreign Affairs Committee’s unanimous and 
majority positions.
Unanimously, the committee noted the increased international interest in 
the north, primarily due to the oil and gas resources on the Norwegian and 
Russian continental shelves. Interests and responsibilities in regard of the re-
source areas under national jurisdiction were considered to be defining aspects 
of Norway’s policy for the High North. It was noted as a particular challenge 
that Norway’s resource management and sovereign rights in the vast ocean areas 
were still questioned or disputed by other states. The committee further noted 
that Norway’s scope for using multilateral frameworks to handle the most com-
plex issues in the North was limited. On this point the committee echoed the 
views of the Orheim Commission. Bilateral dialogues with Canada, France, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, the United States and the European Union were 
considered to be a more promising avenue, as were closer relations with Russia. 
The committee was mindful that cooperation with Russia had to take into ac-
count the two countries’ conflicting views and competing interests in certain are-
as. Yet, it reaffirmed the potential for cooperation between Norway and Russia, 
both being major energy producers, and suggested that the EU should be drawn 
in where possible. Particular mention was made of the difficulty of conducting 
effective resource management and monitoring in areas where Norway’s right 
to exercise authority was not recognised fully by other states. Only by managing 
the areas so that these states, and the US in particular, saw their interests better 
served by leaving the task to Norway, could Norway realistically expect to con-
tinue its present enforcement and resource management.9 
93 The Storting, Recommendation by the Storting, S. no. 26 (200-2005). 
9 Ibid, p. 6.
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new or daring politics – or so at least was the main thrust of the reactions to the 
report, including the ensuing parliamentary debate.
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intention of the dialogues was, on the one hand, to better know and understand 
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whole, and, on the other, for the other states to achieve a greater understanding 
of Norway’s positions and priorities in the north. To achieve better management 
of the ocean areas under Norwegian jurisdiction, the Government signalled it 
favoured comprehensive, ecosystem-based approaches to resource management 
and has sought to enlist its Western partners and allies in this. 
Perspectives on economic and industrial cooperation, in particular within 
energy, featured in the report’s treatment of Russia. Developing the petroleum 
fields in the Barents Sea could open new possibilities for cooperation between 
Norwegian and Russian oil and gas majors. The Government stated that it 
would work actively with a view to achieving Norwegian commercial participa-
tion. Cooperation within extracting oil and gas in the Norwegian sector was 
also mentioned. Furthermore, the report listed opportunities for cooperation on 
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at sea and mutual protection from oil spills. The report emphasised bilateral 
engagement within research and development, with a view to joint activities on 
resource management, climate security and environmental protection. Research 
activities should include joint activities on Svalbard too, the report said. Getting 
Russia to recognise the importance of credible control of the resources could, 
the report seemed to say between the lines, downplay the political significance to 
Russia of accepting Norwegian jurisdiction in ocean areas. Regarding delimita-
tion in the Barents Sea, the Government restated its intention to work towards 
a satisfactory solution with Russia, underlining that this was a matter of prior-
ity. Apart from mentioning that Russia (and Iceland) disagreed with Norway’s 
claims, the report was silent about how to deal with Russia on the outstanding 
bilateral questions of the status of the fisheries zone and the shelf around Sval-
bard.92 
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parliament.93 Whereas the majority of the parliamentary Standing Foreign Af-
fairs Committee shared the Government’s analysis of developments in the north, 
it was dissatisfied with the political measures proposed in the report. The ma-
jority’s statement concluded that the report was the mere beginning of Norway’s 
efforts to place the High North on the international agenda. 
Thus, there were high expectations to be met when the opposition came 
into power only few months later. To better grasp the policy that finally emerged, 
I shall list the main aspects of the Foreign Affairs Committee’s unanimous and 
majority positions.
Unanimously, the committee noted the increased international interest in 
the north, primarily due to the oil and gas resources on the Norwegian and 
Russian continental shelves. Interests and responsibilities in regard of the re-
source areas under national jurisdiction were considered to be defining aspects 
of Norway’s policy for the High North. It was noted as a particular challenge 
that Norway’s resource management and sovereign rights in the vast ocean areas 
were still questioned or disputed by other states. The committee further noted 
that Norway’s scope for using multilateral frameworks to handle the most com-
plex issues in the North was limited. On this point the committee echoed the 
views of the Orheim Commission. Bilateral dialogues with Canada, France, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, the United States and the European Union were 
considered to be a more promising avenue, as were closer relations with Russia. 
The committee was mindful that cooperation with Russia had to take into ac-
count the two countries’ conflicting views and competing interests in certain are-
as. Yet, it reaffirmed the potential for cooperation between Norway and Russia, 
both being major energy producers, and suggested that the EU should be drawn 
in where possible. Particular mention was made of the difficulty of conducting 
effective resource management and monitoring in areas where Norway’s right 
to exercise authority was not recognised fully by other states. Only by managing 
the areas so that these states, and the US in particular, saw their interests better 
served by leaving the task to Norway, could Norway realistically expect to con-
tinue its present enforcement and resource management.9 
93 The Storting, Recommendation by the Storting, S. no. 26 (200-2005). 
9 Ibid, p. 6.
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In its majority recommendation, the committee formulated similar views, 
but more ambitiously. It found that the report ran short of providing the means 
for a forceful and coherent Norwegian policy for the north. The majority was 
particularly seized with the natural resources of the vast ocean areas of the North, 
and with the national rights and responsibilities that they invoked. Conserned 
with the effects of increasing international interests in the natural resources of 
the High North, the majority warned of future marginalisation of Norway in the 
North unless the level of national engagement was considerably strengthened.95 
Referring to the delimitation of the Barents Sea shelf, the majority reaffirmed 
that the negotiations should continue based on a comprehensive approach com-
prising all relevant sectors. It stated that an agreement on delimitation was a 
key condition for full exploitation of the energy opportunities in the area. Until 
such agreement had been achieved, it could be useful to survey more thoroughly 
the undisputed parts of the shelf to determine what resources were present and 
acquire the knowledge and competence needed for a potential partnership with 
Russia on its undisputed shelf. Essentially, the minority and majority views dif-
fered only in terms of the means to be employed, and regarding the call for a 
more active stance. As to the contents of the policy, and the national interests 
underpinning it, there was mutual understanding and agreement.
From policy to strategy and reality
The new red-green coalition government, which came to power in 2005, had to 
meet the expectations it itself had created in terms of new policies and efforts 
for the North. Not surprisingly, a substantial part of the coalition government’s 
initial policy declaration was devoted to the High North. 
An ambitious set of goals was drawn up with a view to shaping a co-
herent approach to three main areas of concern: international acceptance of 
Norway’s views on Svalbard, its surrounding shelf and the Fisheries Protection 
Zone; increased civilian and military presence and ability to exercise Norwe-
gian sovereignty and authority; intensified cooperation with Russia on efforts to 
reach agreement on outstanding issues of ocean jurisdiction and delimitation.96 
Norway’s sovereignty interests, the vulnerability of its security situation vis-à-
vis Russia, and the economic and resource management challenges of the ocean 
areas of the North are all writ large across the resulting High North Strategy.
95 Ibid, p. 1.
96 Soria Moria Declaration, p. 6–7.
Coincidentally, the Elektron incident, which occurred in the Fisheries Pro-
tection Zone off the Svalbard archipelago during five very tense days from 15 to 
20 October 2005 just after the red-green coalition had come into power, height-
ened the new government’s awareness of issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction. 
It also further cemented the perception that international law and a Norwegian 
naval presence were the two most important means to protect the interests and 
values at stake in the ocean areas. The Elektron incident was the first occurrence 
of serious political significance in the waters of the High North since the Norwe-
gian coastguard’s arrest of the Russian trawler Chernigov in April 2001. Though 
different cases, they both illustrate the risk of regular Norwegian law enforce-
ment in the Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard unintentionally being 
elevated to an issue between states. While Russia formally rejects Norway’s right 
to establish the 200 nautical mile Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard, 
in practice it respects Norway’s right to monitor fishing and enforce regulatory 
compliance, even when Russian vessels are involved. However, Russia does not 
recognise Norway’s right to seize Russian vessels and cargo, or levy fines or 
prosecute offenders.97 The trawler Elektron was approached and inspected by 
the Norwegian coastguard on suspicion of illegal, unregulated and unreported 
(IUU) fishing in the Fisheries Protection Zone. Supposedly, the vessel was in a 
part of the zone lying east of the Russian sectoral (meridian) line (yet west of 
the international waters of the Loop Hole).98 With two Norwegian coastguard 
officials onboard, Elektron made a successful run back to Russian territorial wa-
ters. Due to bad weather conditions, the Norwegian coastguard decided against 
using force to arrest the Elektron in mid sea, which helped avoid what could 
otherwise have become a serious diplomatic incident. However, this may have 
given the impression that Norway lacked the will and ability to police the zone. 
The stand-off over the Elektron sparked a debate in Norway about the strate-
gies with which to meet such challenges in the future. The general perception 
was that instances of IUU fishing were not only criminal activity, but also a test 
of Norway’s ability to enforce and justify the regime of the Fisheries Protection 
Zone.
Most importantly, the Elektron incident demonstrates the ease with which 
civil police enforcement can escalate into highly politicised and contentious is-
sues over sovereign rights between states when such rights and jurisdiction are 
not fully recognised or are disputed. To minimise this risk, Norwegian authori-
ties have gone to lengths to reach a common understanding with Russia over 
97 Reports to the Storting no. 0 (1985-1986), no. 30 (200-2005).
98 Interview, PINRO, Murmansk, 19 June 2007. 
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In its majority recommendation, the committee formulated similar views, 
but more ambitiously. It found that the report ran short of providing the means 
for a forceful and coherent Norwegian policy for the north. The majority was 
particularly seized with the natural resources of the vast ocean areas of the North, 
and with the national rights and responsibilities that they invoked. Conserned 
with the effects of increasing international interests in the natural resources of 
the High North, the majority warned of future marginalisation of Norway in the 
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key condition for full exploitation of the energy opportunities in the area. Until 
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acquire the knowledge and competence needed for a potential partnership with 
Russia on its undisputed shelf. Essentially, the minority and majority views dif-
fered only in terms of the means to be employed, and regarding the call for a 
more active stance. As to the contents of the policy, and the national interests 
underpinning it, there was mutual understanding and agreement.
From policy to strategy and reality
The new red-green coalition government, which came to power in 2005, had to 
meet the expectations it itself had created in terms of new policies and efforts 
for the North. Not surprisingly, a substantial part of the coalition government’s 
initial policy declaration was devoted to the High North. 
An ambitious set of goals was drawn up with a view to shaping a co-
herent approach to three main areas of concern: international acceptance of 
Norway’s views on Svalbard, its surrounding shelf and the Fisheries Protection 
Zone; increased civilian and military presence and ability to exercise Norwe-
gian sovereignty and authority; intensified cooperation with Russia on efforts to 
reach agreement on outstanding issues of ocean jurisdiction and delimitation.96 
Norway’s sovereignty interests, the vulnerability of its security situation vis-à-
vis Russia, and the economic and resource management challenges of the ocean 
areas of the North are all writ large across the resulting High North Strategy.
95 Ibid, p. 1.
96 Soria Moria Declaration, p. 6–7.
Coincidentally, the Elektron incident, which occurred in the Fisheries Pro-
tection Zone off the Svalbard archipelago during five very tense days from 15 to 
20 October 2005 just after the red-green coalition had come into power, height-
ened the new government’s awareness of issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction. 
It also further cemented the perception that international law and a Norwegian 
naval presence were the two most important means to protect the interests and 
values at stake in the ocean areas. The Elektron incident was the first occurrence 
of serious political significance in the waters of the High North since the Norwe-
gian coastguard’s arrest of the Russian trawler Chernigov in April 2001. Though 
different cases, they both illustrate the risk of regular Norwegian law enforce-
ment in the Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard unintentionally being 
elevated to an issue between states. While Russia formally rejects Norway’s right 
to establish the 200 nautical mile Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard, 
in practice it respects Norway’s right to monitor fishing and enforce regulatory 
compliance, even when Russian vessels are involved. However, Russia does not 
recognise Norway’s right to seize Russian vessels and cargo, or levy fines or 
prosecute offenders.97 The trawler Elektron was approached and inspected by 
the Norwegian coastguard on suspicion of illegal, unregulated and unreported 
(IUU) fishing in the Fisheries Protection Zone. Supposedly, the vessel was in a 
part of the zone lying east of the Russian sectoral (meridian) line (yet west of 
the international waters of the Loop Hole).98 With two Norwegian coastguard 
officials onboard, Elektron made a successful run back to Russian territorial wa-
ters. Due to bad weather conditions, the Norwegian coastguard decided against 
using force to arrest the Elektron in mid sea, which helped avoid what could 
otherwise have become a serious diplomatic incident. However, this may have 
given the impression that Norway lacked the will and ability to police the zone. 
The stand-off over the Elektron sparked a debate in Norway about the strate-
gies with which to meet such challenges in the future. The general perception 
was that instances of IUU fishing were not only criminal activity, but also a test 
of Norway’s ability to enforce and justify the regime of the Fisheries Protection 
Zone.
Most importantly, the Elektron incident demonstrates the ease with which 
civil police enforcement can escalate into highly politicised and contentious is-
sues over sovereign rights between states when such rights and jurisdiction are 
not fully recognised or are disputed. To minimise this risk, Norwegian authori-
ties have gone to lengths to reach a common understanding with Russia over 
97 Reports to the Storting no. 0 (1985-1986), no. 30 (200-2005).
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what constitutes IUU fishing and other instances of environmental crime and 
how they should be handled. Such concerns form a backdrop to the regular 
negotiations with Russia (and the EU and Iceland) over yearly quotas and total 
allowable catches. Further, the Elektron incident galvanised a Norwegian en-
forcement policy centred on firmness, presence and predictable patterns of be-
haviour. The case made the headlines in Russia as well as Norway, and gave rise 
to opposing interpretations of the lawfulness of Norwegian jurisdiction in the 
Fisheries Protection Zone. The media and groups of various vested interests de-
liberately sought to turn it into an issue between states (Norway versus Russia), 
rather than between authorities and a commercial actor. Finally, both Norwe-
gian and Russian authorities attempted to downplay the interstate aspects of the 
issue. The situation recalled one of the main arguments of the Orheim Commis-
sion; namely that challenges to Norway’s jurisdiction and sovereign rights in the 
North had to be met with firmness and determination, and through an informed 
consideration of the larger political picture. Enforcement of jurisdiction was not 
only a question of handling incidents professionally and without unwarranted 
escalation; even more important was heightening the capacity for prevention 
through foresight and concerted political action. A lesson learned was the need 
to revert to previous modes of coordinating Norway’s policies for the North. 
The importance of understanding the various Russian motives and interests was 
underlined. Having the best skills about Russia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
further restated its position as lead ministry for the North. 
It was thus under the aegis of the Minister of Foreign Affairs that coor-
dinating, planning and finalising the Government’s High North Strategy was 
executed. The strategy ended up including frank language suggesting that Russia 
was moving in the wrong direction with regard to human rights, freedom of 
expression and the rule of law, and that Russia’s internal development was a 
matter of concern to the external world. In binding language, the strategy stated 
that Norway would “maintain a candid dialogue with Russia and (..) be clear 
about Norway’s views on human rights, the principles of the rule of law and 
political rights.”99 Another decisive policy statement was that only by engaging 
directly with Russia could the full potential of the sustainable use of resources 
and of sound stewardship in the North be realised. 
99 MFA, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy”, p. 16.
A policy for a new era 
In order to feel secure in its sovereign claims, Norway still needs backing from 
Europe, NATO and perhaps in particular the US. But the US has its own claims 
and interests to cater for as a contracting party to the Svalbard Treaty, although 
this is of less political significance to Washington than other issues in the High 
North and the Arctic as a whole. To deflect attention from issues of sovereignty 
and draw the US’s interest to the North for other reasons, or so I would claim, 
the Norwegian Government seeks to enhance international awareness about the 
need to cooperate on such issues as energy and the climate, that is, the wider 
international opportunities and challenges of the north. Underlying this is an 
understated invitation to cooperate on handling Russia in the High North. It 
remains to be seen, however, whether Washington and European capitals are 
sufficiently sensitised to the political significance of Russia’s ambitions in the 
north. 
One may ask if Norway has loaded too much into the policy, making it 
excessively difficult for others to distinguish aims from means and thus blurring 
its core.100 In this respect, Norway’s position in the North may seem uncertain 
on four counts: by belonging to a NATO in transition whose focus is far from 
the north of Europe; by being on the outside of the EU yet somehow between 
the EU and Russia in energy matters; by wanting close, yet à la carte, relations 
with a US with much else than Norway on its mind; and by bordering on a 
Russia with whom relations are embedded in an uncertain mix of cooperation 
and conflicting interests. Norway’s position is made all the more precarious by 
the riches and vulnerabilities of the vast ocean areas under Norwegian sovereign 
jurisdiction combined with relatively modest capacities for effective stewardship 
and maritime surveillance and enforcement. However, this is largely a position 
of Norway’s own choosing. 
During the Cold War, the bipolar security order and the perception of a 
very real security threat from the neighbouring Soviet Union gave Norway the 
leeway to conduct a two-pronged security approach: that of Allied deterrence 
mixed with bilateral reassurance. Today, on the premise that the threat is no 
longer as real, the deterrence aspect is hardly as relevant anymore. Consequent-
100 Personal notes from interview, embassy of the United Kingdom, Oslo, 26 June 2007 
and interview, embassy of the United States, Oslo, 27 June 2007. Although the 
interviewees did not explicitly say so, my understanding was that the High North 
Policy was ultimately regarded as more self-serving in terms of Norwegian interests 
rather than shared interests. Requesting anonymity, an official stated that “…it was 
difficult to understand exactly what Norway wanted to achieve by its policy for the 
High North, and to see clearly what it wants from us.”; there also seemed to be “… a 
Svalbard-sized hole in the High North Policy.”
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what constitutes IUU fishing and other instances of environmental crime and 
how they should be handled. Such concerns form a backdrop to the regular 
negotiations with Russia (and the EU and Iceland) over yearly quotas and total 
allowable catches. Further, the Elektron incident galvanised a Norwegian en-
forcement policy centred on firmness, presence and predictable patterns of be-
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to opposing interpretations of the lawfulness of Norwegian jurisdiction in the 
Fisheries Protection Zone. The media and groups of various vested interests de-
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rather than between authorities and a commercial actor. Finally, both Norwe-
gian and Russian authorities attempted to downplay the interstate aspects of the 
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North had to be met with firmness and determination, and through an informed 
consideration of the larger political picture. Enforcement of jurisdiction was not 
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was moving in the wrong direction with regard to human rights, freedom of 
expression and the rule of law, and that Russia’s internal development was a 
matter of concern to the external world. In binding language, the strategy stated 
that Norway would “maintain a candid dialogue with Russia and (..) be clear 
about Norway’s views on human rights, the principles of the rule of law and 
political rights.”99 Another decisive policy statement was that only by engaging 
directly with Russia could the full potential of the sustainable use of resources 
and of sound stewardship in the North be realised. 
99 MFA, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy”, p. 16.
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In order to feel secure in its sovereign claims, Norway still needs backing from 
Europe, NATO and perhaps in particular the US. But the US has its own claims 
and interests to cater for as a contracting party to the Svalbard Treaty, although 
this is of less political significance to Washington than other issues in the High 
North and the Arctic as a whole. To deflect attention from issues of sovereignty 
and draw the US’s interest to the North for other reasons, or so I would claim, 
the Norwegian Government seeks to enhance international awareness about the 
need to cooperate on such issues as energy and the climate, that is, the wider 
international opportunities and challenges of the north. Underlying this is an 
understated invitation to cooperate on handling Russia in the High North. It 
remains to be seen, however, whether Washington and European capitals are 
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One may ask if Norway has loaded too much into the policy, making it 
excessively difficult for others to distinguish aims from means and thus blurring 
its core.100 In this respect, Norway’s position in the North may seem uncertain 
on four counts: by belonging to a NATO in transition whose focus is far from 
the north of Europe; by being on the outside of the EU yet somehow between 
the EU and Russia in energy matters; by wanting close, yet à la carte, relations 
with a US with much else than Norway on its mind; and by bordering on a 
Russia with whom relations are embedded in an uncertain mix of cooperation 
and conflicting interests. Norway’s position is made all the more precarious by 
the riches and vulnerabilities of the vast ocean areas under Norwegian sovereign 
jurisdiction combined with relatively modest capacities for effective stewardship 
and maritime surveillance and enforcement. However, this is largely a position 
of Norway’s own choosing. 
During the Cold War, the bipolar security order and the perception of a 
very real security threat from the neighbouring Soviet Union gave Norway the 
leeway to conduct a two-pronged security approach: that of Allied deterrence 
mixed with bilateral reassurance. Today, on the premise that the threat is no 
longer as real, the deterrence aspect is hardly as relevant anymore. Consequent-
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ly, the basis for reassurance is no longer the same. From this, it must be assumed 
that the NATO solidarity that allowed Norway to expect political and military 
support for its security and sovereignty interests in the North is also less tangi-
ble. Certainly, this must be expected in situations when Western states clearly 
have conflicting interests with Norway. As such, making a new policy choice for 
the North is about more than just how to enhance cooperation with Russia. Ef-
fectively, it influences core dimensions of Norway’s foreign policy as a whole. At 
least one criterion for success is that the perspective has to be long-term, in a sit-
uation in which Norway has to accept being more alone and more deeply bilat-
erally engaged with Russia than has been customary. As Norway heads further 
down the road as entrepreneur of cooperation in the High North, it could come 
to a point where it has to choose; either continued reliance on Western capitals 
and political structures, or greater self-reliance in bilateral relations with Russia. 
For the time being Norway is trying to reconcile the two. In fact, the High North 
policy initiative may seem to be predicated on the ability to do just so. From the 
Norwegian perspective it would be unreasonable to engage in solutions in the 
North without seeking to commit Russia to them. If and when such commitment 
is obtained, it would also serve the interests of other Western states. Energy 
seems the most promising area for fuelling cooperation in the North.
ENERGy – FUELLING FRIENDSHIp IN THE NORTH 
Energy and cooperation
In this chapter I shall discuss some of the premises for energy cooperation in the 
High North. I will start by looking into the vision of the energy province of the 
north and how it relates to Norway’s future foreign-policy field of action in the 
region. Cooperative structures in the fields of oil and gas are mostly resistant 
to multilateralisation. The European Energy Charter Treaty process is, so far, a 
failed attempt to build an international legal foundation for energy security and 
for the uninterrupted transit of energy. In the short to medium term, it looks 
as if energy cooperation in the High North will remain bilateral. Norway and 
Russia possess considerable unexploited petroleum resources on their respective 
continental shelves and, in Russia’s case, on-shore as well. But even bilateral 
cooperation in field development, extraction and export is fraught with complex 
difficulties. 
In the following, I shall discuss the energy province with a view to clarify-
ing what space Norway could carve out for itself in the complex political reali-
ties of the North, and whether energy cooperation does indeed provide the right 
solution to the problem. 
An emerging energy province?
What kind of energy cooperation is it reasonable to consider for the north? The 
High North Strategy invokes images of an emerging petroleum province.101 The 
word “province” is hardly accidental. It conveys a sense of belonging to a larger 
community; in this case a regional energy community, replacing the earlier se-
curity community and embracing Russia. It makes history of old divides also in 
energy terms. Belonging to different political and economic poles, Norway and 
Russia formerly oriented their petroleum exports largely to different markets.102 
Today, current economic integration in global energy trade and markets makes it 
natural to consider energy cooperation up-stream, to the very sources, as well as 
101 MFA, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy”, pp. 11, 13. See also 
Jonas Gahr Støre, foreign minister, “The Emergence of the Barents Sea as a Petroleum 
province: Implications for Norway and Europe”, speech at ECP policy briefing, 
Brussels 10 October 2006. 
102 Ole Gunnar Austvik, “The Geopolitics of Barents Sea Oil and Gas: The Mouse and the 
Bear”, International Association for Energy Economics (third quarter 2007): 19–23.
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for the uninterrupted transit of energy. In the short to medium term, it looks 
as if energy cooperation in the High North will remain bilateral. Norway and 
Russia possess considerable unexploited petroleum resources on their respective 
continental shelves and, in Russia’s case, on-shore as well. But even bilateral 
cooperation in field development, extraction and export is fraught with complex 
difficulties. 
In the following, I shall discuss the energy province with a view to clarify-
ing what space Norway could carve out for itself in the complex political reali-
ties of the North, and whether energy cooperation does indeed provide the right 
solution to the problem. 
An emerging energy province?
What kind of energy cooperation is it reasonable to consider for the north? The 
High North Strategy invokes images of an emerging petroleum province.101 The 
word “province” is hardly accidental. It conveys a sense of belonging to a larger 
community; in this case a regional energy community, replacing the earlier se-
curity community and embracing Russia. It makes history of old divides also in 
energy terms. Belonging to different political and economic poles, Norway and 
Russia formerly oriented their petroleum exports largely to different markets.102 
Today, current economic integration in global energy trade and markets makes it 
natural to consider energy cooperation up-stream, to the very sources, as well as 
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province: Implications for Norway and Europe”, speech at ECP policy briefing, 
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down-stream, into retail. The vision of energy cooperation on the Russian shelf 
is mirrored by the idea of a complementary zone of economic and industrial 
cooperation on land; a trans-border zone of cooperation (the “Pomor Zone”)103 
intended to support future petroleum activities in the Barents Sea in general, and 
the Shtokman development in particular.10 In both respects, the future energy 
province would seem to indicate a new “bilateral reality” between Norway and 
Russia. In addition, it suggests a way towards the eventual elimination of the de-
limitation issue. At this point in time, the energy province is a political concept. 
It is a vision, and it points the way forwards. 
To assess the promise of the energy province, I shall seek to define it in 
terms of geostrategic considerations and emerging interdependence structures. 
Though I may risk arriving at a blurred energy province meaning different things 
according to the interests and the analytical levels applied, I hope to be able to 
discuss it as a political “vision”, a fairly open-ended idea of what energy coop-
eration in the High North could become. The vision’s concrete goals are appar-
ently twofold and interrelated: to create an environment conducive to interna-
tional cooperation in a geographical area typified by a lack of such interaction; 
and to assist in manoeuvring StatoilHydro and the Norwegian industrial energy 
cluster into a favourable position vis-à-vis Russian petroleum developments in 
the north. In both respects, I expect that time and space are important factors. 
Though natural resources are usually thought of almost exclusively in spatial 
terms, I shall include temporal aspects. 
It may be helpful to start by outlining the energy province geographically, 
according to the known and potential location of hydrocarbons in the area. Rus-
sia’s territorial share of the Arctic may outstrip the future claims of Canada, the 
US and Denmark combined. Norway makes no claim north of the 85’ parallel. 
Considerable reserves of oil and gas have been discovered on the undisputed 
Russian shelf of the Eastern Barents Sea. Russia’s most significant potential for 
petroleum currently is in fact in the Barents and Kara seas, the Pechora Ba-
sin and on-shore in Western Siberia.105 Much is oil, but most is expected to be 
gas. The further west, towards the Barents Sea, the higher the gas to oil ratio 
becomes. The most important is the Shtokman field. It is rated as one of the 
103 Russo-Norwegian Pomor trade was most intense in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries up until the Russian revolution and resulted in a form of Russo-Norwegian 
pidgin language i.e. Pomor.
10 MFA, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy”, p. 16; Arve 
Johnsen,“Barents 2020”. Et virkemiddel for en framtidsrettet nordområdepolitikk 
[“Barents 2020”. A means to a forward looking policy for the High North], report 
commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2006.
105 Brunstad et al., Big Oil Playground …
largest off-shore gas and gas condensate fields in the world. Located some 600 
kilometres north of Murmansk, it is difficult to exploit, and environmentally 
risky. In view of the general orientation of the High North policy, it seems ap-
propriate to position the energy province’s geographic locus in the Barents Sea; 
a semi-enclosed sea bordering on the Svalbard archipelago to the west, on Franz 
Josef Land to the north and on Novaya Zemlya to the east. Whereas Svalbard 
is under Norwegian sovereignty, Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya are Rus-
sian territory. The delimitation of the Barents Sea shelf has not been settled. 
Thus, significant parts of the energy province coincide with areas where Russia 
and Norway have overlapping territorial claims and interests. The estimated 
resources on the Norwegian shelf in the Barents Sea amount to a third of the 
total Norwegian potential. 
It is reasonable to include the fields on the undisputed Norwegian shelf in 
the western parts of the Barents Sea in the energy province. The most prominent 
is the Snow White field, although it is much smaller than Shtokman. To the 
south, seismic testing has determined potentially economically viable petroleum 
fields in the still disputed areas.106 These fields are minor compared to Shtokman, 
yet comparably difficult and expensive to exploit, and therefore not considered 
very attractive at the moment. 107 Thus, also in a long-term Norwegian perspec-
tive, the energy province’s political and economic point of gravity lies to the east 
of the disputed areas of the Barents Sea. At the moment, all is overshadowed by 
the particular attention given to the Shtokman field. In fact, the energy province 
of the High North may in the short to medium term for all practical purposes 
be the Shtokman field itself, and the petroleum-related activities that it will gen-
erate off-and on-shore in the region. But it is not inconceivable that the future 
energy province could extend further east too, to the Timan-Pechora basin and 
the Kara Sea. At the moment, there are no clear indications of Norway wanting 
to include the shelf around Svalbard in the energy province.
106 Not much information is publicly available. A map of the disputed southern area was 
printed in Aftenposten on 20 December 1991. It depicts “six interesting geological 
structures”: Fedynarch, Kol’skaya, Aybatshinskaya, Kurtshatovskaya, Varyashkaya, 
Oktyaberskaya. In particular the Fedynarch field is considered promising. See map 
reprinted in Kristian Aatland, Russisk nordområdepolitikk etter den kalde krigen: 
Forholdet mellom næringsinteresser og militærstrategiske interesser, [Russian High 
North policy after the Cold War: the relationship between commercial and military 
strategic interests], FFI/Rapport-2003/00713 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment, 2003), p. 29. 
107 The technological challenges of the two areas are comparable and currently of less 
interest to Norwegian and Russian companies, interview, Hydro, 30 May 2007.
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is mirrored by the idea of a complementary zone of economic and industrial 
cooperation on land; a trans-border zone of cooperation (the “Pomor Zone”)103 
intended to support future petroleum activities in the Barents Sea in general, and 
the Shtokman development in particular.10 In both respects, the future energy 
province would seem to indicate a new “bilateral reality” between Norway and 
Russia. In addition, it suggests a way towards the eventual elimination of the de-
limitation issue. At this point in time, the energy province is a political concept. 
It is a vision, and it points the way forwards. 
To assess the promise of the energy province, I shall seek to define it in 
terms of geostrategic considerations and emerging interdependence structures. 
Though I may risk arriving at a blurred energy province meaning different things 
according to the interests and the analytical levels applied, I hope to be able to 
discuss it as a political “vision”, a fairly open-ended idea of what energy coop-
eration in the High North could become. The vision’s concrete goals are appar-
ently twofold and interrelated: to create an environment conducive to interna-
tional cooperation in a geographical area typified by a lack of such interaction; 
and to assist in manoeuvring StatoilHydro and the Norwegian industrial energy 
cluster into a favourable position vis-à-vis Russian petroleum developments in 
the north. In both respects, I expect that time and space are important factors. 
Though natural resources are usually thought of almost exclusively in spatial 
terms, I shall include temporal aspects. 
It may be helpful to start by outlining the energy province geographically, 
according to the known and potential location of hydrocarbons in the area. Rus-
sia’s territorial share of the Arctic may outstrip the future claims of Canada, the 
US and Denmark combined. Norway makes no claim north of the 85’ parallel. 
Considerable reserves of oil and gas have been discovered on the undisputed 
Russian shelf of the Eastern Barents Sea. Russia’s most significant potential for 
petroleum currently is in fact in the Barents and Kara seas, the Pechora Ba-
sin and on-shore in Western Siberia.105 Much is oil, but most is expected to be 
gas. The further west, towards the Barents Sea, the higher the gas to oil ratio 
becomes. The most important is the Shtokman field. It is rated as one of the 
103 Russo-Norwegian Pomor trade was most intense in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries up until the Russian revolution and resulted in a form of Russo-Norwegian 
pidgin language i.e. Pomor.
10 MFA, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy”, p. 16; Arve 
Johnsen,“Barents 2020”. Et virkemiddel for en framtidsrettet nordområdepolitikk 
[“Barents 2020”. A means to a forward looking policy for the High North], report 
commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2006.
105 Brunstad et al., Big Oil Playground …
largest off-shore gas and gas condensate fields in the world. Located some 600 
kilometres north of Murmansk, it is difficult to exploit, and environmentally 
risky. In view of the general orientation of the High North policy, it seems ap-
propriate to position the energy province’s geographic locus in the Barents Sea; 
a semi-enclosed sea bordering on the Svalbard archipelago to the west, on Franz 
Josef Land to the north and on Novaya Zemlya to the east. Whereas Svalbard 
is under Norwegian sovereignty, Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya are Rus-
sian territory. The delimitation of the Barents Sea shelf has not been settled. 
Thus, significant parts of the energy province coincide with areas where Russia 
and Norway have overlapping territorial claims and interests. The estimated 
resources on the Norwegian shelf in the Barents Sea amount to a third of the 
total Norwegian potential. 
It is reasonable to include the fields on the undisputed Norwegian shelf in 
the western parts of the Barents Sea in the energy province. The most prominent 
is the Snow White field, although it is much smaller than Shtokman. To the 
south, seismic testing has determined potentially economically viable petroleum 
fields in the still disputed areas.106 These fields are minor compared to Shtokman, 
yet comparably difficult and expensive to exploit, and therefore not considered 
very attractive at the moment. 107 Thus, also in a long-term Norwegian perspec-
tive, the energy province’s political and economic point of gravity lies to the east 
of the disputed areas of the Barents Sea. At the moment, all is overshadowed by 
the particular attention given to the Shtokman field. In fact, the energy province 
of the High North may in the short to medium term for all practical purposes 
be the Shtokman field itself, and the petroleum-related activities that it will gen-
erate off-and on-shore in the region. But it is not inconceivable that the future 
energy province could extend further east too, to the Timan-Pechora basin and 
the Kara Sea. At the moment, there are no clear indications of Norway wanting 
to include the shelf around Svalbard in the energy province.
106 Not much information is publicly available. A map of the disputed southern area was 
printed in Aftenposten on 20 December 1991. It depicts “six interesting geological 
structures”: Fedynarch, Kol’skaya, Aybatshinskaya, Kurtshatovskaya, Varyashkaya, 
Oktyaberskaya. In particular the Fedynarch field is considered promising. See map 
reprinted in Kristian Aatland, Russisk nordområdepolitikk etter den kalde krigen: 
Forholdet mellom næringsinteresser og militærstrategiske interesser, [Russian High 
North policy after the Cold War: the relationship between commercial and military 
strategic interests], FFI/Rapport-2003/00713 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment, 2003), p. 29. 
107 The technological challenges of the two areas are comparable and currently of less 
interest to Norwegian and Russian companies, interview, Hydro, 30 May 2007.
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A coincidence of time and geography is at play. Norwegian petroleum interests 
are moving northwards from the North Sea into the Barents Sea, while the Rus-
sian petroleum industry is moving from on-shore to off-shore developments in 
the Arctic. Shtokman is what brings the two together for the moment. Shared 
energy interests may over time draw Norwegian industry further to the east into 
the Kara Sea and the development of the Timan Pechora basin. Norway and 
Russia are not competitors in terms of pipelines or markets and in this respect 
there is no serious reason for rivalry. But unsettled sovereignty issues are linked 
to access to future petroleum fields and to the two states’ strategic interests. 
Moreover, the wider political significance of energy security in relations between 
states makes it natural to think of the energy province in the north in terms of 
geopolitics. In this context, the power asymmetry between Norway and Russia 
is a constant policy factor. So are the two countries’ very different approaches 
to thinking about geopolitics and to making such thinking part of foreign-policy 
strategies. To begin to explore such far-reaching aspects, one must look at what 
we know about the accessibility and longevity of the energy deposits in the 
north. While gas now seems to be the dominant factor of Russian petroleum 
development in the north, oil still plays an important role. Russia is the second 
most important source of oil for the European market. Russia’s oil fields alone 
account for forty per cent of the world’s total production increases since 2000.108 
Onshore reserves in the north are substantial, for instance in the Timan-Pechora 
basin. It is expected that oil from the northern Timan-Pechora fields will be 
exported by tankers along the Kola Peninsula and the coast of Norway.109 The 
more developed southern oil fields of Timan-Pechora are linked to a pipeline 
system connected to central Russia and thereon to European markets. Estimates 
are, however, that Russia at the current production rate will cease to be a domi-
nant actor in the oil market in two to three decades from now.110 Nonetheless, 
Russia possesses the world’s largest share of gas reserves: estimates vary between 
one quarter and one third of proven global reserves.111 Thus the key to Russia’s 
energy future, and to its role as a global energy player, is in natural gas. From 
this it seems clear that the energy province is first and foremost a gas province, 
and that gas is the key to Russia’s geostrategic significance. 
How, then, may the interdependence structures emanating from the energy 
province affect the energy situation in Europe, and what are the basic conditions 
for such effects? Europe’s future economic growth is becoming relatively more 
dependent on oil and gas from Norway and Russia. An attempt has been made 
to offset dependence on Russian gas, in part by importing Norwegian and Cen-
tral Asian gas as well. But Europe cannot circumvent Russia. As part of the EU’s 
common external energy policy, the European Commission is therefore directing 
its attention to harmonising the regulatory framework, developing institutions, 
108 “General Report to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly by Jos van Gennip 
(Rapporteur) on Energy Security”, 170 ESC 06 E rev 1, November 2006.
109 Brunstad et al., Big Oil Playground …
110 International Energy Agency (IEA): Optimising Russian Natural Gas. Reform and 
Climate Policy, IEA/OECD, 2006.
111 Brunstad et al., Big Oil Playground …
Figure 2: Russian oil and gas fields in the Barents and Pechora Seas. (Image: Fridtjof Nansen 
Institute.)
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to thinking about geopolitics and to making such thinking part of foreign-policy 
strategies. To begin to explore such far-reaching aspects, one must look at what 
we know about the accessibility and longevity of the energy deposits in the 
north. While gas now seems to be the dominant factor of Russian petroleum 
development in the north, oil still plays an important role. Russia is the second 
most important source of oil for the European market. Russia’s oil fields alone 
account for forty per cent of the world’s total production increases since 2000.108 
Onshore reserves in the north are substantial, for instance in the Timan-Pechora 
basin. It is expected that oil from the northern Timan-Pechora fields will be 
exported by tankers along the Kola Peninsula and the coast of Norway.109 The 
more developed southern oil fields of Timan-Pechora are linked to a pipeline 
system connected to central Russia and thereon to European markets. Estimates 
are, however, that Russia at the current production rate will cease to be a domi-
nant actor in the oil market in two to three decades from now.110 Nonetheless, 
Russia possesses the world’s largest share of gas reserves: estimates vary between 
one quarter and one third of proven global reserves.111 Thus the key to Russia’s 
energy future, and to its role as a global energy player, is in natural gas. From 
this it seems clear that the energy province is first and foremost a gas province, 
and that gas is the key to Russia’s geostrategic significance. 
How, then, may the interdependence structures emanating from the energy 
province affect the energy situation in Europe, and what are the basic conditions 
for such effects? Europe’s future economic growth is becoming relatively more 
dependent on oil and gas from Norway and Russia. An attempt has been made 
to offset dependence on Russian gas, in part by importing Norwegian and Cen-
tral Asian gas as well. But Europe cannot circumvent Russia. As part of the EU’s 
common external energy policy, the European Commission is therefore directing 
its attention to harmonising the regulatory framework, developing institutions, 
108 “General Report to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly by Jos van Gennip 
(Rapporteur) on Energy Security”, 170 ESC 06 E rev 1, November 2006.
109 Brunstad et al., Big Oil Playground …
110 International Energy Agency (IEA): Optimising Russian Natural Gas. Reform and 
Climate Policy, IEA/OECD, 2006.
111 Brunstad et al., Big Oil Playground …
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and cooperating on energy policy. The European Energy Charter Treaty process 
seeks to embody all three aspects. The success and failure of the EU’s bilateral 
energy cooperation with Russia invariably provides an added “EU dimension” 
to Norway’s energy politics regarding Russia in the North. If one adds together 
Norway’s and Russia’s resources in the Barents Sea, the High North is poised to 
become one of two central energy provinces of Europe, the other being Central 
Asia.112 However, national energy interdependence management policies may be 
an obstacle, as the dependence structures go both ways. Between Norway and 
European markets they are well established, depoliticised and stable, but this is 
hardly the case between Russia and Europe today. This may seem surprising: the 
Soviet Union was a notably stable supplier even during political tension in the 
Cold War. Why change the good track record now? The answer may lie in the 
heightened stakes and the sense of nervousness this generates among producer 
and consumer countries alike. Concerning Russia’s internal development, there 
is a tight link between the steep rise and subsequent fall in oil prices on the world 
market and Russia’s makeover as a renewed global power of consequence. The 
re-nationalisation of strategic businesses has provided Russian foreign policy 
with a new “arm” and led to the introduction of a degree of external econom-
ic interventionism. Russia has little experience with, and probably harbours a 
good deal of aversion towards, mutual dependence situations. This may explain 
its propensity to consider them in terms of power politics. Thus, when consider-
ing the potential future promise of the energy province, one should also consider 
Russia’s energy-driven, ambitious and, in part, revanchist national project to 
reconstitute itself as a great power. 
Russia may be heading towards a gas supply gap.113 Should this occur, 
it would deal a blow to Russia’s great power ambitions, but early gas from 
Shtokman and greater reliance on gas from Central Asia could fill the gap. The 
only other option for Russia would be to increase domestic gas prices to fi-
nance substantial energy efficiency measures. Though price hikes are expected 
in industrial and private sectors, these will probably not be enough in view of 
the formidable task of reforming the Russian energy sector. Any such invest-
ments are also increasingly unlikely in the present “financial crisis”. In addi-
tion, Russia’s options are made unappealing by the high economic and political 
112 Minister of petroleum and energy, Odd Roger Enoksen, “Energidimensjonen i 
nordområdepolitikken” [The Energy Dimension of the High North Policy], 1 March 
2006.
113 IEA, Optimising Russian Natural Gas, pp. 25–29, IEA, Natural Gas Market Review 
2006. Towards a Global Gas Market, IEA/OECD, 2006, p. 65; IEA, World Economic 
Outlook 2008, Executive Summary, IEA/OECD 2008
costs involved.11 Poised to be affected by the potential gas supply gap, Europe’s 
future energy security is tied to the challenges of reforming the entire Russian 
energy sector. This is a new aspect of energy interdependence, and no common 
institutions seem available to deal with it. Shtokman may in fact symbolise the 
challenges Russia faces as well as the potential risk to Europe if Russia fails to 
deal with them. All at once, changing patterns of external and domestic energy 
demand are coinciding with the rapid depletion of Russia’s developed fields.115 
The credit crunch on global financial markets has forced the Russian govern-
ment to offer substantial tax breaks to the oil and gas industry. In addition, the 
sudden fall in oil prices strains Russia’s capacity to export and to generate the 
income needed to subsidise domestic consumption. This is a vicious circle that 
can either be broken by tough decisions to reform the domestic energy sector 
or by banking on increased production alone. The latter is the politically easier 
way out, and seems to be the Russian leadership’s favoured option. Gazprom 
can hardly afford to miss the increasingly urgent deadline on Shtokman. In any 
case, the era of relatively “easy” gas is ending with investment costs outstripping 
the breakeven price level of the yields from future developments. Based on oil 
prices at around 50–60 USD, the whole Shtokman investment plan may be in 
jeopardy. Major decisions, postponed for too long, need to be made. The invest-
ment gap foreseen by the International Energy Agency is becoming a reality, and 
a negative gas balance in Russia may ensue. In spite of frequently updated and 
optimistic production targets, Gazprom may in fact be drifting further away 
from realising the estimated needed production levels of the critical period of 
2015–20.116 Other energy sources, in particular coal, may be used to fuel the 
domestic market, while gas is prioritised for export. Nuclear power is also an 
alternative for the Russian power-grid. Either way there are economic and en-
vironmental costs involved. Although the exact time is still uncertain, Gazprom 
maintains that production at Shtokman will start before 2015 and that an on-
shore LNG plant will be ready by approximately that time. At the time of writ-
ing, these estimates seem optimistic, but the seriousness of the situation may 
11 Interview, Hydro, ibid. See also IEA, Optimising Russian Natural Gas.
115 The bulk of Russian gas production comes from a small number of giant fields now 
depleting at a considerable rate. Gazprom’s development strategy is to meet production       
targets by optimising capacities at the giant fields and by bringing on-stream the 
satellite fields located in their margins, cf. ЭНЕРГЕТИЧЕСКАЯ� СТРАТЕГИЯ�  
РОССИИ НА �ЕРИО�� ��О ���� ГО��А�� ������� ����� ����� ����          [Russia’s energy 
strategy up to 2020, May 2003]. See also IEA, Optimising Russian Natural Gas,       
“Executive summary”. 
116 IEA Optimising Russian Natural Gas; Natural Gas Market Review 2006.
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and cooperating on energy policy. The European Energy Charter Treaty process 
seeks to embody all three aspects. The success and failure of the EU’s bilateral 
energy cooperation with Russia invariably provides an added “EU dimension” 
to Norway’s energy politics regarding Russia in the North. If one adds together 
Norway’s and Russia’s resources in the Barents Sea, the High North is poised to 
become one of two central energy provinces of Europe, the other being Central 
Asia.112 However, national energy interdependence management policies may be 
an obstacle, as the dependence structures go both ways. Between Norway and 
European markets they are well established, depoliticised and stable, but this is 
hardly the case between Russia and Europe today. This may seem surprising: the 
Soviet Union was a notably stable supplier even during political tension in the 
Cold War. Why change the good track record now? The answer may lie in the 
heightened stakes and the sense of nervousness this generates among producer 
and consumer countries alike. Concerning Russia’s internal development, there 
is a tight link between the steep rise and subsequent fall in oil prices on the world 
market and Russia’s makeover as a renewed global power of consequence. The 
re-nationalisation of strategic businesses has provided Russian foreign policy 
with a new “arm” and led to the introduction of a degree of external econom-
ic interventionism. Russia has little experience with, and probably harbours a 
good deal of aversion towards, mutual dependence situations. This may explain 
its propensity to consider them in terms of power politics. Thus, when consider-
ing the potential future promise of the energy province, one should also consider 
Russia’s energy-driven, ambitious and, in part, revanchist national project to 
reconstitute itself as a great power. 
Russia may be heading towards a gas supply gap.113 Should this occur, 
it would deal a blow to Russia’s great power ambitions, but early gas from 
Shtokman and greater reliance on gas from Central Asia could fill the gap. The 
only other option for Russia would be to increase domestic gas prices to fi-
nance substantial energy efficiency measures. Though price hikes are expected 
in industrial and private sectors, these will probably not be enough in view of 
the formidable task of reforming the Russian energy sector. Any such invest-
ments are also increasingly unlikely in the present “financial crisis”. In addi-
tion, Russia’s options are made unappealing by the high economic and political 
112 Minister of petroleum and energy, Odd Roger Enoksen, “Energidimensjonen i 
nordområdepolitikken” [The Energy Dimension of the High North Policy], 1 March 
2006.
113 IEA, Optimising Russian Natural Gas, pp. 25–29, IEA, Natural Gas Market Review 
2006. Towards a Global Gas Market, IEA/OECD, 2006, p. 65; IEA, World Economic 
Outlook 2008, Executive Summary, IEA/OECD 2008
costs involved.11 Poised to be affected by the potential gas supply gap, Europe’s 
future energy security is tied to the challenges of reforming the entire Russian 
energy sector. This is a new aspect of energy interdependence, and no common 
institutions seem available to deal with it. Shtokman may in fact symbolise the 
challenges Russia faces as well as the potential risk to Europe if Russia fails to 
deal with them. All at once, changing patterns of external and domestic energy 
demand are coinciding with the rapid depletion of Russia’s developed fields.115 
The credit crunch on global financial markets has forced the Russian govern-
ment to offer substantial tax breaks to the oil and gas industry. In addition, the 
sudden fall in oil prices strains Russia’s capacity to export and to generate the 
income needed to subsidise domestic consumption. This is a vicious circle that 
can either be broken by tough decisions to reform the domestic energy sector 
or by banking on increased production alone. The latter is the politically easier 
way out, and seems to be the Russian leadership’s favoured option. Gazprom 
can hardly afford to miss the increasingly urgent deadline on Shtokman. In any 
case, the era of relatively “easy” gas is ending with investment costs outstripping 
the breakeven price level of the yields from future developments. Based on oil 
prices at around 50–60 USD, the whole Shtokman investment plan may be in 
jeopardy. Major decisions, postponed for too long, need to be made. The invest-
ment gap foreseen by the International Energy Agency is becoming a reality, and 
a negative gas balance in Russia may ensue. In spite of frequently updated and 
optimistic production targets, Gazprom may in fact be drifting further away 
from realising the estimated needed production levels of the critical period of 
2015–20.116 Other energy sources, in particular coal, may be used to fuel the 
domestic market, while gas is prioritised for export. Nuclear power is also an 
alternative for the Russian power-grid. Either way there are economic and en-
vironmental costs involved. Although the exact time is still uncertain, Gazprom 
maintains that production at Shtokman will start before 2015 and that an on-
shore LNG plant will be ready by approximately that time. At the time of writ-
ing, these estimates seem optimistic, but the seriousness of the situation may 
11 Interview, Hydro, ibid. See also IEA, Optimising Russian Natural Gas.
115 The bulk of Russian gas production comes from a small number of giant fields now 
depleting at a considerable rate. Gazprom’s development strategy is to meet production       
targets by optimising capacities at the giant fields and by bringing on-stream the 
satellite fields located in their margins, cf. ЭНЕРГЕТИЧЕСКАЯ� СТРАТЕГИЯ�  
РОССИИ НА �ЕРИО�� ��О ���� ГО��А�� ������� ����� ����� ����          [Russia’s energy 
strategy up to 2020, May 2003]. See also IEA, Optimising Russian Natural Gas,       
“Executive summary”. 
116 IEA Optimising Russian Natural Gas; Natural Gas Market Review 2006.
OF_1_2009_innhold.indd   47 26-02-09   12:14:44
4 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty 1/2009 NOr�e�IaN fOreI�N �O�Icy IN t�e �I�� NOrt�      
have dawned on Gazprom’s top leadership.117 Inevitably, 2015 will prove to be 
a crucial date for the future prospects of the energy province. 
Energy province and the pomor zone
The discussion above confirms that Russia is influenced by internal and exter-
nal circumstances to speed up energy production in the North. It suggests that 
Russia will not be able to do it all alone, and that energy development in the 
North has political implications for Europe and for the direction and content of 
Europe’s common energy policy. But does Norway need the energy province as 
much as Russia? 
Currently, Norway’s annual production of oil amounts to three million 
barrels per day, and annual gas production is 85 billion cubic metres. By 2013 
gas production will surpass the comparative level of oil production. Overall 
production volumes will continue to increase only in the shorter term. In the me-
dium to longer term, the level of production will depend on the development of 
new fields. As of today, approximately one third of the resource potential of the 
Norwegian continental shelf has been extracted. According to the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate’s estimates, a substantial amount of undiscovered oil and 
gas reserves may be found in the northernmost part of the undisputed Norwe-
gian shelf.118 Norway is at present the third largest exporter of oil worldwide, 
and the second largest exporter of gas to the European market. Official predic-
tions are that Norway’s access to mature resources will continue to improve and 
that natural gas exports may increase considerably and reach a total volume of 
125 to 10 billion cubic metres during the next decade.119 Thus, provided that 
Russian production and export levels do not change notably before Shtokman is 
on-stream, Norway’s supply of natural gas to Europe will in the not too distant 
future equal that of Russia, and account for a third of the consumption of the 
biggest consumer countries: France, Germany and Great Britain.120 
117 Ibid; interview Hydro, 
118 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Sokkelåret 2006. Ressursregnskapet pr. 31.12.2006 
[Resource account for the (Norwegian) shelf per 31.12.2006], Stavanger, 5 January 
2007.
119 See Ingebjørg Erlandsen Tofte (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy), Tarjei Moen, Evy 
Zenker (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate) (eds.), Facts. The Norwegian Petroleum 
Sector 2008, Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
2008, pp. 15, 80–82.
120 Jonas Gahr Støre, foreign minister, “Norway’s Perspective on Energy Security”, 
presentation at breakfast with U.S. House of Representatives, Friends of Norway 
Caucus, Capitol Hill, Washington D.C., 28 February 2007.
Over the years, Norway has worked hard to achieve energy cooperation 
with Russia. The Norwegian authorities have negotiated bilateral agreements 
and joint policy declarations, and facilitated energy-related contact and dia-
logue. In 1992, Norway and Russia formally established an “energy dialogue”. 
For Norway, the aim of this is to have close consultations on energy policy and 
win a privileged position for its oil and gas majors and contractors in the devel-
opment of Russia’s northern petroleum “bonanza”.121 Before merging in 2007, 
the Norwegian oil and gas majors Statoil and Hydro had been trying for years to 
play a role in Russia’s petroleum production and acquire ownership shares in its 
fields. During President Putin’s visit to Norway in November 2002, a joint dec-
laration was issued in which petroleum cooperation in the North was encour-
aged and Norwegian companies were “welcomed” to participate in developing 
the Shtokman field.122 During the visit, Putin also expressed optimistic views on 
the feasibility of reaching early agreement on the Barents Sea shelf delimitation 
issue, views that were noticed and later mentioned in the Orheim Commission’s 
report. Three years later, during Norwegian Prime Minister Bondevik’s visit to 
Russia in 2005, Putin announced a bilateral “strategic partnership” on energy 
development in the North and a Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Energy 
Sector, signed by Prime Ministers Bondevik and Fradkov, was issued.123 
Nonetheless, the energy province is a Norwegian political vision, and to 
what degree Russia shares this is not quite certain. When the Norwegian oil 
and gas majors, at the time competitors Statoil and Hydro, were first short-
listed as potential partners for developing Shtokman, expectations rocketed and 
plummeted as if on a montagne russe. Reciprocal deals were envisaged, such 
as awarding shares in the Norwegian Snow White and the Ormen Lange fields 
to Gazprom. As the final Russian decision was again and again postponed, the 
Norwegian government again and again tried to come up with new ideas that 
could ingratiate Statoil and Hydro with the Russians. Commissioned by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in September 2006 a former chief ex-
ecutive officer of Statoil and state secretary at the Ministry of Industry presented 
a list of ambitious Russian and Norwegian energy-related co-projects towards 
the year 2020.12 Making explicit references to the Bondevik-Fradkov Decla-
ration, the “Barents 2020” report proposed five technology projects: deep-sea 
121 Cf. Brunstad et al.,    Big Oil Playground …
122 Joint Declaration by the President of the Russian Federation and the Prime Minister of 
the Kingdom of Norway, 12 November 2002.
123 Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Energy Sector, 20 June 2005. This, so-called, 
“Bondevik-Fradkov Declaration” refers to the 1992 establishment of the energy 
dialogue and the 2002 declaration (ibid.). 
12 Arve Johnsen, “Barents 2020”. 
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have dawned on Gazprom’s top leadership.117 Inevitably, 2015 will prove to be 
a crucial date for the future prospects of the energy province. 
Energy province and the pomor zone
The discussion above confirms that Russia is influenced by internal and exter-
nal circumstances to speed up energy production in the North. It suggests that 
Russia will not be able to do it all alone, and that energy development in the 
North has political implications for Europe and for the direction and content of 
Europe’s common energy policy. But does Norway need the energy province as 
much as Russia? 
Currently, Norway’s annual production of oil amounts to three million 
barrels per day, and annual gas production is 85 billion cubic metres. By 2013 
gas production will surpass the comparative level of oil production. Overall 
production volumes will continue to increase only in the shorter term. In the me-
dium to longer term, the level of production will depend on the development of 
new fields. As of today, approximately one third of the resource potential of the 
Norwegian continental shelf has been extracted. According to the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate’s estimates, a substantial amount of undiscovered oil and 
gas reserves may be found in the northernmost part of the undisputed Norwe-
gian shelf.118 Norway is at present the third largest exporter of oil worldwide, 
and the second largest exporter of gas to the European market. Official predic-
tions are that Norway’s access to mature resources will continue to improve and 
that natural gas exports may increase considerably and reach a total volume of 
125 to 10 billion cubic metres during the next decade.119 Thus, provided that 
Russian production and export levels do not change notably before Shtokman is 
on-stream, Norway’s supply of natural gas to Europe will in the not too distant 
future equal that of Russia, and account for a third of the consumption of the 
biggest consumer countries: France, Germany and Great Britain.120 
117 Ibid; interview Hydro, 
118 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Sokkelåret 2006. Ressursregnskapet pr. 31.12.2006 
[Resource account for the (Norwegian) shelf per 31.12.2006], Stavanger, 5 January 
2007.
119 See Ingebjørg Erlandsen Tofte (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy), Tarjei Moen, Evy 
Zenker (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate) (eds.), Facts. The Norwegian Petroleum 
Sector 2008, Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
2008, pp. 15, 80–82.
120 Jonas Gahr Støre, foreign minister, “Norway’s Perspective on Energy Security”, 
presentation at breakfast with U.S. House of Representatives, Friends of Norway 
Caucus, Capitol Hill, Washington D.C., 28 February 2007.
Over the years, Norway has worked hard to achieve energy cooperation 
with Russia. The Norwegian authorities have negotiated bilateral agreements 
and joint policy declarations, and facilitated energy-related contact and dia-
logue. In 1992, Norway and Russia formally established an “energy dialogue”. 
For Norway, the aim of this is to have close consultations on energy policy and 
win a privileged position for its oil and gas majors and contractors in the devel-
opment of Russia’s northern petroleum “bonanza”.121 Before merging in 2007, 
the Norwegian oil and gas majors Statoil and Hydro had been trying for years to 
play a role in Russia’s petroleum production and acquire ownership shares in its 
fields. During President Putin’s visit to Norway in November 2002, a joint dec-
laration was issued in which petroleum cooperation in the North was encour-
aged and Norwegian companies were “welcomed” to participate in developing 
the Shtokman field.122 During the visit, Putin also expressed optimistic views on 
the feasibility of reaching early agreement on the Barents Sea shelf delimitation 
issue, views that were noticed and later mentioned in the Orheim Commission’s 
report. Three years later, during Norwegian Prime Minister Bondevik’s visit to 
Russia in 2005, Putin announced a bilateral “strategic partnership” on energy 
development in the North and a Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Energy 
Sector, signed by Prime Ministers Bondevik and Fradkov, was issued.123 
Nonetheless, the energy province is a Norwegian political vision, and to 
what degree Russia shares this is not quite certain. When the Norwegian oil 
and gas majors, at the time competitors Statoil and Hydro, were first short-
listed as potential partners for developing Shtokman, expectations rocketed and 
plummeted as if on a montagne russe. Reciprocal deals were envisaged, such 
as awarding shares in the Norwegian Snow White and the Ormen Lange fields 
to Gazprom. As the final Russian decision was again and again postponed, the 
Norwegian government again and again tried to come up with new ideas that 
could ingratiate Statoil and Hydro with the Russians. Commissioned by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in September 2006 a former chief ex-
ecutive officer of Statoil and state secretary at the Ministry of Industry presented 
a list of ambitious Russian and Norwegian energy-related co-projects towards 
the year 2020.12 Making explicit references to the Bondevik-Fradkov Decla-
ration, the “Barents 2020” report proposed five technology projects: deep-sea 
121 Cf. Brunstad et al.,    Big Oil Playground …
122 Joint Declaration by the President of the Russian Federation and the Prime Minister of 
the Kingdom of Norway, 12 November 2002.
123 Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Energy Sector, 20 June 2005. This, so-called, 
“Bondevik-Fradkov Declaration” refers to the 1992 establishment of the energy 
dialogue and the 2002 declaration (ibid.). 
12 Arve Johnsen, “Barents 2020”. 
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drilling and production technology for Arctic waters; long distance transporta-
tion of oil, gas and condensate in pipes; petroleum exploration and ice; real 
time “on screen” monitoring of the Barents Sea; joint practices in health, the 
environment and security. Underlying “Barents 2020” is the expectation that 
the future development of Shtokman could set an example for cooperation of 
great bilateral consequence. In this spirit, Barents 2020 suggested establishing 
an on-shore cross-border zone of industrial cooperation in energy activities (i.e. 
the “Pomor zone”). 
Irrespective of Gazprom’s decision to own Shtokman’s resources alone and 
have Total and StatoilHydro as partners in developing the first phase of the 
field, the Norwegian authorities have proceeded with Barents 2020, and tried 
to warm up Russia to the ideas in it. However, political momentum may have 
been lost regarding the “Pomor zone”. Much of the land-based infrastructure 
and chain of logistics needed to sustain activities at Shtokman are envisaged in 
this zone. But the Russian authorities seem reticent. There are probably two 
reasons for this: first, because locating industrial infrastructure in the Pomor 
zone may challenge the position of Murmansk as an aspiring petroleum capital; 
second, because of the envisaged difficulties of squaring the trans-border zone 
with the Russian military’s bases, operational needs and activities in the area. 
The main obstacle to cooperation could, then, prove to be die-hard notions of 
economic nationalism and territorial security combined. It is already evident 
that a newly established border security zone on the Russian side may effectively 
hinder extensive trans-border cooperation. While long undisclosed, the fifteen-
kilometre wide security zone entered into force for the Murmansk region on 2 
June 2006. It applies to Russian citizens and foreigners.125 Nonetheless, accord-
ing to the Norwegian media, the governor of Murmansk expressed cautious 
interest in the idea of a Pomor zone during a visit to Oslo in April 2007, as did 
Foreign Minister Lavrov when in Oslo for a NATO-Russia Council meeting the 
same month.126 Russia’s initial formal response to the Norwegian High North 
Strategy was given at the same occasion. Whatever the outcome, the idea of a 
cross-border economic zone of cooperation is interesting for the new thinking 
it represents: it breaks with the caution that has previously guided Norway’s 
approach to bilateral cooperation with Russia in the North. In particular, the 
125 In a press release from the office of the governor of the Murmansk oblast, Yuri 
Yevdokimov, posted on the web 1 June 2007, the practical consequences of the 
security zone were played down, cf. Governor of Murmansk, �ре��-релиз #3 [press 
release no. 3], 1 June 2007 [online 13 Jan 2009].
126 Governor Yevdokimov’s visit, Oslo 20 April, Foreign Minister Lavrov’s visit, Oslo 
26–27 April.
down-playing of the meaning of national borders that it entails represents some-
thing qualitatively new.
Even if unrealistic in the near future, the Pomor zone belongs to the vision 
of the energy province: it forces Russia to consider wide-ranging thematic en-
ergy cooperation in the region; it tries to engage with Russia during a formative 
phase of its future foreign and energy policy for the North. As the greater power 
and with the greater fields to develop, Russia will expect Norway to make such 
approaches: it is less clear how it will respond to them. Moreover, it is uncertain 
whether Moscow’s outlook on the Arctic matches that of the regional leadership 
in Murmansk, although it seems fairly clear that Moscow’s and Gazprom’s in-
terests will override those of the regional authorities. Energy cooperation might 
generate trans-border regional spillover, but will be a far cry from putting the re-
gion at the centre of development. Below lies in wait the unresolved delimitation 
of property rights to the natural resources of the Barents Sea shelf. This suggests 
that the energy province will not escape the “reasons of state” when national 
versus shared interests are being defined; the geography of natural resources 
remains a determinant factor for the content of policy. What could mitigate 
the spatial preponderance of all things sovereign is the pressing emphasis on 
temporal aspects of cooperation. Every vision needs a conceptual anchor in the 
real world, something concrete to relate to. The vision of an energy province in 
the High North is, I have found after examining it from different angles, largely 
dependent on the Shtokman timetable. If the project is delayed considerably, 
postponed from 2015 to more like 2020–25, the relative dependence on cheap 
intermediary supplies from Central Asia will expose Russia to new insecurities. 
The new energy interdependence implies that Russia’s vulnerability is also Eu-
rope’s. Globalisation of energy interdependence is a challenge in a world turning 
simultaneously and increasingly towards a (re)polarised order. This is a problem 
that the energy province can probably do little about.
It seems appropriate to conclude that energy is rightfully considered an ef-
fective instrument for Norway to carve out a wider political and economic space 
in the North. However, a complex set of variables pertaining to the development 
of Shtokman, to regional and global energy markets and future prices, and to 
geostrategic considerations, comes into play. This makes it difficult to assess the 
risk of Norway being marginalised in the future energy province of the High 
North. But in view of the active stance that the Norwegian Government has 
taken in cooperating with Russia, that StatoilHydro has managed to become 
part of the Shtokman project, and the present souring of relations between Rus-
sian and the West, the threat of marginalisation seem less apparent now than 
around the turn of the millennium. It is nonetheless uncertain whether energy 
cooperation may bring a sense of community to the region. While the realist 
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drilling and production technology for Arctic waters; long distance transporta-
tion of oil, gas and condensate in pipes; petroleum exploration and ice; real 
time “on screen” monitoring of the Barents Sea; joint practices in health, the 
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and chain of logistics needed to sustain activities at Shtokman are envisaged in 
this zone. But the Russian authorities seem reticent. There are probably two 
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zone may challenge the position of Murmansk as an aspiring petroleum capital; 
second, because of the envisaged difficulties of squaring the trans-border zone 
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kilometre wide security zone entered into force for the Murmansk region on 2 
June 2006. It applies to Russian citizens and foreigners.125 Nonetheless, accord-
ing to the Norwegian media, the governor of Murmansk expressed cautious 
interest in the idea of a Pomor zone during a visit to Oslo in April 2007, as did 
Foreign Minister Lavrov when in Oslo for a NATO-Russia Council meeting the 
same month.126 Russia’s initial formal response to the Norwegian High North 
Strategy was given at the same occasion. Whatever the outcome, the idea of a 
cross-border economic zone of cooperation is interesting for the new thinking 
it represents: it breaks with the caution that has previously guided Norway’s 
approach to bilateral cooperation with Russia in the North. In particular, the 
125 In a press release from the office of the governor of the Murmansk oblast, Yuri 
Yevdokimov, posted on the web 1 June 2007, the practical consequences of the 
security zone were played down, cf. Governor of Murmansk, �ре��-релиз #3 [press 
release no. 3], 1 June 2007 [online 13 Jan 2009].
126 Governor Yevdokimov’s visit, Oslo 20 April, Foreign Minister Lavrov’s visit, Oslo 
26–27 April.
down-playing of the meaning of national borders that it entails represents some-
thing qualitatively new.
Even if unrealistic in the near future, the Pomor zone belongs to the vision 
of the energy province: it forces Russia to consider wide-ranging thematic en-
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generate trans-border regional spillover, but will be a far cry from putting the re-
gion at the centre of development. Below lies in wait the unresolved delimitation 
of property rights to the natural resources of the Barents Sea shelf. This suggests 
that the energy province will not escape the “reasons of state” when national 
versus shared interests are being defined; the geography of natural resources 
remains a determinant factor for the content of policy. What could mitigate 
the spatial preponderance of all things sovereign is the pressing emphasis on 
temporal aspects of cooperation. Every vision needs a conceptual anchor in the 
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postponed from 2015 to more like 2020–25, the relative dependence on cheap 
intermediary supplies from Central Asia will expose Russia to new insecurities. 
The new energy interdependence implies that Russia’s vulnerability is also Eu-
rope’s. Globalisation of energy interdependence is a challenge in a world turning 
simultaneously and increasingly towards a (re)polarised order. This is a problem 
that the energy province can probably do little about.
It seems appropriate to conclude that energy is rightfully considered an ef-
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of Shtokman, to regional and global energy markets and future prices, and to 
geostrategic considerations, comes into play. This makes it difficult to assess the 
risk of Norway being marginalised in the future energy province of the High 
North. But in view of the active stance that the Norwegian Government has 
taken in cooperating with Russia, that StatoilHydro has managed to become 
part of the Shtokman project, and the present souring of relations between Rus-
sian and the West, the threat of marginalisation seem less apparent now than 
around the turn of the millennium. It is nonetheless uncertain whether energy 
cooperation may bring a sense of community to the region. While the realist 
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and liberal views emphasise that cooperation must match material interests, the 
constructivist approach would also explore perceptions of cooperation as such, 
to assess how Russia’s interests are interpreted and shaped.
ENERGy – bETWEEN COMMUNITy AND SOVEREIGNTy 
Energy province and community in the North
Norway’s High North policy is not without regard for traditional trans-Atlantic 
and European considerations. The Stoltenberg II Government has probably 
worked as hard as any since the Cold War to make Norway’s Western allies in-
terested in the High North. It has been careful to explain the bilateral reasons for 
and regional perspectives of energy cooperation with Russia. Balanced engage-
ment is what the Government is trying to achieve by structuring the High North 
policy into an international dialogue alongside closer relations with Russia. In 
spite of such twin-tracked approaches, or perhaps because of them, Norway’s 
policy for the North has been characterised as “blurry” and “difficult to get a 
grip on” by some Western partners and allies.127 The overshadowing perception 
in Moscow and Western capitals is that Norway is poised to formulate and pur-
sue national interests in the North more vigorously.128 
From Moscow’s perspective this is not entirely negative. When seeking co-
operation with Russia, Norway now actually goes to Moscow and not first to 
Washington or Brussels. Also, Norway’s purposes and reasons for cooperating 
with Russia in the North are more precisely formulated and tied to the two 
countries’ material interests. The interest-based approach may in itself have a 
confidence-building effect, since it represents a way of thinking that the policy-
makers in Moscow can relate to more easily. Yet Russian policy-makers are also 
voicing their concern about what they consider expansive Norwegian designs in 
the High North.129 To those of Norway’s NATO Allies who are most apprehen-
sive and to Russia alike, it is not the unsettled Russian-Norwegian borderline 
in the Barents Sea that gives reason for concern, but access to the resources of 
the maritime zones surrounding the Svalbard archipelago. The promise of the 
energy province and of cooperation to develop the riches of the undisputed Rus-
sian Barents Sea shelf has done little to deflect attention from or soften reserva-
tions about Norway’s claims to the zone and shelf around Svalbard. Rather, the 
energy dimension of Norway’s High North policy may have triggered recent 
127 Interview, UK embassy Oslo, 26 June 2007; interview, US embassy Oslo, 27 June 
2007, cf. supra note 100.
128 Inteviews ibid; interview, representative of the Russian embassy, Oslo, 23 January 
2007. 
129  Ibid.
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restatements of such reservations. 130 Whereas the policy’s main premise suggests 
that there is a community platform in the North to build on, the historical no-
tion of such a community is debatable. The emergence of community among 
states involves social learning, building trust and ultimately changes in mutual 
and self-perceptions.131 Relations with Russia throughout most of the Cold War 
were characterised by the very lack of such community and the mutual confi-
dence needed to underpin it. Whenever the Soviet leadership advanced condo-
minium-like proposals, be they on Svalbard or in the Barents Sea, Norwegian 
governments suspected ulterior, security-related motives. Equally, the security 
community of Atlantic states was predicated on security concerns in the north 
rather than feelings of community for the north. Lingering just below the secu-
rity overlay, narrowly defined national interests were never far away. How can 
we, then, get a grip on the question of community in the North today: what does 
it do for policy, if anything? 
Although Russia’s 1826 border with Norway is uncontested, and Norway 
is the only neighbour with which Russia has never been at war, overall bilateral 
relations have never enjoyed much trust or mutual confidence.132 Little remains 
of the historical community feeling of the North from pre-Soviet times.133 After 
the Cold War, institutionalised regional cooperation like the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Region and the Baltic Sea cooperation have sought to breathe new life into pu-
tative historic community sentiments. Regional cooperation in the North was 
kick-started through institutional entrepreneurship and invention.13 This ele-
ment of artificiality notwithstanding, the Barents region has been productive in 
shaping practical cooperation on interlocking levels: between states, administra-
tive regions and municipalities, and people-to-people. Paradoxically, coopera-
tion has been most productive when state structures were disinterested and kept 
130 Interview at Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 9 November 2006. Cf. UK 
Diplomatic Note 17 March 2006, and UK Non-Paper: Svalbard: Further UK views, 
July 2006.
131 Andrea Oelsner, “Two Sides of the Same Coin: Mutual Perceptions and Security 
Community in the Case of Argentina and Brazil”, in Comparative Regional 
Integration. Theoretical Perspectives, ed. Finn Laursen, The International Political 
Economy of New Regionalism Series (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 186.
132 Iver B. Neumann, “Russian identity in the European mirror”, Europa-programmet, 
no. 1 (1993), and Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe. A Study in identity and 
international relations (London: Routledge, 16).
133 Ola Tunander, “Inventing the Barents Region: Overcoming the East-West Divide”, 
in The Barents Region. Cooperation in Arctic Europe, eds Olav Schram Stokke, Ola 
Tunander (London: SAGE Publications, 199), pp. 31–; Tatjana N. Jackson and 
Jens Petter Nielsen, eds, Russia-Norway. Physical and Symbolic Borders (Moscow: 
Languages of Slavonic Culture, 2005); Børresen, Forsvar uten trussel.
13 Tunander, “Inventing the Barents Region”. 
at a distance. This observation was the reason why the majority of the Orheim 
Commission felt that the Barents cooperation would be of little use to deal with 
issues of bilateral significance. Subsequently, energy cooperation has been kept 
out of it altogether. More surprisingly perhaps, it is questionable whether there 
was ever much Western community feeling for the North to speak of in the 
first place. Throughout the Cold War, the Allied sense of common purpose and 
cohesiveness in the North was driven by the imperatives of security. The West’s 
interest in the North was chiefly strategic, and born out of adversarial relations 
with the Soviet Union. Military and political presence was motivated by the 
strategic importance of sea lines of communication and of the North as a staging 
area for nuclear weapons. As pointed out by Sjaastad and Skogan as early as the 
mid-1970s, apart from security, there was not much community perspective for 
the North on the Western side.135 Some thirty years later, Alyson Bailes makes a 
similar point, although from the perspective of the Nordic states, when saying 
that “[T]he democracies of the North had an essentially defence-related concern 
about their Big Neighbour to the East and an essentially defence-related motive 
for working with their Big Ally (or for the non-Allies, their Big Friend) in the 
West, namely the United States.”136 
In other words, while security communities may provide stable peace, not 
all stable peace situations make up a community.137 The question of Norway’s 
political position in the North is not a matter of relations with Russia alone. At 
the time of its conception, the High North policy sought to take into account a 
situation when relations between Russia and the West, notably with the US, and 
driven by the great powers’ strategic energy interests, were quickly picking up. 
Overtaken by events, the High North policy has now to readjust to the deterio-
ration of US-Russia relations. Ironically, the situation may strengthen Norway’s 
relative position vis-à-vis Russia. Yet it creates other challenges – such as the 
impression that Norway is acting in disregard of the emerging trans-Atlantic 
consensus on Russia as a self-interested “free rider” who is not living up to the 
high standards inherent to the High North strategy, including its language on 
democracy, political freedom and rule of law in Russia.138 Thus, post-Cold War 
peace brings new challenges to Norway in the North – irrespective of whether 
East-West relations are good or strained. Although the signs are encouraging, 
135 Sjaastad and Skogan,   Politikk og sikkerhet i Norskehavsområdet, p. 259. Cf. Wight,  
“The Balance of Power”, p. 17. 
136 Alyson J. K. Bailes, “New NATO, old Norway? The changing security environment 
for Northern Europe”, speaking notes, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1 
December 2006 (Forsvarsnett [online 15 Jan 2009]). Emphasis added.
137 Oelsner, “Two Sides of the Same Coin”, p. 186. 
138 Interview, US embassy, Oslo, 27 June 2007.
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community of Atlantic states was predicated on security concerns in the north 
rather than feelings of community for the north. Lingering just below the secu-
rity overlay, narrowly defined national interests were never far away. How can 
we, then, get a grip on the question of community in the North today: what does 
it do for policy, if anything? 
Although Russia’s 1826 border with Norway is uncontested, and Norway 
is the only neighbour with which Russia has never been at war, overall bilateral 
relations have never enjoyed much trust or mutual confidence.132 Little remains 
of the historical community feeling of the North from pre-Soviet times.133 After 
the Cold War, institutionalised regional cooperation like the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Region and the Baltic Sea cooperation have sought to breathe new life into pu-
tative historic community sentiments. Regional cooperation in the North was 
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Diplomatic Note 17 March 2006, and UK Non-Paper: Svalbard: Further UK views, 
July 2006.
131 Andrea Oelsner, “Two Sides of the Same Coin: Mutual Perceptions and Security 
Community in the Case of Argentina and Brazil”, in Comparative Regional 
Integration. Theoretical Perspectives, ed. Finn Laursen, The International Political 
Economy of New Regionalism Series (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 186.
132 Iver B. Neumann, “Russian identity in the European mirror”, Europa-programmet, 
no. 1 (1993), and Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe. A Study in identity and 
international relations (London: Routledge, 16).
133 Ola Tunander, “Inventing the Barents Region: Overcoming the East-West Divide”, 
in The Barents Region. Cooperation in Arctic Europe, eds Olav Schram Stokke, Ola 
Tunander (London: SAGE Publications, 199), pp. 31–; Tatjana N. Jackson and 
Jens Petter Nielsen, eds, Russia-Norway. Physical and Symbolic Borders (Moscow: 
Languages of Slavonic Culture, 2005); Børresen, Forsvar uten trussel.
13 Tunander, “Inventing the Barents Region”. 
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first place. Throughout the Cold War, the Allied sense of common purpose and 
cohesiveness in the North was driven by the imperatives of security. The West’s 
interest in the North was chiefly strategic, and born out of adversarial relations 
with the Soviet Union. Military and political presence was motivated by the 
strategic importance of sea lines of communication and of the North as a staging 
area for nuclear weapons. As pointed out by Sjaastad and Skogan as early as the 
mid-1970s, apart from security, there was not much community perspective for 
the North on the Western side.135 Some thirty years later, Alyson Bailes makes a 
similar point, although from the perspective of the Nordic states, when saying 
that “[T]he democracies of the North had an essentially defence-related concern 
about their Big Neighbour to the East and an essentially defence-related motive 
for working with their Big Ally (or for the non-Allies, their Big Friend) in the 
West, namely the United States.”136 
In other words, while security communities may provide stable peace, not 
all stable peace situations make up a community.137 The question of Norway’s 
political position in the North is not a matter of relations with Russia alone. At 
the time of its conception, the High North policy sought to take into account a 
situation when relations between Russia and the West, notably with the US, and 
driven by the great powers’ strategic energy interests, were quickly picking up. 
Overtaken by events, the High North policy has now to readjust to the deterio-
ration of US-Russia relations. Ironically, the situation may strengthen Norway’s 
relative position vis-à-vis Russia. Yet it creates other challenges – such as the 
impression that Norway is acting in disregard of the emerging trans-Atlantic 
consensus on Russia as a self-interested “free rider” who is not living up to the 
high standards inherent to the High North strategy, including its language on 
democracy, political freedom and rule of law in Russia.138 Thus, post-Cold War 
peace brings new challenges to Norway in the North – irrespective of whether 
East-West relations are good or strained. Although the signs are encouraging, 
135 Sjaastad and Skogan,   Politikk og sikkerhet i Norskehavsområdet, p. 259. Cf. Wight,  
“The Balance of Power”, p. 17. 
136 Alyson J. K. Bailes, “New NATO, old Norway? The changing security environment 
for Northern Europe”, speaking notes, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1 
December 2006 (Forsvarsnett [online 15 Jan 2009]). Emphasis added.
137 Oelsner, “Two Sides of the Same Coin”, p. 186. 
138 Interview, US embassy, Oslo, 27 June 2007.
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it is too early to say what the foreign policy of the Obama Administration may 
mean for US-Russia relations and for the overall political environment of the 
High North.
A key Norwegian concern is to avoid a policy and security void in the 
ocean areas of the High North. The military has an important role in both 
respects. Sovereign control and law enforcement are tasks that Norway needs 
to conduct single-handedly lest a void be perceived to exist which other states 
attempt to fill. By being present and controlling activities and upholding juris-
diction, Norway substantiates its sovereign claims. This is, moreover, a way of 
shaping and building international law as an institution governing international 
relations. The coastguard is the preferred means for the task. International law 
has the inherent capacity of making even small states “big” by virtue of the 
authority bestowed by the principle of the rule of law. But in terms of seago-
ing enforcement capabilities Norway remains “small”, having at its disposal 
a relatively modest number of coastguard vessels (with maritime helicopters) 
and new frigates. In addition, maritime surveillance is regularly conducted by 
the air force’s Orion planes and satellites. This is hardly more than necessary 
for credible control of an ocean area about six times greater than that of main-
land Norway.139 Yet, Russia frequently maintains that Norway is engaging in a 
militarisation of the northern ocean areas. From Russia’s viewpoint, Norway’s 
policy could be interpreted as one of securitisation. Framing it thus would in 
a narrow sense serve Russia’s own interests. How deep Russia’s suspicions of 
Norway’s motives in the North actually run is difficult to assess. 
I shall in the following explore the international disagreement over issues 
related to Svalbard and their regional connotations. I take the lacking commu-
nity effect in the North as a point of departure. My findings suggest that there is 
no tangible northern community between Norway and Russia to speak of, and 
that the security community of the West has not given way to any other com-
munity feeling for the North. In both cases an energy community could emerge, 
but then most presumably embracing the West as a whole and Russia. Norway’s 
challenge, then, would again be to avoid marginalisation in such a political set-
ting. I will structure the analysis along the two external orientations of the High 
North policy.
139 NOU 2007: 15, “Et styrket Forsvar” [Strengthened Defence Forces], White Book to 
the Ministry of Defence, 31 October 2007. Norwegian Armed Forces, “Forsvarssjefens 
Forsvarsstudie 2007. Sluttrapport” [Chief of Defence’s Defence Study 2007. Final 
Report], Norwegian Armed Forces/Ministry of Defence.
The two external orientations of the High North policy
Generally, the international Law of the Sea has moved in a direction favouring 
the interests of coastal states. However, the sovereign rights accorded to them 
come at a cost: international standards and shared interests and values depend 
on a national resolve to uphold and protect them. The implication is that na-
tional capacities need to be available, present and credible – as well as interna-
tionally legitimate. Historically, the combination of strategic resources, unset-
tled borders and unrecognised jurisdiction augments the potential for conflict 
between states. The potential for conflict is still present in the new security envi-
ronment of the North, although in a somewhat different guise. A sticky situation 
arises from the fact that most EU states and fellow NATO members, although 
traditionally supportive of Norway in the North, are themselves signatories to 
the Svalbard Treaty. They jealously guard their rights under the treaty, but are 
at once watchful of Russia’s attempts to secure a de facto privileged position in 
the maritime zones around Svalbard.
A diplomatic non-paper addressed by the United Kingdom to the Norwe-
gian Government in July 2006 is of general interest as it may well sum up the 
position of several of the signatories to the Svalbard Treaty. In the non-paper, 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office says that “recent UK interest in Svalbard 
has been prompted by (…) the announcement by Norway in 200 of the 19th 
Hydrocarbon Licensing Round, which includes blocks [the UK] considers to lie 
on Svalbard’s continental shelf.”10 According to the non-paper, the United King-
dom has had similar exchanges with the Norwegian authorities about earlier 
licensing rounds in the 1990s. Moreover, the non-paper refers to Prime Minister 
Stoltenberg’s inaugural address to parliament in October 2005, announcing the 
Government’s intention to make the High North a foreign-policy priority and to 
“assert its interests in the region more strongly and ‘intensify efforts to exercise 
Norwegian sovereignty’”.11 The twentieth licensing round is what is really on 
the UK’s mind.12 Not only UK authorities are mindful about this. In the follow-
ing, I shall conduct a brief comparative analysis of Norway’s, Russia’s, the EU’s 
(including the United Kingdom, France and Germany), the US’s and the Nordic 
states’ positions on sovereignty and jurisdiction in the zone and on the shelf 
10 United Kingdom Non-Paper, July 2006. Copy handed to author together with copies 
of UK Diplomatic Notes to Norway on Svalbard-related issues from the 1970s 
onwards. 
11 Quote, inserted quote and emphasis as in UK Non-Paper, ibid. See also chapter 1, 
supra note 3.
12 Interview, FCO, 9 November 2006.
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the air force’s Orion planes and satellites. This is hardly more than necessary 
for credible control of an ocean area about six times greater than that of main-
land Norway.139 Yet, Russia frequently maintains that Norway is engaging in a 
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policy could be interpreted as one of securitisation. Framing it thus would in 
a narrow sense serve Russia’s own interests. How deep Russia’s suspicions of 
Norway’s motives in the North actually run is difficult to assess. 
I shall in the following explore the international disagreement over issues 
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nity effect in the North as a point of departure. My findings suggest that there is 
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139 NOU 2007: 15, “Et styrket Forsvar” [Strengthened Defence Forces], White Book to 
the Ministry of Defence, 31 October 2007. Norwegian Armed Forces, “Forsvarssjefens 
Forsvarsstudie 2007. Sluttrapport” [Chief of Defence’s Defence Study 2007. Final 
Report], Norwegian Armed Forces/Ministry of Defence.
The two external orientations of the High North policy
Generally, the international Law of the Sea has moved in a direction favouring 
the interests of coastal states. However, the sovereign rights accorded to them 
come at a cost: international standards and shared interests and values depend 
on a national resolve to uphold and protect them. The implication is that na-
tional capacities need to be available, present and credible – as well as interna-
tionally legitimate. Historically, the combination of strategic resources, unset-
tled borders and unrecognised jurisdiction augments the potential for conflict 
between states. The potential for conflict is still present in the new security envi-
ronment of the North, although in a somewhat different guise. A sticky situation 
arises from the fact that most EU states and fellow NATO members, although 
traditionally supportive of Norway in the North, are themselves signatories to 
the Svalbard Treaty. They jealously guard their rights under the treaty, but are 
at once watchful of Russia’s attempts to secure a de facto privileged position in 
the maritime zones around Svalbard.
A diplomatic non-paper addressed by the United Kingdom to the Norwe-
gian Government in July 2006 is of general interest as it may well sum up the 
position of several of the signatories to the Svalbard Treaty. In the non-paper, 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office says that “recent UK interest in Svalbard 
has been prompted by (…) the announcement by Norway in 200 of the 19th 
Hydrocarbon Licensing Round, which includes blocks [the UK] considers to lie 
on Svalbard’s continental shelf.”10 According to the non-paper, the United King-
dom has had similar exchanges with the Norwegian authorities about earlier 
licensing rounds in the 1990s. Moreover, the non-paper refers to Prime Minister 
Stoltenberg’s inaugural address to parliament in October 2005, announcing the 
Government’s intention to make the High North a foreign-policy priority and to 
“assert its interests in the region more strongly and ‘intensify efforts to exercise 
Norwegian sovereignty’”.11 The twentieth licensing round is what is really on 
the UK’s mind.12 Not only UK authorities are mindful about this. In the follow-
ing, I shall conduct a brief comparative analysis of Norway’s, Russia’s, the EU’s 
(including the United Kingdom, France and Germany), the US’s and the Nordic 
states’ positions on sovereignty and jurisdiction in the zone and on the shelf 
10 United Kingdom Non-Paper, July 2006. Copy handed to author together with copies 
of UK Diplomatic Notes to Norway on Svalbard-related issues from the 1970s 
onwards. 
11 Quote, inserted quote and emphasis as in UK Non-Paper, ibid. See also chapter 1, 
supra note 3.
12 Interview, FCO, 9 November 2006.
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around Svalbard to try to ascertain whether the positions in any way interrelate 
with political designs and interests in the wider Arctic region.
RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA
The following presentation of Russian thinking on questions of ocean status 
and strategic interests related to Svalbard and the Barents Sea shelf draws large-
ly on two sources: an exposé by the Russian international lawyer Alexander 
Vylegzhanin at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters in January 
2007,13 and a Duma report on Svalbard affairs delivered at a hearing in June 
2007 by Gennadiy Oleinik, committee chairman of the Federal Council of the 
Russian State Duma.1 Between them, they cover the most contentious issues of 
the North from the perspective of international law and politics, and must be ex-
pected to represent the political mainstream of Russian thinking on the matter. 
Over the years Russia’s presence on Svalbard has been assured mainly by 
the General Consulate in Barentsburg and the activities of the coal mining com-
pany, Trust Arktikugol.15 Russia’s policy for Svalbard was last laid down in a 
Presidential Decree of 31 December 1997. Another policy revision may now be 
under way. The former Russian inter-ministerial commission on Svalbard was 
abolished in 200, but in spring 2007 a new government commission was es-
tablished, to be headed by then Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Naryshkin.16 As 
minister responsible for Svalbard affairs, Naryshkin in the autumn of 2007 led 
an official delegation consisting of some fifty people to Svalbard. Reportedly, he 
argued the importance of Svalbard to Russia on the grounds that the isles secure 
Russia’s presence in the western Arctic.17 He informed those present about the 
13 Alexander N. Vylegzhanin, “Future problems of International law in the High North: 
Review of Russian legal literature”, Politics and Law – Energy and Environment in the 
far north, Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, 25 January 2007.
1 G. D. Oleinik, “Вы�тупление пре���е����теля К��итет�� С��ет�� Фе��ер��ции п� 
��ел��� Се�ер�� и ���л�чи�ленных н��р����� Г.��. Оле��ни��� н�� р���ширенн�� 
з���е����нии К��итет�� п� те�е: ‘�ри�ут�т�ие Р���и������� Фе��ер��ции н�� ��рхипел���е 
Шпицбер�ен: п�лити��-пр�����ые�� э��н��иче��ие и �у���нит��рные ���пе�ты’” 
[Report by the Chairman of the Federal Council’s Committee on the North and 
Minorities, G. D. Oleinik, at the enlarged meeting of the Committee on the subject 
of: “Presence of the Russian Federation on the Svalbard Archipelago: Politico-legal, 
economic and humanitarian aspects”], 19 June 2007 (Federal Council of the State 
Duma [online 15 Jan 2009]).
15 Full name in the Russian ФГУ� Тре�т Ар�ти�у��ль.
16 ���т��н��ление �р���итель�т��� �т 1� ��преля ���7 ������ № �16 [Government Decision of   
10 April 2007, no. 216].   
17 “This [i.e. Svalbard] is a strategic spot, which gives our country the chance to 
be present in the western part of the Arctic.” Quote from BarentsObserver.com, 
“Spitsbergen secures Russia’s presence in the western Arctic”, posted 19 October 
2007.
government’s intention to present a Russian strategy for Svalbard by mid-2008, 
whose aim was to diversify economic and research activities on the archipelago 
and secure additional funding for the Russian presence in Barentsburg and for 
Arktikugol. Russia’s mobilisation of interests regarding Svalbard is conceivably 
part of a strategy to secure a better foothold on the archipelago, possibly in re-
sponse to Norway’s High North Strategy. 
Vylegzhanin traces the question of Svalbard’s international status back to 
the 1872 agreement between Russia and the former Union of Norway-Sweden. 
Since both states claimed historical rights to conduct economic and scientific ac-
tivities on the archipelago, the agreement stipulated that neither Norway (then 
under Sweden) nor Russia was to have sole sovereignty over Svalbard. This 
concept of divided sovereignty is, according to Vylegzhanin, incorporated and 
continued in the 1920 Svalbard Treaty. Although article one of the treaty confers 
“full and absolute” sovereignty to Norway, this is a sovereignty with princi-
pal limitations, according to the Russian view. The restrictions invoked by the 
treaty, it is claimed, define the real scope of Norwegian sovereignty over Sval-
bard. These include the provisions stipulating that Norway cannot discriminate 
against the subjects of other signatories or impose higher taxes than necessary 
for the administration of Svalbard itself, and the prohibition of military uses 
of the islands. 18 Crucially, the Russian point is that the treaty, and a restricted 
interpretation of the content of Norway’s sovereignty therein, should apply also 
to the economic zone and the shelf around Svalbard. Russia rejects the view 
that the shelf around Svalbard is part of Norway’s continuous mainland shelf. 
Moreover, Russia does not recognise the Norwegian 200-mile Fisheries Protec-
tion Zone around Svalbard as such, but tacitly conforms to Norway’s practice 
of “leniently” exercising authority over Russian fishing activities in the zone. In-
spections are accepted, but Russian captains are under instruction not to sign the 
inspection protocols as this would be tantamount to recognising Norway’s right 
to exercise authority and, thus, Norwegian sovereign rights in the zone. Conse-
quently, Russia argues that by establishing the Fisheries Protection Zone under 
Norwegian law (as if it were an exclusive economic zone) and by maintaining 
that the continental shelf around Svalbard is not Svalbard’s (but a continuation 
18 On the legal debate about the stipulations of the treaty, see Willy Østreng, 
“Svalbards situasjon i storpolitisk perspektiv” [The situation of Svalbard in a high 
policy perspective], Internasjonal politikk, no. 3 (197): 679–701; Geir Ulfstein, 
The Svalbard Treaty: From Terra Nullius to Norwegian Sovereignty (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1995), Carl August Fleischer, “Svalbards sokkel og sone i lys av 
Svalbardkonferanse og traktattekst” [The shelf and zone of Svalbard in light of the 
Svalbard Conference and the Treaty text], speech at NORISS – Forum for strategi og 
næringsutvikling, 21 March 2006; and “The New International Law …”
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around Svalbard to try to ascertain whether the positions in any way interrelate 
with political designs and interests in the wider Arctic region.
RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA
The following presentation of Russian thinking on questions of ocean status 
and strategic interests related to Svalbard and the Barents Sea shelf draws large-
ly on two sources: an exposé by the Russian international lawyer Alexander 
Vylegzhanin at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters in January 
2007,13 and a Duma report on Svalbard affairs delivered at a hearing in June 
2007 by Gennadiy Oleinik, committee chairman of the Federal Council of the 
Russian State Duma.1 Between them, they cover the most contentious issues of 
the North from the perspective of international law and politics, and must be ex-
pected to represent the political mainstream of Russian thinking on the matter. 
Over the years Russia’s presence on Svalbard has been assured mainly by 
the General Consulate in Barentsburg and the activities of the coal mining com-
pany, Trust Arktikugol.15 Russia’s policy for Svalbard was last laid down in a 
Presidential Decree of 31 December 1997. Another policy revision may now be 
under way. The former Russian inter-ministerial commission on Svalbard was 
abolished in 200, but in spring 2007 a new government commission was es-
tablished, to be headed by then Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Naryshkin.16 As 
minister responsible for Svalbard affairs, Naryshkin in the autumn of 2007 led 
an official delegation consisting of some fifty people to Svalbard. Reportedly, he 
argued the importance of Svalbard to Russia on the grounds that the isles secure 
Russia’s presence in the western Arctic.17 He informed those present about the 
13 Alexander N. Vylegzhanin, “Future problems of International law in the High North: 
Review of Russian legal literature”, Politics and Law – Energy and Environment in the 
far north, Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, 25 January 2007.
1 G. D. Oleinik, “Вы�тупление пре���е����теля К��итет�� С��ет�� Фе��ер��ции п� 
��ел��� Се�ер�� и ���л�чи�ленных н��р����� Г.��. Оле��ни��� н�� р���ширенн�� 
з���е����нии К��итет�� п� те�е: ‘�ри�ут�т�ие Р���и������� Фе��ер��ции н�� ��рхипел���е 
Шпицбер�ен: п�лити��-пр�����ые�� э��н��иче��ие и �у���нит��рные ���пе�ты’” 
[Report by the Chairman of the Federal Council’s Committee on the North and 
Minorities, G. D. Oleinik, at the enlarged meeting of the Committee on the subject 
of: “Presence of the Russian Federation on the Svalbard Archipelago: Politico-legal, 
economic and humanitarian aspects”], 19 June 2007 (Federal Council of the State 
Duma [online 15 Jan 2009]).
15 Full name in the Russian ФГУ� Тре�т Ар�ти�у��ль.
16 ���т��н��ление �р���итель�т��� �т 1� ��преля ���7 ������ № �16 [Government Decision of   
10 April 2007, no. 216].   
17 “This [i.e. Svalbard] is a strategic spot, which gives our country the chance to 
be present in the western part of the Arctic.” Quote from BarentsObserver.com, 
“Spitsbergen secures Russia’s presence in the western Arctic”, posted 19 October 
2007.
government’s intention to present a Russian strategy for Svalbard by mid-2008, 
whose aim was to diversify economic and research activities on the archipelago 
and secure additional funding for the Russian presence in Barentsburg and for 
Arktikugol. Russia’s mobilisation of interests regarding Svalbard is conceivably 
part of a strategy to secure a better foothold on the archipelago, possibly in re-
sponse to Norway’s High North Strategy. 
Vylegzhanin traces the question of Svalbard’s international status back to 
the 1872 agreement between Russia and the former Union of Norway-Sweden. 
Since both states claimed historical rights to conduct economic and scientific ac-
tivities on the archipelago, the agreement stipulated that neither Norway (then 
under Sweden) nor Russia was to have sole sovereignty over Svalbard. This 
concept of divided sovereignty is, according to Vylegzhanin, incorporated and 
continued in the 1920 Svalbard Treaty. Although article one of the treaty confers 
“full and absolute” sovereignty to Norway, this is a sovereignty with princi-
pal limitations, according to the Russian view. The restrictions invoked by the 
treaty, it is claimed, define the real scope of Norwegian sovereignty over Sval-
bard. These include the provisions stipulating that Norway cannot discriminate 
against the subjects of other signatories or impose higher taxes than necessary 
for the administration of Svalbard itself, and the prohibition of military uses 
of the islands. 18 Crucially, the Russian point is that the treaty, and a restricted 
interpretation of the content of Norway’s sovereignty therein, should apply also 
to the economic zone and the shelf around Svalbard. Russia rejects the view 
that the shelf around Svalbard is part of Norway’s continuous mainland shelf. 
Moreover, Russia does not recognise the Norwegian 200-mile Fisheries Protec-
tion Zone around Svalbard as such, but tacitly conforms to Norway’s practice 
of “leniently” exercising authority over Russian fishing activities in the zone. In-
spections are accepted, but Russian captains are under instruction not to sign the 
inspection protocols as this would be tantamount to recognising Norway’s right 
to exercise authority and, thus, Norwegian sovereign rights in the zone. Conse-
quently, Russia argues that by establishing the Fisheries Protection Zone under 
Norwegian law (as if it were an exclusive economic zone) and by maintaining 
that the continental shelf around Svalbard is not Svalbard’s (but a continuation 
18 On the legal debate about the stipulations of the treaty, see Willy Østreng, 
“Svalbards situasjon i storpolitisk perspektiv” [The situation of Svalbard in a high 
policy perspective], Internasjonal politikk, no. 3 (197): 679–701; Geir Ulfstein, 
The Svalbard Treaty: From Terra Nullius to Norwegian Sovereignty (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1995), Carl August Fleischer, “Svalbards sokkel og sone i lys av 
Svalbardkonferanse og traktattekst” [The shelf and zone of Svalbard in light of the 
Svalbard Conference and the Treaty text], speech at NORISS – Forum for strategi og 
næringsutvikling, 21 March 2006; and “The New International Law …”
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of the Norwegian mainland shelf), Norway is acting both in contravention of 
the Svalbard Treaty itself and in general breach of international law.
Broadly, the same sentiments were echoed at an enlarged committee hearing 
on the political, legal, economic and humanitarian aspects of Russia’s presence 
on Svalbard at the Federal Council of the Russian State Duma in June 2007. The 
speaker at the hearing, Committee Chairman Gennadiy Oleinik, reminded those 
present of the “’particular significance’” to Russia, as to the Soviet Union before 
it, of questions relating to Svalbard’s legal status.19 Referring to the reasoning 
behind establishing the Naryshkin government commission, Oleinik emphasised 
Svalbard’s importance as a “zone of special state interest” to Russia.150 He then 
warned that 
behind all the [Norwegian] talk of preservation of the ecology and bio-resources 
around the [Svalbard] archipelago there are far-reaching plans – to use the is-
lands to accomplish military control in the Arctic for NATO. Norway and its 
NATO partners are trying at all cost to secure rights and as far as possible limit 
the Russian presence in the Barents Sea and in the whole of the Arctic.151 
This warning mirrors the degree of nervousness that Norway’s High North 
policy seems to incite in Russia, where it may in fact be regarded as a “trial of 
strength”.152 According to Oleinik, Norway is motivated by the imminent deple-
tion of the petroleum fields in the Norwegian and North seas. Therefore it is 
looking further north with a view to gaining access to the promising fields on the 
Barents Sea shelf, including in the disputed areas. Oleinik alludes in particular 
to Norwegian interests in the Fedinsky High field, identified by Russian seismic 
surveying prior to 1982.153 The point made, is that Norway may be trying to 
drive Russia away from Svalbard and the western Barents Sea, and that this in 
turn is rooted in the West’s ambition to roll Russia back into Eurasia.15 With 
Norwegian eyes, this may seem to be far-fetched, or to be calculated alarmism, 
when considering the reservations that Norway itself experiences from close 
19 Oleinik, Вы�тупление пре���е����теля К��итет��, p. 1 
150 Ibid, cf. supra note 16.    
151 Ibid, p.  (auth’s transl. from the Russian, the original text as follows): “[             з]�� 
р��з����р���и � ��хр��нении э��л��ии и би�ре�ур��� ���ру� ��рхипел����� �т�ят 
����ле�� и��ущие пл��ны – и�п�льз����ть е�� ��тр���� ��ля ��уще�т�ления ��енн��� 
��нтр�ля � Ар�ти�е �� �т�р�ны НАТО. Н�р�е�ия и ее ��юзни�и п� НАТО �тре�ят�я 
�� чт�бы т� ни �т��л� з���репить з�� ��б��� пр����� н�� �п�рные р�����ны и �����и���льн� 
��р��ничить р���и�����е при�ут�т�ие � Б��ренце��� ��ре и � цел�� � Ар�ти�е.”
152 Ibid, p. 3. 
153 Ibid, p. , see also Austvik, “The Geopolitics of Barents Sea …”, p. 19.
15 Oleinik, Вы�тупление пре���е����теля К��итет��, pp. 3, –5.   
Western allies regarding the maritime zones around Svalbard. But one must pre-
sume that such sentiments, voiced in the State Duma, are fairly mainstream, 
though not necessarily explicitly endorsed by the Russian Foreign Ministry or 
government officials in public. It should not be excluded that they may indeed 
express widespread thinking in Russia and may incite conspiratorial notions. 
Most probably, the main point that Oleinik really wants to make in his capac-
ity as responsible for policies for the North in the Duma, is that Russia needs a 
more comprehensive programme for Svalbard and the Arctic as a whole. In this 
particular regard, Oleinik may have achieved what he aimed for. At the time of 
writing, the Russian Security Council is finalising a national strategy for the Arc-
tic. This has been in the offing ever since the Security Council on 12 September 
2008 scheduled a special meeting dedicated to the Arctic on the islands of Franz 
Josef Land in the northernmost part of the Barents Sea. After this meeting, a 
regular meeting of the Security Council was held on 17 September with the par-
ticipation of Medvedev, his first council meeting as president, at which Russian 
interests in the Arctic were on the agenda. A Russian strategy for the Arctic was 
cleared on 17 December and is expected to be promulgated by February 2009.
It is worth noting that Svalbard, a separate legal entity under Norwegian 
sovereignty, did not join the European Economic Area (EEA) with Norway. The 
same would be true if Norway were to join the European Union: Svalbard was 
exempted from Norway’s 199 agreement on accession to the EU (before the lat-
est referendum). As to ocean areas, Russia may find reason to worry if Norway 
becomes an EU member.155 While the maritime zones around Svalbard would 
in all likelihood remain under Norwegian jurisdiction, Russia may fear that the 
political weight of the legal argument would start listing in Norway’s direction, 
which in all probability would be backed by the EU. First, Russia’s opportunity 
to deal bilaterally with Norway on Svalbard issues would be reduced, due to the 
political support Norway as an EU member would enjoy from Brussels. Second, 
the linkage that Russia is trying to establish by arguing legally that Norway’s 
sovereignty over Svalbard is limited and that the treaty (with the same limita-
tions) should apply to the maritime zones around Svalbard, would lose political 
momentum once these zones were associated with the EU. 
The power-political and legal complexities involved make it difficult to 
tell exactly how the question of Svalbard is perceived to affect Russia’s wider 
interests in the Arctic. The bottom line seems to be, however, that Svalbard does 
matter. Thus, better policy coordination and more comprehensive approaches 
are what one may expect to see from Moscow in the future. It will also be dif-
155 This case was also made by Oleinik, p. 2.
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of the Norwegian mainland shelf), Norway is acting both in contravention of 
the Svalbard Treaty itself and in general breach of international law.
Broadly, the same sentiments were echoed at an enlarged committee hearing 
on the political, legal, economic and humanitarian aspects of Russia’s presence 
on Svalbard at the Federal Council of the Russian State Duma in June 2007. The 
speaker at the hearing, Committee Chairman Gennadiy Oleinik, reminded those 
present of the “’particular significance’” to Russia, as to the Soviet Union before 
it, of questions relating to Svalbard’s legal status.19 Referring to the reasoning 
behind establishing the Naryshkin government commission, Oleinik emphasised 
Svalbard’s importance as a “zone of special state interest” to Russia.150 He then 
warned that 
behind all the [Norwegian] talk of preservation of the ecology and bio-resources 
around the [Svalbard] archipelago there are far-reaching plans – to use the is-
lands to accomplish military control in the Arctic for NATO. Norway and its 
NATO partners are trying at all cost to secure rights and as far as possible limit 
the Russian presence in the Barents Sea and in the whole of the Arctic.151 
This warning mirrors the degree of nervousness that Norway’s High North 
policy seems to incite in Russia, where it may in fact be regarded as a “trial of 
strength”.152 According to Oleinik, Norway is motivated by the imminent deple-
tion of the petroleum fields in the Norwegian and North seas. Therefore it is 
looking further north with a view to gaining access to the promising fields on the 
Barents Sea shelf, including in the disputed areas. Oleinik alludes in particular 
to Norwegian interests in the Fedinsky High field, identified by Russian seismic 
surveying prior to 1982.153 The point made, is that Norway may be trying to 
drive Russia away from Svalbard and the western Barents Sea, and that this in 
turn is rooted in the West’s ambition to roll Russia back into Eurasia.15 With 
Norwegian eyes, this may seem to be far-fetched, or to be calculated alarmism, 
when considering the reservations that Norway itself experiences from close 
19 Oleinik, Вы�тупление пре���е����теля К��итет��, p. 1 
150 Ibid, cf. supra note 16.    
151 Ibid, p.  (auth’s transl. from the Russian, the original text as follows): “[             з]�� 
р��з����р���и � ��хр��нении э��л��ии и би�ре�ур��� ���ру� ��рхипел����� �т�ят 
����ле�� и��ущие пл��ны – и�п�льз����ть е�� ��тр���� ��ля ��уще�т�ления ��енн��� 
��нтр�ля � Ар�ти�е �� �т�р�ны НАТО. Н�р�е�ия и ее ��юзни�и п� НАТО �тре�ят�я 
�� чт�бы т� ни �т��л� з���репить з�� ��б��� пр����� н�� �п�рные р�����ны и �����и���льн� 
��р��ничить р���и�����е при�ут�т�ие � Б��ренце��� ��ре и � цел�� � Ар�ти�е.”
152 Ibid, p. 3. 
153 Ibid, p. , see also Austvik, “The Geopolitics of Barents Sea …”, p. 19.
15 Oleinik, Вы�тупление пре���е����теля К��итет��, pp. 3, –5.   
Western allies regarding the maritime zones around Svalbard. But one must pre-
sume that such sentiments, voiced in the State Duma, are fairly mainstream, 
though not necessarily explicitly endorsed by the Russian Foreign Ministry or 
government officials in public. It should not be excluded that they may indeed 
express widespread thinking in Russia and may incite conspiratorial notions. 
Most probably, the main point that Oleinik really wants to make in his capac-
ity as responsible for policies for the North in the Duma, is that Russia needs a 
more comprehensive programme for Svalbard and the Arctic as a whole. In this 
particular regard, Oleinik may have achieved what he aimed for. At the time of 
writing, the Russian Security Council is finalising a national strategy for the Arc-
tic. This has been in the offing ever since the Security Council on 12 September 
2008 scheduled a special meeting dedicated to the Arctic on the islands of Franz 
Josef Land in the northernmost part of the Barents Sea. After this meeting, a 
regular meeting of the Security Council was held on 17 September with the par-
ticipation of Medvedev, his first council meeting as president, at which Russian 
interests in the Arctic were on the agenda. A Russian strategy for the Arctic was 
cleared on 17 December and is expected to be promulgated by February 2009.
It is worth noting that Svalbard, a separate legal entity under Norwegian 
sovereignty, did not join the European Economic Area (EEA) with Norway. The 
same would be true if Norway were to join the European Union: Svalbard was 
exempted from Norway’s 199 agreement on accession to the EU (before the lat-
est referendum). As to ocean areas, Russia may find reason to worry if Norway 
becomes an EU member.155 While the maritime zones around Svalbard would 
in all likelihood remain under Norwegian jurisdiction, Russia may fear that the 
political weight of the legal argument would start listing in Norway’s direction, 
which in all probability would be backed by the EU. First, Russia’s opportunity 
to deal bilaterally with Norway on Svalbard issues would be reduced, due to the 
political support Norway as an EU member would enjoy from Brussels. Second, 
the linkage that Russia is trying to establish by arguing legally that Norway’s 
sovereignty over Svalbard is limited and that the treaty (with the same limita-
tions) should apply to the maritime zones around Svalbard, would lose political 
momentum once these zones were associated with the EU. 
The power-political and legal complexities involved make it difficult to 
tell exactly how the question of Svalbard is perceived to affect Russia’s wider 
interests in the Arctic. The bottom line seems to be, however, that Svalbard does 
matter. Thus, better policy coordination and more comprehensive approaches 
are what one may expect to see from Moscow in the future. It will also be dif-
155 This case was also made by Oleinik, p. 2.
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ficult for Norway to legislate on Svalbard without raising Russian anxieties. 
As seen above, Russia tends to perceive new Norwegian national legislation 
on Svalbard to be part of a broader campaign to drive it away from the archi-
pelago or even the ocean areas around. Unsurprisingly, on such grounds Nor-
way’s introduction of stricter environmental regulation on Svalbard in recent 
years has been met with suspicion. Russian politicians, foreign-policy officials 
and international lawyers must be expected to be apprehensive about anything 
reminiscent of a Norwegian “revision” of the Svalbard Treaty or “creeping ju-
risdiction” in disputed ocean areas. This greatly helps explain any opposition to 
Norwegian legislative measures and regulations, as these are generally perceived 
to limit Russia’s future interests on the archipelago or in the maritime zones 
around. In the Barents Sea, a symbolic line seems to run alongside the sector line 
which defines the western extension of Russia’s territorial claims, east of which 
Norway’s jurisdiction within the Fisheries Protection Zone is more passionately 
contested.156 For the moment it must be assumed that Russia is content that 
the shelf around Svalbard has not been opened to petroleum activity, since this 
could deflect international attention from the development of the fields on Rus-
sia’s undisputed shelf, i.e. Shtokman. But this is for the short to medium term 
only, as Russia is gradually directing its interests towards the perspectives of the 
wider Arctic region, which is expected to hold a significant share of the world’s 
remaining petroleum deposits.157
THE INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE
The US recognises the bilateral nature of the unsettled delimitation of the Bar-
ents Sea shelf. Its interest in a settlement is largely related to the wider energy 
security dividend from enhanced Norwegian-Russian energy cooperation in the 
north. The US supports the idea that agreement on delimitation in the Barents 
may open up for large-scale petroleum exploration and exploitation in the High 
North. The US’s position as to the status of the maritime zones around Svalbard 
is guided by similar motivations. Its main interest is in energy, not the fisheries. 
A Norwegian-Russian delimitation agreement could positively influence other 
issues, and so would a settlement of the dispute over the Svalbard shelf: “The 
United States supports a responsible and rapid resolution of the disputed Bar-
ents Sea border between Norway and Russia (…) lack of clarity about rights 
and responsibilities around Svalbard also poses a potential obstacle to global 
156 Interview PINRO, Murmansk 19 June 2007. Note that this was the area in which the 
Elektron incident played out.
157 Re. the frequently quoted findings of the US Geological Survey. 
interests in that region of the Arctic.”158 Formally, the US has made reserva-
tions about Norway’s view on Svalbard. But it does not voice them loudly, as 
the interest from US-based petroleum companies in the shelf around Svalbard 
is still moderate to low.159 The US’s interest is seemingly indirect, with a view 
to seeing new petroleum fields developed and securing diversity of supply in the 
longer term. In this sense, the US will most probably be a supportive partner of 
whatever settlement of sovereignty issues Norway can achieve with Russia. It 
has, however, made it clear that if Russia is to obtain rights on the shelf around 
Svalbard, then the US will insist on the same rights under the Svalbard Treaty.160 
After the 11 September 2001 terrorist assault, US energy politics assumed a 
more pronounced security dimension. The 2002 strategic energy partnership 
process with Russia was motivated not least by the US’s dependence on the Mid-
dle East. As the energy relationship with Russia was gradually polluted by politi-
cal controversies, interest in Norwegian energy has increased comparatively. On 
sovereign interests in the Arctic, the US, which has still not joined the UN Law 
of the Sea Convention (LOSC), views Russia’s Arctic claims with apprehension. 
If the LOSC is ratified soon, the US will also submit geological data to the UN 
and define its future territorial claims.161 A factor here is a perceived emerging 
international race for the vast natural resources of the Arctic, and that the US 
may miss out on its claims if it continues to stay outside of the regime. The US 
otherwise insists on the rights, deriving from the principle of freedom of the 
seas, to traffic the waterways adjacent to the (Russian) Northern Sea Route and 
north of Canada. These US positions are reaffirmed in a Presidential Directive 
issued on 9 January 2009 by the Bush administration. Other aspects of interest 
here are that the directive instructs the state secretary to seek the consent of the 
US Senate to accede to the LOSC, and to urge Russia to ratify the 1990 maritime 
boundary agreement with the US. Also it states that geopolitical circumstances 
of the Arctic region do not necessitate or make it appropriate to have a particu-
lar treaty for the Arctic along the lines of the Antarctic Treaty.  
Canada has in particular voiced concern over Russia’s recent sub-sea flag 
planting under the North Pole, underlining the gesture’s lack of relevance ac-
158 Benson K. Whitney, US Ambassador, “U.S. View – Energy and the High North”, 
speech at the conference Politics and Law – Energy and Environment in the far north, 
Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, 25 January 2007, p. 3.
159 Interview, US Embassy, Oslo, 27 June 2007.
160 Interview with Amanda D. Rogers-Harper of the US State Department, referred in 
Sigri M. Sandberg, Jógvan H. Gardar, Tarjei Leer-Salvesen: “Taler Støre midt imot” 
[Speaking against Støre] Ny Tid, 5 May 2006.
161 It is assumed that the Obama administration will move to join the LOSC, and will 
have the support of the Democrats in the US congress. 
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ficult for Norway to legislate on Svalbard without raising Russian anxieties. 
As seen above, Russia tends to perceive new Norwegian national legislation 
on Svalbard to be part of a broader campaign to drive it away from the archi-
pelago or even the ocean areas around. Unsurprisingly, on such grounds Nor-
way’s introduction of stricter environmental regulation on Svalbard in recent 
years has been met with suspicion. Russian politicians, foreign-policy officials 
and international lawyers must be expected to be apprehensive about anything 
reminiscent of a Norwegian “revision” of the Svalbard Treaty or “creeping ju-
risdiction” in disputed ocean areas. This greatly helps explain any opposition to 
Norwegian legislative measures and regulations, as these are generally perceived 
to limit Russia’s future interests on the archipelago or in the maritime zones 
around. In the Barents Sea, a symbolic line seems to run alongside the sector line 
which defines the western extension of Russia’s territorial claims, east of which 
Norway’s jurisdiction within the Fisheries Protection Zone is more passionately 
contested.156 For the moment it must be assumed that Russia is content that 
the shelf around Svalbard has not been opened to petroleum activity, since this 
could deflect international attention from the development of the fields on Rus-
sia’s undisputed shelf, i.e. Shtokman. But this is for the short to medium term 
only, as Russia is gradually directing its interests towards the perspectives of the 
wider Arctic region, which is expected to hold a significant share of the world’s 
remaining petroleum deposits.157
THE INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE
The US recognises the bilateral nature of the unsettled delimitation of the Bar-
ents Sea shelf. Its interest in a settlement is largely related to the wider energy 
security dividend from enhanced Norwegian-Russian energy cooperation in the 
north. The US supports the idea that agreement on delimitation in the Barents 
may open up for large-scale petroleum exploration and exploitation in the High 
North. The US’s position as to the status of the maritime zones around Svalbard 
is guided by similar motivations. Its main interest is in energy, not the fisheries. 
A Norwegian-Russian delimitation agreement could positively influence other 
issues, and so would a settlement of the dispute over the Svalbard shelf: “The 
United States supports a responsible and rapid resolution of the disputed Bar-
ents Sea border between Norway and Russia (…) lack of clarity about rights 
and responsibilities around Svalbard also poses a potential obstacle to global 
156 Interview PINRO, Murmansk 19 June 2007. Note that this was the area in which the 
Elektron incident played out.
157 Re. the frequently quoted findings of the US Geological Survey. 
interests in that region of the Arctic.”158 Formally, the US has made reserva-
tions about Norway’s view on Svalbard. But it does not voice them loudly, as 
the interest from US-based petroleum companies in the shelf around Svalbard 
is still moderate to low.159 The US’s interest is seemingly indirect, with a view 
to seeing new petroleum fields developed and securing diversity of supply in the 
longer term. In this sense, the US will most probably be a supportive partner of 
whatever settlement of sovereignty issues Norway can achieve with Russia. It 
has, however, made it clear that if Russia is to obtain rights on the shelf around 
Svalbard, then the US will insist on the same rights under the Svalbard Treaty.160 
After the 11 September 2001 terrorist assault, US energy politics assumed a 
more pronounced security dimension. The 2002 strategic energy partnership 
process with Russia was motivated not least by the US’s dependence on the Mid-
dle East. As the energy relationship with Russia was gradually polluted by politi-
cal controversies, interest in Norwegian energy has increased comparatively. On 
sovereign interests in the Arctic, the US, which has still not joined the UN Law 
of the Sea Convention (LOSC), views Russia’s Arctic claims with apprehension. 
If the LOSC is ratified soon, the US will also submit geological data to the UN 
and define its future territorial claims.161 A factor here is a perceived emerging 
international race for the vast natural resources of the Arctic, and that the US 
may miss out on its claims if it continues to stay outside of the regime. The US 
otherwise insists on the rights, deriving from the principle of freedom of the 
seas, to traffic the waterways adjacent to the (Russian) Northern Sea Route and 
north of Canada. These US positions are reaffirmed in a Presidential Directive 
issued on 9 January 2009 by the Bush administration. Other aspects of interest 
here are that the directive instructs the state secretary to seek the consent of the 
US Senate to accede to the LOSC, and to urge Russia to ratify the 1990 maritime 
boundary agreement with the US. Also it states that geopolitical circumstances 
of the Arctic region do not necessitate or make it appropriate to have a particu-
lar treaty for the Arctic along the lines of the Antarctic Treaty.  
Canada has in particular voiced concern over Russia’s recent sub-sea flag 
planting under the North Pole, underlining the gesture’s lack of relevance ac-
158 Benson K. Whitney, US Ambassador, “U.S. View – Energy and the High North”, 
speech at the conference Politics and Law – Energy and Environment in the far north, 
Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, 25 January 2007, p. 3.
159 Interview, US Embassy, Oslo, 27 June 2007.
160 Interview with Amanda D. Rogers-Harper of the US State Department, referred in 
Sigri M. Sandberg, Jógvan H. Gardar, Tarjei Leer-Salvesen: “Taler Støre midt imot” 
[Speaking against Støre] Ny Tid, 5 May 2006.
161 It is assumed that the Obama administration will move to join the LOSC, and will 
have the support of the Democrats in the US congress. 
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cording to the principles and workings of the modern Law of the Sea. Canada 
at one point seemed willing to support Norway’s positions on the legal basis 
for the Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard; but this no longer seems to 
be the case, if it ever were. Possibly inspired by Norway’s policy initiatives for 
the High North and by international awareness of resource management and 
climate change, Canada is focusing attention on dealing with political and legal 
challenges in ocean areas under Canadian jurisdiction and in which Canada has 
territorial claims.  
The EU seen as a whole is motivated by much the same concerns as the 
US. It is striving to achieve a common external energy policy to operate with 
more consistency and rationality on the global energy market on behalf of its 
members.162 This implies working out a union-wide approach to dealing with 
Russia. Early development of Shtokman is of strategic significance for the Eu-
ropean market and has drawn considerable political attention. In early 2008, 
the EU started developing an Arctic policy of its own.163 A paper issued by the 
end of the same year stated that the EU was “inextricably linked to the Arctic 
region”,16 citing a combination of historic, geographic, economic and scientific 
factors and that the three EU member states of Denmark (Greenland), Finland 
and Sweden all have territories in the Arctic. It also cites the link to the Arctic 
by virtue of two EEA members, Iceland and Norway, and the EU’s strategic 
partners Canada, Russia and the United States. The stated objective of the policy 
is to protect and preserve the Arctic, promote sustainable use of resources and 
contribute to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance.165 The European Com-
mission may thus be taking a more tangible interest. An end to the Norwegian-
Russian disagreement over how to delimit the Barents Sea shelf would serve the 
EU’s interests. Under the chapter dedicated to hydrocarbons, the paper proposes 
to activate stronger foundations for cooperation with Norway and Russia with 
a view to “facilitating the sustainable and environmentally friendly exploration, 
162 Gawdat Bahgat, “Europe’s energy security: challenges and opportunities”, 
International Affairs, vol. 82, no. 5 (2006): 961–975. José Manuel Barroso, President 
of the European Commission, “Opening speech External energy conference”, External 
energy policy conference, Brussels (SPEECH/06/711), 20 November 2006 and 
“Europe’s energy policy and the third industrial revolution”, Loyola de Palacio energy 
conference, Madrid (SPEECH/07/580), 1 October 2007. 
163 European Union High Representative and European Commission, “Climate Change 
and International Security”, paper from the High Representative and the European 
Commission to the European Council, S113/08, 1 March 2008.
16 CEC – Commission of the European Communities, “The European Union and the 
Arctic Region”, communication from the Commission to the European Council and 
the European Parliament, COM(2008) 763 final, 20 November 2008.
165  Ibid, p. 3.
extraction and transportation of Arctic hydrocarbon resources”.166 In the chap-
ter on multilateral governance, the EU reverses some of its previous doubts,167 
and states that the provisions of the Law of the Sea do “provide the basis for the 
settlement of disputes including delimitation”.168 Some hesitancy seems to re-
main, however, as the EU intends to assess multilateral agreements in the Arctic 
in order to “determine whether additional initiatives or measures are needed” 
and follow the maritime delimitation disputes and the settlement of the outer 
limits of the continental shelves to assess “impacts on EU interests”.169 With 
Svalbard outside of the EEA, the European Commission is, however, only indi-
rectly concerned via the interests of the member states who are signatories to the 
Svalbard Treaty. 
France is poised to take a more active stance in Northern energy questions 
now that Total has become one of Gazprom’s partners in Shtokman. Germany 
is engaged in transporting gas from Shtokman to the European market through 
the Nord Stream pipeline project. It must be expected that France and Germany, 
on behalf of the EU and in partnership, will take a closer interest and more 
concerted approach to the development of Shtokman in particular, and energy 
cooperation in the North in general. The UK has shifted from being predomi-
nantly self-reliant to becoming a net importer of energy, although on a much 
smaller scale than mainland Europe.170 This has turned the UK’s attention to 
the need for a more concerted European energy policy, and to the prospects of 
exploiting the shelf around Svalbard in which British petroleum companies are 
interested.171 The UK may be expected to react negatively to any consolidation 
of the view that the Svalbard shelf is part of the continuous Norwegian shelf.172 
Spain would also be sceptical to any such development, but its present interest 
is for all practical purposes in the fisheries and the status of the Fisheries Protec-
tion Zone. 
166 Ibid, p. 7.
167 European Union High Representative and European Commission, S113/08, which 
stated the “need to revisit existing rules of international law, particularly the Law of 
the Sea, as regards the resolution of territorial and border disputes”, p. , cf. supra 
note 58. 
168 CEC, “The European Union and the Arctic Region”, p. 9.
169 Ibid, p. 11.
170 Dieter Helm, ed., The New Energy Paradigm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), and Dieter Helm, “The Russian dimension and Europe’s external energy 
policy”, paper, 3 September 2007, Dieter Helm [online 16 Jan 2009].
171 Interview FCO, 9 November 2006.
172 David Anderson, “The Status under International Law of the Maritime Areas around 
Svalbard”, paper at the conference Politics and Law – Energy and Environment in the 
far north, Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, 25 January 2007. 
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cording to the principles and workings of the modern Law of the Sea. Canada 
at one point seemed willing to support Norway’s positions on the legal basis 
for the Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard; but this no longer seems to 
be the case, if it ever were. Possibly inspired by Norway’s policy initiatives for 
the High North and by international awareness of resource management and 
climate change, Canada is focusing attention on dealing with political and legal 
challenges in ocean areas under Canadian jurisdiction and in which Canada has 
territorial claims.  
The EU seen as a whole is motivated by much the same concerns as the 
US. It is striving to achieve a common external energy policy to operate with 
more consistency and rationality on the global energy market on behalf of its 
members.162 This implies working out a union-wide approach to dealing with 
Russia. Early development of Shtokman is of strategic significance for the Eu-
ropean market and has drawn considerable political attention. In early 2008, 
the EU started developing an Arctic policy of its own.163 A paper issued by the 
end of the same year stated that the EU was “inextricably linked to the Arctic 
region”,16 citing a combination of historic, geographic, economic and scientific 
factors and that the three EU member states of Denmark (Greenland), Finland 
and Sweden all have territories in the Arctic. It also cites the link to the Arctic 
by virtue of two EEA members, Iceland and Norway, and the EU’s strategic 
partners Canada, Russia and the United States. The stated objective of the policy 
is to protect and preserve the Arctic, promote sustainable use of resources and 
contribute to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance.165 The European Com-
mission may thus be taking a more tangible interest. An end to the Norwegian-
Russian disagreement over how to delimit the Barents Sea shelf would serve the 
EU’s interests. Under the chapter dedicated to hydrocarbons, the paper proposes 
to activate stronger foundations for cooperation with Norway and Russia with 
a view to “facilitating the sustainable and environmentally friendly exploration, 
162 Gawdat Bahgat, “Europe’s energy security: challenges and opportunities”, 
International Affairs, vol. 82, no. 5 (2006): 961–975. José Manuel Barroso, President 
of the European Commission, “Opening speech External energy conference”, External 
energy policy conference, Brussels (SPEECH/06/711), 20 November 2006 and 
“Europe’s energy policy and the third industrial revolution”, Loyola de Palacio energy 
conference, Madrid (SPEECH/07/580), 1 October 2007. 
163 European Union High Representative and European Commission, “Climate Change 
and International Security”, paper from the High Representative and the European 
Commission to the European Council, S113/08, 1 March 2008.
16 CEC – Commission of the European Communities, “The European Union and the 
Arctic Region”, communication from the Commission to the European Council and 
the European Parliament, COM(2008) 763 final, 20 November 2008.
165  Ibid, p. 3.
extraction and transportation of Arctic hydrocarbon resources”.166 In the chap-
ter on multilateral governance, the EU reverses some of its previous doubts,167 
and states that the provisions of the Law of the Sea do “provide the basis for the 
settlement of disputes including delimitation”.168 Some hesitancy seems to re-
main, however, as the EU intends to assess multilateral agreements in the Arctic 
in order to “determine whether additional initiatives or measures are needed” 
and follow the maritime delimitation disputes and the settlement of the outer 
limits of the continental shelves to assess “impacts on EU interests”.169 With 
Svalbard outside of the EEA, the European Commission is, however, only indi-
rectly concerned via the interests of the member states who are signatories to the 
Svalbard Treaty. 
France is poised to take a more active stance in Northern energy questions 
now that Total has become one of Gazprom’s partners in Shtokman. Germany 
is engaged in transporting gas from Shtokman to the European market through 
the Nord Stream pipeline project. It must be expected that France and Germany, 
on behalf of the EU and in partnership, will take a closer interest and more 
concerted approach to the development of Shtokman in particular, and energy 
cooperation in the North in general. The UK has shifted from being predomi-
nantly self-reliant to becoming a net importer of energy, although on a much 
smaller scale than mainland Europe.170 This has turned the UK’s attention to 
the need for a more concerted European energy policy, and to the prospects of 
exploiting the shelf around Svalbard in which British petroleum companies are 
interested.171 The UK may be expected to react negatively to any consolidation 
of the view that the Svalbard shelf is part of the continuous Norwegian shelf.172 
Spain would also be sceptical to any such development, but its present interest 
is for all practical purposes in the fisheries and the status of the Fisheries Protec-
tion Zone. 
166 Ibid, p. 7.
167 European Union High Representative and European Commission, S113/08, which 
stated the “need to revisit existing rules of international law, particularly the Law of 
the Sea, as regards the resolution of territorial and border disputes”, p. , cf. supra 
note 58. 
168 CEC, “The European Union and the Arctic Region”, p. 9.
169 Ibid, p. 11.
170 Dieter Helm, ed., The New Energy Paradigm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), and Dieter Helm, “The Russian dimension and Europe’s external energy 
policy”, paper, 3 September 2007, Dieter Helm [online 16 Jan 2009].
171 Interview FCO, 9 November 2006.
172 David Anderson, “The Status under International Law of the Maritime Areas around 
Svalbard”, paper at the conference Politics and Law – Energy and Environment in the 
far north, Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, 25 January 2007. 
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There is no unified Nordic view on issues of sovereign rights in the High 
North. The Nordic EU members support developing cooperation with Russia 
on a broad range of issue areas, for example through the Northern Dimension 
and involvement in the regional and multilateral building of institutions, i.e. 
through the Baltic Sea and Barents Region Cooperation. Sweden has lately taken 
a more concrete interest in energy cooperation in the Barents Sea, where it sees 
opportunities for its own industries. Formally, Sweden does not share Norway’s 
legal positions on the maritime zones of Svalbard.173 Finland has a long-standing 
policy of bilateral relations with Russia in the North, and is interested in de-
veloping infrastructure in the region. Finland has previously expressed support 
for Norway’s position on the zones around Svalbard, but this was before its EU 
accession. Today, Finland is towing the EU line. Iceland is a special case, as it is 
the only country so far which has openly threatened to bring the jurisdictional 
issues related to Svalbard before the courts.17 Iceland’s interests in sovereignty 
and Svalbard are related to fisheries; energy is no particular concern. Security, 
however, is also important to Iceland, and presumably a moderating factor in 
its disagreement with Norway on the Fisheries Protection Zone. Following the 
severe blow to the economy from the financial crisis, Icelandic membership of 
the EU has resurfaced in the national debate. Denmark has settled its claims 
vis-à-vis Norway in regard of ocean areas adjacent to Greenland. Its remaining 
interests may now be with Russia, in light of Russia’s claims to the Lomono-
sov ridge, as this may overlap with Denmark’s and Canada’s claims around the 
North Pole.
The Ilulissat meeting on Greenland (Denmark) in May 2008 represented 
a step towards a further multilateralisation of ocean affairs in the circumpolar 
Arctic. At the meeting, the foreign ministers of the five Arctic coastal states 
were present: Denmark, Canada, Russia, the US and Norway. This concluded 
a process initiated at a meeting in Oslo in October 2007 of senior officials who 
discussed legal matters of the Arctic. At Ilulissat, the ministers discussed chal-
lenges in the Arctic oceans such as melting polar ice, climate change, vulnerable 
eco-systems and the exploitation of natural resources. In the declaration, the five 
states concluded that the current international regime for the Arctic – essentially 
the Law of the Sea Convention, the International Maritime Organisation and the 
Arctic Council – constitutes an adequate legal and political framework for na-
173 Sandberg et al., “Taler Støre midt imot”.      
17 See Jón Baldvin Hannibalson, “Vårt halve fedreland er havet” [Half our fatherland            
is the Sea], in Fiske og havrett i nord, Jón Baldvin Hannibalson and Carl August 
Fleischer, Det sikkerhetspolitiske bibliotek, no. 8 (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic 
Committee, 1996), pp. 3–19.
tional and international measures and cooperation, including for the protection 
of the marine environment, marine scientific research, freedom of navigation, 
and the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf.175 Most impor-
tantly, the declaration clarifies that the five states see no reason to negotiate an 
alternative regime for Arctic oceans, and wish in no way to amend or change the 
principles laid down by the Law of the Sea. In addition to being a potentially 
important declaration for maritime legal issues, the declaration also suggests the 
increasing significance of the Arctic Council as a forum for multilateral policy 
deliberation and coordination.  
175 The declaration is posted at Ocean Law.org, “The Ilulissat Declaration”, May 2008 
[online 16 Jan 2009].
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There is no unified Nordic view on issues of sovereign rights in the High 
North. The Nordic EU members support developing cooperation with Russia 
on a broad range of issue areas, for example through the Northern Dimension 
and involvement in the regional and multilateral building of institutions, i.e. 
through the Baltic Sea and Barents Region Cooperation. Sweden has lately taken 
a more concrete interest in energy cooperation in the Barents Sea, where it sees 
opportunities for its own industries. Formally, Sweden does not share Norway’s 
legal positions on the maritime zones of Svalbard.173 Finland has a long-standing 
policy of bilateral relations with Russia in the North, and is interested in de-
veloping infrastructure in the region. Finland has previously expressed support 
for Norway’s position on the zones around Svalbard, but this was before its EU 
accession. Today, Finland is towing the EU line. Iceland is a special case, as it is 
the only country so far which has openly threatened to bring the jurisdictional 
issues related to Svalbard before the courts.17 Iceland’s interests in sovereignty 
and Svalbard are related to fisheries; energy is no particular concern. Security, 
however, is also important to Iceland, and presumably a moderating factor in 
its disagreement with Norway on the Fisheries Protection Zone. Following the 
severe blow to the economy from the financial crisis, Icelandic membership of 
the EU has resurfaced in the national debate. Denmark has settled its claims 
vis-à-vis Norway in regard of ocean areas adjacent to Greenland. Its remaining 
interests may now be with Russia, in light of Russia’s claims to the Lomono-
sov ridge, as this may overlap with Denmark’s and Canada’s claims around the 
North Pole.
The Ilulissat meeting on Greenland (Denmark) in May 2008 represented 
a step towards a further multilateralisation of ocean affairs in the circumpolar 
Arctic. At the meeting, the foreign ministers of the five Arctic coastal states 
were present: Denmark, Canada, Russia, the US and Norway. This concluded 
a process initiated at a meeting in Oslo in October 2007 of senior officials who 
discussed legal matters of the Arctic. At Ilulissat, the ministers discussed chal-
lenges in the Arctic oceans such as melting polar ice, climate change, vulnerable 
eco-systems and the exploitation of natural resources. In the declaration, the five 
states concluded that the current international regime for the Arctic – essentially 
the Law of the Sea Convention, the International Maritime Organisation and the 
Arctic Council – constitutes an adequate legal and political framework for na-
173 Sandberg et al., “Taler Støre midt imot”.      
17 See Jón Baldvin Hannibalson, “Vårt halve fedreland er havet” [Half our fatherland            
is the Sea], in Fiske og havrett i nord, Jón Baldvin Hannibalson and Carl August 
Fleischer, Det sikkerhetspolitiske bibliotek, no. 8 (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic 
Committee, 1996), pp. 3–19.
tional and international measures and cooperation, including for the protection 
of the marine environment, marine scientific research, freedom of navigation, 
and the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf.175 Most impor-
tantly, the declaration clarifies that the five states see no reason to negotiate an 
alternative regime for Arctic oceans, and wish in no way to amend or change the 
principles laid down by the Law of the Sea. In addition to being a potentially 
important declaration for maritime legal issues, the declaration also suggests the 
increasing significance of the Arctic Council as a forum for multilateral policy 
deliberation and coordination.  
175 The declaration is posted at Ocean Law.org, “The Ilulissat Declaration”, May 2008 
[online 16 Jan 2009].
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SECURITy – RUSSIA’S TRIAD OF NATIONAL VALUES 
The rise of sovereigntism in Russia
A desire for tighter sovereign control over natural resources seems to be pushing 
Russia towards maximising its independence in international energy politics. 
Underneath security issues lie questions of how to manage sovereignty amidst 
increasing interdependence. Paradoxically, its great power ambition and using 
energy as a means to that end may force Russia to accept greater integration and 
regulatory convergence, first and foremost with the EU. This effect may become 
more tangible if cooperation on developing the petroleum fields in the High 
North takes place, not least Shtokman. Most recognisable in Russia today, how-
ever, is the re-employment of policies of economic nationalism and the protec-
tion of strategic resources; that is, a resort to resource nationalism. At the time 
of writing, Russia seems unlikely to compromise in any way on its sovereign 
control of natural resources. Rather, renewed sentiments of sovereigntism seem 
to be developing, which may originate from both external and internal threat 
perceptions. 
The question in this chapter is how economic and resource nationalism may 
coincide with and reinforce Russian awareness of security and sovereignty. The 
examination will centre on what the then First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey 
Ivanov famously dubbed the “triad of Russian national values”: sovereign de-
mocracy, economic might and military power.176 This triad of value-based inter-
ests will structure the discussions. First, I will look at aspects of Russian “man-
aged” democracy, state capitalism, interdependence and “real sovereignty”.177 
Second, I shall move on to material energy and military interests in the North. 
Security and sovereign democracy
The dramatic changes Russia experienced under Yeltsin have given “change” 
itself a bad name, with a corresponding perception that stability is inherently 
good. Yeltsin’s “unmanageable” liberalism was criticised for promoting democ-
racy at the cost of stability. Equally, the rampant privatisation of the state’s re-
176 In an article by Minister of Defence Sergey Ivanov (at that time deputy prime minister) 
(2005) in Izvestia, 13 July 2006, referred to in Lilia Shevtsova, “Russia’s Ersatz 
Democracy”, Current History, October (2006).
177 See Andrei Kokoshin, “Real Sovereignty and Sovereign Democracy”, Russia 
in Global Affairs, vol. , no.  (2006): 105–118. Notably, Kokoshin uses the 
term “strengthening ‘real sovereignty’” in the sense of “securitisation”, and “de-
sovereignisation” in the sense of “desecuritisation”.
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sources and assets was perceived as weakening the Russian state. Putin’s “man-
aged” democracy and de-privatisation policy set out to redress this, succeeding 
to such an extent that there are concerns about the long-term effects on society, 
and about the future premises for international cooperation with Russia. The 
entry onto the scene of Medvedev as president, and of the Georgian and finan-
cial crises, have so far done little to alter the general thrust of Russian internal 
and external politics.
By portraying their chosen model of democracy particular to and “sover-
eign” to Russia, the Putin regime was clearly indicating which of the wrongs 
of the past it intended to right. To some, sovereign democracy was regarded as 
the “main ideological postulate of the incumbent leadership in Russia.”178 As a 
political construction, it was designed to lend legitimacy and popular support 
to the Kremlin’s chosen political party, United Russia, and secure the smooth 
continuation of power following the December 2007 Duma elections, and the 
March 2008 presidential elections.179 In this regard, sovereign democracy was 
also perceived, particularly in the West, as a political “prophylactic” devised to 
curb the emergence in Russia of Western liberal and popular democracy.180 Al-
though the term itself is new, “sovereign democracy” cannot be said to represent 
anything new. Rather, it has given a name to an ongoing restructuring of Russian 
politics. It does, however, intellectualise and legitimise the ideas underpinning 
the process. It may therefore be useful to try to understand the notion of the 
securitisation of sovereignty that it entails.181 
Conceptually, sovereign democracy makes democracy an aspect of state 
sovereignty and, as such, places it beyond legitimate external criticism. Further-
more, it creates one sovereign space for the management of the state’s strategic 
resources, human as well as natural. During President Putin’s two terms, Rus-
sian politics witnessed the recentralisation and monopolisation of political deci-
sion-making. As a result, political power-brokering is now conducted largely 
outside of democratic institutions. The first effect of the sovereign democracy 
model is that not only political power itself, but also the opportunity to compete 
for political power, have been monopolised. Corporate interests increasingly use 
pro-government political parties as a platform for business development and 
public office to ensure immunity. The interest of the voter is replaced by vested 
178 Fyodor Lukyanov, “A Time for Life Jackets?” Russia in Global Affairs, editorial, vol. 
5, no. 3 (2007): 5–6.
179 Andrei Okara, “Sovereign Democracy: A New Russian Idea or PR Project?” Russia in 
Global Affairs, vol. 5, no. 3, July-September (2007): 8–20.
180 Ivan Krastev, “Р���ия ���� ‘��ру���я Е�р�п��’” [Russia as “the other Europe”], Russia in 
Global Affairs (Russian version), no. , July-August (2007): 33–5.
181 Cf. Kokoshin, “Real Sovereignty …” 
interests, and the individual is further crowded out of the political marketplace. 
With increasingly exclusionary access to decision-making structures, the inter-
ests of the state are narrowed down and become quasi-synonymous with those 
of the ruling elite(s). The special mix of policy and corporate interest character-
istic of Russian state capitalism is encapsulated in the notion of “Russia Inc.”182 
In other words, the business of the state becomes a self-legitimising interest in 
a country ruled by people who largely own it. As Dmitri Trenin further notes, 
when people say that what is good for Gazprom is good for Russia, ”Russia” 
stands for only a small group of people.183 
Essentially, sovereign democracy subordinates individual rights to the col-
lective interests of the state. Its proponents argue that the Russian democracy 
model is moving both Russia and democracy in Russia in the right direction. 
Russia has made its strategic choice, they claim.18 Critics, however, see it as 
a sham, as a measure originally designed to ensure the preferred outcome of 
the 2008 presidential elections and the orderly transition to the post-Putin era, 
with Putin as prime minister. Putin must be in control of the highest office, if 
not necessarily in it himself, to safeguard the continuation of the power struc-
tures developed under his reign.185 Sovereign democracy has helped avoid seri-
ous challenges from rival groupings and stood as a bulwark stopping Western 
criticism of Putinism from finding popular resonance.186 By playing up to the 
notion of a Russian “self” that needs to be protected from its Western “other”, 
sovereign democracy conveys a sense of a distinct linkage between the Russian 
state’s security interests and economic nationalism. Oil and gas deposits and 
182 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West”, 1 March 
2007 (Carnegie Moscow [online 16 Jan 2009]); Okara, “Sovereign Democracy”: 10.
183 Trenin, “Russia Redefines Itself …”
18 Vladislav Surkov, “Су�еренитет – эт� п�литиче��и�� �ин�ни� 
��н�урент��п���бн��ти” [Sovereignty is a political synonym of competitiveness], 7 
February 2006; and “Н��ш�� р���и������я ����ель ��е���р��тии н��зы���ет�я ‘�у�еренн��� 
��е���р��тие��’”[Our Russian model of democracy is called “Sovereign Democracy”], 
28 June 2006 (United Russia [online]). See also Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov, “С��ержи���ние Р���ии: н��з���� � бу��ущее?”[Containing Russia: back to the 
future?], Russia in Global Affairs (Russian version), no. , July-August (2007): 8–21, 
10: “Russia has become a part of the universal consensus to the effect that democracy 
and free market should form the basis of social and political order and economic 
life. (..) [W]e have chosen our path of development once and for all.” (Author’s 
translation.)
185 Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, [2003] 2005). Trenin, “Russia redefines itself…”, 2007.
186 Krastev, “Р���ия ����  ‘��ру���я Е�р�п�� ’”, and Okara, “Sovereign Democracy”. See also 
Nikolai Petrov, From Managed Democracy to Sovereign Democracy. Putin’s Regime 
Evolution in 2005, PONARS Policy Memo, no. 396 (Washington D.C.: CSIS, 2005); 
and The Full Cycle of Political Evolution in Russia. From Chaotic to Overmanaged 
Democracy, PONARS Policy Memo, no. 13 (Washington D.C.: CSIS, 2006).
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curb the emergence in Russia of Western liberal and popular democracy.180 Al-
though the term itself is new, “sovereign democracy” cannot be said to represent 
anything new. Rather, it has given a name to an ongoing restructuring of Russian 
politics. It does, however, intellectualise and legitimise the ideas underpinning 
the process. It may therefore be useful to try to understand the notion of the 
securitisation of sovereignty that it entails.181 
Conceptually, sovereign democracy makes democracy an aspect of state 
sovereignty and, as such, places it beyond legitimate external criticism. Further-
more, it creates one sovereign space for the management of the state’s strategic 
resources, human as well as natural. During President Putin’s two terms, Rus-
sian politics witnessed the recentralisation and monopolisation of political deci-
sion-making. As a result, political power-brokering is now conducted largely 
outside of democratic institutions. The first effect of the sovereign democracy 
model is that not only political power itself, but also the opportunity to compete 
for political power, have been monopolised. Corporate interests increasingly use 
pro-government political parties as a platform for business development and 
public office to ensure immunity. The interest of the voter is replaced by vested 
178 Fyodor Lukyanov, “A Time for Life Jackets?” Russia in Global Affairs, editorial, vol. 
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Global Affairs (Russian version), no. , July-August (2007): 33–5.
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Russia has made its strategic choice, they claim.18 Critics, however, see it as 
a sham, as a measure originally designed to ensure the preferred outcome of 
the 2008 presidential elections and the orderly transition to the post-Putin era, 
with Putin as prime minister. Putin must be in control of the highest office, if 
not necessarily in it himself, to safeguard the continuation of the power struc-
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distribution networks are looked upon as sovereign strategic resources and are 
permissibly used for the state’s wider political purposes when necessary. They 
become commodities of political significance and are withheld from the open 
market, just as the political power-brokering is conducted beyond the reach of 
the popular electorate. 
The political landscape in Russia may thus be undergoing structural chang-
es that cannot easily be undone. Gradually, the arena for moderate political 
opposition is disappearing in the wake of the deconstruction of the political 
middle-ground – to the detriment of moderate forces and pluralism in Russian 
politics. There is no viable alternative to the omnipresent pro-Government camp, 
and little reason to expect that the new Solidarity movement, rallying the few 
remaining liberal opposition parties, will be anything but a marginal political 
force, and at best an irritant to the Kremlin. The so-called one-and-a-half-party 
system taking form is dominated by the Kremlin-backed United Russia, which 
has acquired an unrivalled position nationwide. The Communist Party, which 
due to its politics on the extreme left and its Soviet past is no serious threat, 
merely serves as a token “opposition”. It is also worth noting that the extremist 
and nationalist views primarily associated with Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) are increasingly becoming part of the politi-
cal mainstream, although Zhirinovsky’s party is on the way to marginalisation. 
The remaining parties in Russian politics are becoming fewer and less relevant. 
Russian sovereign democracy means that there is little room for separating how 
the system works from those who run it, and who have large stakes in the cur-
rent order of things.187 The people running it and the system are so intertwined 
that it is virtually impossible to change the one and keep the other. This may 
be one of the most significant legacies of the system that took root under the 
Putin regime, the essence of the “soft authoritarianism” of so-called Putinism.188 
Hence, Putinism seems poised to survive Putin, and it may matter less who is 
president, whether Putin or Dmitri Medvedev. The state of democracy in Russia 
points to an emerging dilemma: modernising and reconstructing Russia’s energy 
sector depends on economic and political reform, but it is doubtful whether 
oil and gas revenues can be expected to fuel economic reform and social devel-
opment without democratic institutions and the bureaucracy’s administrative 
capacity first being improved. Thus, according to Lilia Shevtsova, the energy-
187 Trenin, “Russia redefines itself…”.
188 Okara, “Sovereign Democracy”. See also Lilia Shevtsova, “Power Scenarios in 
Russia”, Moscow Times, issue 3813, 2 December 2007; Dmitri Trenin “The Perils of 
Putinism. A non-transfer of power that makes Russia less stable”, Wall Street Journal, 
15 December 2007.
related partnership policies towards Russia of certain Western states may in fact 
preserve and reinforce bureaucratic authoritarianism in Russia.189 It is difficult 
to see any way out of this conundrum for foreign states who seek energy coop-
eration with Russia. 
This state of internal affairs does not mean that the security dividend of 
social and economic development is lost on the Kremlin. Presidents Putin and 
Medvedev have made clear the importance of progress and prosperity for Rus-
sian society and its people. In macroeconomic terms, the situation has indeed 
improved considerably. Putin once succinctly stated that “there can be no su-
perpower where weakness and poverty reign.”190 Economic might is the key to 
power, prestige and influence in the world. The lesson from the downfall of the 
Soviet Union and the turbulent economic upheavals of the 1990s is that Russia 
cannot be strong if economically weak. Yet in drawing this conclusion, the lead-
ership in Moscow may be getting its priorities wrong. Although Russia has paid 
off its foreign debts and obtained a budget surplus and positive trade balance, its 
economy is structurally skewed and the opportunities offered by the petroleum 
revenues to redress the situation are not put to full use. The political purposes of 
resource nationalism make Russia’s priorities excruciatingly statist and possibly 
self-defeating in the long run. The financial crisis seems to confirm this point 
beyond any doubt. This apart, the formulation of the state’s energy interest, at 
the crossroads of Russian energy policy and economic nationalism, is opaque 
and largely inaccessible. To get a grip on the interests linked to energy as a policy 
area in Russia, one probably needs to look at how energy and security interests 
are organised and their relative standing. Under Putin’s presidency, personnel 
from the security services were systematically appointed to important positions 
in the state and business administration. This is unlikely to change radically 
with Putin as prime minister. In the Soviet Union these services were held in 
check by the Politburo “[b]ut now the chekists are their own ‘Politburo’”.191 
Their network is informal, yet rooted in and working across formal structures. 
In a sense it compensates for the poorly developed cross-cutting functions of the 
state bureaucracy itself. Being a closed system, beyond democratic, administra-
189 Lilia Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, p. 398.
190 From Putin’s “Open Letter to the Russian Voters”, 2000, quoted in Bobo Lo, Vladimir 
Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2003), p. 65. The full quote reads as follows: “There is not, nor can there be, a        
superpower where weakness and poverty reign. It is time to understand: our place in 
the world, our prosperity, and our newfound rights directly depend on the successful 
resolution of our internal problems.”
191 Olga Khrystanovskaya, “The Power of the Chekists is Incredibly Stable”, interviewed 
in Kommersant-Vlast, 22 March 2007.
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become commodities of political significance and are withheld from the open 
market, just as the political power-brokering is conducted beyond the reach of 
the popular electorate. 
The political landscape in Russia may thus be undergoing structural chang-
es that cannot easily be undone. Gradually, the arena for moderate political 
opposition is disappearing in the wake of the deconstruction of the political 
middle-ground – to the detriment of moderate forces and pluralism in Russian 
politics. There is no viable alternative to the omnipresent pro-Government camp, 
and little reason to expect that the new Solidarity movement, rallying the few 
remaining liberal opposition parties, will be anything but a marginal political 
force, and at best an irritant to the Kremlin. The so-called one-and-a-half-party 
system taking form is dominated by the Kremlin-backed United Russia, which 
has acquired an unrivalled position nationwide. The Communist Party, which 
due to its politics on the extreme left and its Soviet past is no serious threat, 
merely serves as a token “opposition”. It is also worth noting that the extremist 
and nationalist views primarily associated with Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) are increasingly becoming part of the politi-
cal mainstream, although Zhirinovsky’s party is on the way to marginalisation. 
The remaining parties in Russian politics are becoming fewer and less relevant. 
Russian sovereign democracy means that there is little room for separating how 
the system works from those who run it, and who have large stakes in the cur-
rent order of things.187 The people running it and the system are so intertwined 
that it is virtually impossible to change the one and keep the other. This may 
be one of the most significant legacies of the system that took root under the 
Putin regime, the essence of the “soft authoritarianism” of so-called Putinism.188 
Hence, Putinism seems poised to survive Putin, and it may matter less who is 
president, whether Putin or Dmitri Medvedev. The state of democracy in Russia 
points to an emerging dilemma: modernising and reconstructing Russia’s energy 
sector depends on economic and political reform, but it is doubtful whether 
oil and gas revenues can be expected to fuel economic reform and social devel-
opment without democratic institutions and the bureaucracy’s administrative 
capacity first being improved. Thus, according to Lilia Shevtsova, the energy-
187 Trenin, “Russia redefines itself…”.
188 Okara, “Sovereign Democracy”. See also Lilia Shevtsova, “Power Scenarios in 
Russia”, Moscow Times, issue 3813, 2 December 2007; Dmitri Trenin “The Perils of 
Putinism. A non-transfer of power that makes Russia less stable”, Wall Street Journal, 
15 December 2007.
related partnership policies towards Russia of certain Western states may in fact 
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economy is structurally skewed and the opportunities offered by the petroleum 
revenues to redress the situation are not put to full use. The political purposes of 
resource nationalism make Russia’s priorities excruciatingly statist and possibly 
self-defeating in the long run. The financial crisis seems to confirm this point 
beyond any doubt. This apart, the formulation of the state’s energy interest, at 
the crossroads of Russian energy policy and economic nationalism, is opaque 
and largely inaccessible. To get a grip on the interests linked to energy as a policy 
area in Russia, one probably needs to look at how energy and security interests 
are organised and their relative standing. Under Putin’s presidency, personnel 
from the security services were systematically appointed to important positions 
in the state and business administration. This is unlikely to change radically 
with Putin as prime minister. In the Soviet Union these services were held in 
check by the Politburo “[b]ut now the chekists are their own ‘Politburo’”.191 
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tive and judicial control, it fosters corruption and thrives on a complex structure 
of reward and dependence. The Foreign Ministry is not in a position to play a 
decisive role in defining and shaping – the increasingly important – energy di-
mension of Russian foreign policy. Rather, Gazprom plays an influential role at 
the forefront of energy policy, but under the auspices of the Kremlin.192
State capitalism – from resource curse to state curse?
Through de-privatisation of strategic sector industries and the steady rise in 
prices of raw materials since the turn of the century, the Russian state was grad-
ually turned into a politico-economic powerhouse. Controlling strategic assets 
and resources on Russian territory was vital to the project. If strategic natural 
resources slip from the government’s immediate control, so too do the most im-
portant means of attaining power, this logic says. 
Khodorkovsky’s arrest in October 2003 may stand as a milestone of an era 
characterised by the further strengthening of the state’s role in the oil sector and 
a new round of redistribution of petroleum assets.193 Big business and politics 
in Russia are still reserved for the few, but only if they rally behind the state. 
Most observers conclude that business is in the state’s pockets, and not the other 
way around; bureaucratic authoritarianism thrives within a system run for and 
by the state.19 Ultimately, however, state capitalism in Russia may represent a 
potential state curse and resource curse.195 How did it come to this?
The “lesson learned” by Putin from the Yeltsin years was that relying solely 
on market forces will not enable smooth economic transition. As Putin empha-
sised during his 200 presidential campaign, the “premature globalisation of 
the Russian economy” will lead to greater hardships for most Russians.196 In an 
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analysis of Russian petroleum politics, Martha Brill Olcott draws attention to 
a dissertation authored by Putin on “Mineral Raw Materials in the Strategy for 
the Development of the Russian Economy”, while he was at the State Mining 
Institute in St Petersburg at the end of the 1990s.197 What Putin construes as pri-
vate ownership of strategic resources and assets hardly matches what the West 
would consider to be full ownership rights. According to the text, industrial 
groups are to operate within the framework of the state, which has the 
right to regulate the process of the acquisition and the use of natural resources, 
and particularly mineral resources, independent of on whose property they are 
located; in this regard the state acts in the interests of society as a whole, as well 
as in the interests of the private owners whose interests conflict and who need 
the help of state organs of power to achieve a compromise.198
Although the new Russian petroleum bonanza has in reality barely begun, inter-
nal developments give cause for concern in terms of how Russia is organising its 
petroleum sector, including a lack of transparency and disregard for the rule of 
law. The Russian economy has until lately been surfing ahead on high oil prices, 
but the reliance on oil and gas also reveals its latent weaknesses. The combined 
effect of plummeting oil prices and lack of foreign investments are dealing hard 
blows to the economy. The state budget, originally fixed at a modest oil price 
of 70 USD when the market price was twice this level, has been readjusted to 
50 USD in order to be in balance. Two mutually reinforcing negative factors are 
now at play and threaten to aggravate the general economic situation further. 
First, Russia’s petroleum business is relatively insulated and decision-makers 
are not forced to align economic interests with the rules and mechanisms of 
a transparent and strictly commercial marketplace. Second, political decision-
makers align their personal interests with the state’s, and, in so doing, reinforce 
a system based less on the separation than on the centralisation of power. Do-
mestic circumstances underpin a system in which energy interests become in-
distinguishable from the security interests of the corporate state.199 Some of the 
recent bail-outs of oligarchs by the state have been difficult to understand and 
criticised for their negative knock-on effects on economic actors further down 
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January 1999, see Martha Brill Olcott, “Vladimir Putin and the Geopolitics of Oil”, in 
The Energy Dimension in Russian Global Strategy.
198 Quoted in Olcott, ibid. p. 19 (emph. added).
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the echelons. Commercialisation of power structures has been accompanied by 
a law-enforcement system attuned to political dictates. Critics claim that Russia 
has been putting the natural rent at risk and let itself become vulnerable to the 
negative impacts of petroleum affluence.200 Much too little was done to remedy 
the situation when macroeconomic fundamentals were good, with a budget in 
surplus, positive foreign-exchange reserves and a generally sound fiscal policy. 
Now that the economy is no longer profiting from favourable external condi-
tions, Russia’s internal social and economic situation, viewed in its totality, may 
become untenable in the longer term.
Based on the discussion above, one may conclude that Russia’s energy poli-
tics is predominantly state-centric. Economic power is concentrated in the hands 
of the state, just as political power and control over the state are centralised. 
Energy cooperation with Russia is thus predicated on the premise of an om-
nipresent state. This does not mean that the securitised étatism of Russia is a 
well-structured process and that the state’s interests are easily discerned. But one 
factor seems overriding; the quest for sovereign control. Political life and eco-
nomic activity in Russia present themselves in a particular form of sovereignt-
ism, which illustrates the normative distance from the West as to the legitimate 
roles and interests of the state. Today, policy-makers in the West increasingly see 
human rights, environmental protection and economic development as comple-
mentary. There is a rising awareness of the interdependence between such ar-
eas. Recent trends suggest that integrated resource management is conducive to 
social development and to sustainable economic growth. They require flexible, 
subtle and responsive state institutions. Russia is not alone in seeking to hedge 
over its sovereignty by resorting to economic nationalism. But its proclivity to 
use energy as a foreign-policy tool has led to widespread unease. 
The (mis)management of energy interdependence 
Energy security is a two-way dependence which in its most basic form encapsu-
lates both security of supply and security of demand in stable producer-consumer 
relations and predictable market conditions.201 Security of energy supply and de-
mand played a central role at the G8 July 2006 summit in St Petersburg and is a 
main theme of the EU’s common external energy policy. At the St Petersburg G-8 
summit, state leaders agreed to set out “common goals and approaches aimed at 
200 Mau, “Strengths and Weaknesses …: 105. 
201 See Helm, The New Energy Paradigm for further development of security of supply 
according to markets and sources, pp. 23–28.
ensuring sufficient, reliable and environmentally responsible supplies of energy 
at prices reflecting market fundamentals.”202 It is not entirely clear whether Rus-
sia’s rough handling of its energy clients in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) is due to a genuine concern over prices, or politically motivated.203 
When trying to deal with the CIS countries, admittedly in an abrupt and po-
liticised manner, Russia has mainly succeeded in bringing upon itself nervous 
market responses, in addition to political animosity. This is a reminder that en-
ergy dependence is double-edged, and too important to be played as a political 
card, which is something Russia is gradually appreciating. It is not in the seller’s 
long-term interest to seem unreliable, even if his product is in great demand. At 
the same time, transit states do not win much sympathy in Europe by politically 
blackmailing Russia. 2009 started with another gas conflict between Russia and 
the Ukraine, ultimately harming Gazprom’s customers in Eastern Europe in the 
coldest months of the year. As there is no binding legal framework, such as that 
proposed by the European Energy Charter, Europe’s problems with energy secu-
rity are not over. However, the decision to have a third party – the EU – monitor 
the gas flows from Russia to the Ukraine is an example of multilateralisation 
of energy relations that recalls vital principles of the European Energy Charter 
Treaty.
In principle, both Russia and the European energy market stand to benefit 
from the Nord Stream pipeline through the Baltic Sea. But transit countries in 
the CIS and Eastern Europe fear that Russian export diversification will reduce 
their own diversification of supply. They see Russia’s gain as their loss, in a 
traditional kto kovo power game reminiscent of the past. Russia’s ambition to 
develop an LNG export capacity is generally seen in the same light, as a way 
to increase Russian independence while augmenting consumer-transit countries’ 
dependence. On the other hand, LNG could provide the global energy market 
with better flexibility. Pipelines are fixed and have a distinct regional dimen-
sion. Yet, the geopolitics of pipelines and energy security may be overstated. 
The European market is attractive and reliable. Few genuinely seem to believe 
that Russia’s development of fields in eastern Siberia to serve markets in Asia is 
intended to harm Europe. Ironically, the crucial factor for European security of 
supply is not the Russian-produced gas as such, but Russia’s access to cheap gas 
from Central Asia. It is largely this gas that Gazprom re-exports to European 
markets. The day that Central Asia has a greater diversity of export routes, and 
202 G-8 Summary, 17 July 2006, Chairman’s Report, Global Energy Security. 
203 Alan Riley, “The Coming of the Russian Gas Deficit: Consequences and Solutions”, 
CEPS Policy Brief, no. 116 (October 2006).
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social development and to sustainable economic growth. They require flexible, 
subtle and responsive state institutions. Russia is not alone in seeking to hedge 
over its sovereignty by resorting to economic nationalism. But its proclivity to 
use energy as a foreign-policy tool has led to widespread unease. 
The (mis)management of energy interdependence 
Energy security is a two-way dependence which in its most basic form encapsu-
lates both security of supply and security of demand in stable producer-consumer 
relations and predictable market conditions.201 Security of energy supply and de-
mand played a central role at the G8 July 2006 summit in St Petersburg and is a 
main theme of the EU’s common external energy policy. At the St Petersburg G-8 
summit, state leaders agreed to set out “common goals and approaches aimed at 
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ensuring sufficient, reliable and environmentally responsible supplies of energy 
at prices reflecting market fundamentals.”202 It is not entirely clear whether Rus-
sia’s rough handling of its energy clients in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) is due to a genuine concern over prices, or politically motivated.203 
When trying to deal with the CIS countries, admittedly in an abrupt and po-
liticised manner, Russia has mainly succeeded in bringing upon itself nervous 
market responses, in addition to political animosity. This is a reminder that en-
ergy dependence is double-edged, and too important to be played as a political 
card, which is something Russia is gradually appreciating. It is not in the seller’s 
long-term interest to seem unreliable, even if his product is in great demand. At 
the same time, transit states do not win much sympathy in Europe by politically 
blackmailing Russia. 2009 started with another gas conflict between Russia and 
the Ukraine, ultimately harming Gazprom’s customers in Eastern Europe in the 
coldest months of the year. As there is no binding legal framework, such as that 
proposed by the European Energy Charter, Europe’s problems with energy secu-
rity are not over. However, the decision to have a third party – the EU – monitor 
the gas flows from Russia to the Ukraine is an example of multilateralisation 
of energy relations that recalls vital principles of the European Energy Charter 
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In principle, both Russia and the European energy market stand to benefit 
from the Nord Stream pipeline through the Baltic Sea. But transit countries in 
the CIS and Eastern Europe fear that Russian export diversification will reduce 
their own diversification of supply. They see Russia’s gain as their loss, in a 
traditional kto kovo power game reminiscent of the past. Russia’s ambition to 
develop an LNG export capacity is generally seen in the same light, as a way 
to increase Russian independence while augmenting consumer-transit countries’ 
dependence. On the other hand, LNG could provide the global energy market 
with better flexibility. Pipelines are fixed and have a distinct regional dimen-
sion. Yet, the geopolitics of pipelines and energy security may be overstated. 
The European market is attractive and reliable. Few genuinely seem to believe 
that Russia’s development of fields in eastern Siberia to serve markets in Asia is 
intended to harm Europe. Ironically, the crucial factor for European security of 
supply is not the Russian-produced gas as such, but Russia’s access to cheap gas 
from Central Asia. It is largely this gas that Gazprom re-exports to European 
markets. The day that Central Asia has a greater diversity of export routes, and 
202 G-8 Summary, 17 July 2006, Chairman’s Report, Global Energy Security. 
203 Alan Riley, “The Coming of the Russian Gas Deficit: Consequences and Solutions”, 
CEPS Policy Brief, no. 116 (October 2006).
OF_1_2009_innhold.indd   77 26-02-09   12:14:51
7 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty 1/2009 NOr�e�IaN fOreI�N �O�Icy IN t�e �I�� NOrt�      
is willing and able to use them, Russia may come under greater pressure to meet 
domestic and foreign commitments. The producer-consumer interdependence of 
energy in Russia-CIS relations is a legacy from the Soviet Union. The sooner it 
can be normalised, the better for Russia too, taking into account the enormous 
investments that Gazprom is facing to compensate for the depletion of its three 
supergiant fields. But the road to multi-level and sector-crossing interdepend-
ence between Russia and its energy partners and dependents, be it upstream 
or downstream, is littered with obstacles. IEA estimates of the need for global 
energy investments from 2001 to 2030 were USD 3.1 trillion, an average of USD 
105 billion a year at a time when oil prices were still high.20 The figures also 
cover investment in energy efficiency and emission reduction. What they affirm 
is that attractive investment conditions are needed if a gas supply gap is to be 
avoided in the next decade, without being compensated for by massive increases 
in coal-based energy production worldwide. According to the IEA, there is a 
serious risk of under-investment in the global gas sector, and in Russia’s in par-
ticular; “unless all projects currently planned are also delivered by 2010, which 
is unlikely.”205 Since the Russian-Georgian war, and due to the effect of the 
financial crisis and plummeting oil prices being felt in full in the real economy, 
private capital has flown from Russia: correspondingly, investing in developing 
fields, other than through public funding, is increasingly difficult.  
Russia’s restrictive rules for foreign access to its petroleum sector do not 
help much in the present situation. Hydrocarbon fields on the Russian shelf 
are regarded as strategic. In questions of cooperation with foreign companies, 
Russia does not seem willing to ease its control over the natural resources any 
time soon. Rather, the opportunities for direct foreign ownership are waning 
and the investment climate is getting tougher. In the winter of 2007, a bill was 
put to the Duma limiting foreign ownership of Russia’s strategic resources. The 
new legislation aims to protect Russia’s strategic resources by limiting foreign 
companies’ ownership to fifty per cent minus one share, or to twenty-five per 
cent minus one if the company concerned is state-owned or controlled.206 The 
bill was finally passed in April 2008 and came into force on 7 May, only a few 
months before oil prices started to fall. Using such legal measures, Russian au-
thorities are seeking to avoid having their sovereignty over the state’s resources 
20 IEA, Natural Gas Market Review 2006, pp. 65–78.
205 Ibid, p. 65.
206 “Law on the Procedures for Investing Foreign Funds into Commercial Organizations 
Strategically Important for the National Security of the Russian Federation”. For an 
analysis, see Rob Patterson and Natalya Morozova, Russia’s Strategic Industries Law: 
Latest Developments (Vinson & Elkins LLP, October 2007). 
undermined. Not everything is bad about the new law, however: there is bet-
ter monitoring, and rules are more clearly stated. The correct application of 
rules has been made less ambiguous, and there is less opportunity for arbitrary 
practices. The downside is that the market is still susceptible to political consid-
erations, since there are no real institutional checks provided by market forces, 
independent supervisory state bodies or regulatory frameworks. Thus, in Russia 
there are no real barriers to mixing energy with politics. To the extent that it is 
possible to make inferences from the Shtokman decision of the autumn of 2006, 
control seems to have trumped cooperation just as conservatism and power-
gaining seem to trump liberalisation and reform.207 It is a paradox that Russia’s 
external strength only in a limited sense is helping it redress internal weaknesses. 
The concentration of political and economic power to control the state’s sov-
ereign resources incapacitates internal economic and democratic development. 
The energy sector is drifting away from efficient regulatory mechanisms and 
competitiveness. This leaves less space for multilateral legal regimes and for 
foreign and private multinational companies to operate in Russia. This also ap-
plies to the Energy Charter Treaty, which at the time of signing was a trade-off 
so Russia could gain access to European markets. 
THE FOREIGN pOLITICS OF ENERGy COOpERATION
Management of energy interdependence, then, seems to mean limiting external 
dependence to a minimum. From its position of strength, Russia may compen-
sate for dependence by applying political and economic power bilaterally. The 
assumption is, thus, that energy will allow Russia to turn further towards bi-
lateralism as its preferred foreign-policy modus operandi. Russia holds the key 
to cooperation in the North. Interests in maintaining sovereign control over 
strategic resources do not per se imply a policy that eschews international coop-
eration. But this requires a positive-sum approach to energy cooperation, and 
it is an open question whether the region is there yet. Interdependence is a dif-
ficult concept to make operational in politico-economic practice. The underlying 
question is how Norway (and the West) and Russia can establish and manage 
mutually binding energy relations. 
Russia’s present penchant for “sovereigntism” emerges as a preventive 
strategy; to rein in and control the dynamics of interdependence, be they with 
Europe or Central Asia. Until gas flows from Shtokman, possibly by 2015, but 
207 For a thorough analysis, see Arild Moe, “Sjtokman-beslutningen: Forklaringer og 
implikasjoner” [The Shtokman decision: explanations and implications], Nordisk 
Østforum, no.  (2006): 389–03.
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avoided in the next decade, without being compensated for by massive increases 
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is unlikely.”205 Since the Russian-Georgian war, and due to the effect of the 
financial crisis and plummeting oil prices being felt in full in the real economy, 
private capital has flown from Russia: correspondingly, investing in developing 
fields, other than through public funding, is increasingly difficult.  
Russia’s restrictive rules for foreign access to its petroleum sector do not 
help much in the present situation. Hydrocarbon fields on the Russian shelf 
are regarded as strategic. In questions of cooperation with foreign companies, 
Russia does not seem willing to ease its control over the natural resources any 
time soon. Rather, the opportunities for direct foreign ownership are waning 
and the investment climate is getting tougher. In the winter of 2007, a bill was 
put to the Duma limiting foreign ownership of Russia’s strategic resources. The 
new legislation aims to protect Russia’s strategic resources by limiting foreign 
companies’ ownership to fifty per cent minus one share, or to twenty-five per 
cent minus one if the company concerned is state-owned or controlled.206 The 
bill was finally passed in April 2008 and came into force on 7 May, only a few 
months before oil prices started to fall. Using such legal measures, Russian au-
thorities are seeking to avoid having their sovereignty over the state’s resources 
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undermined. Not everything is bad about the new law, however: there is bet-
ter monitoring, and rules are more clearly stated. The correct application of 
rules has been made less ambiguous, and there is less opportunity for arbitrary 
practices. The downside is that the market is still susceptible to political consid-
erations, since there are no real institutional checks provided by market forces, 
independent supervisory state bodies or regulatory frameworks. Thus, in Russia 
there are no real barriers to mixing energy with politics. To the extent that it is 
possible to make inferences from the Shtokman decision of the autumn of 2006, 
control seems to have trumped cooperation just as conservatism and power-
gaining seem to trump liberalisation and reform.207 It is a paradox that Russia’s 
external strength only in a limited sense is helping it redress internal weaknesses. 
The concentration of political and economic power to control the state’s sov-
ereign resources incapacitates internal economic and democratic development. 
The energy sector is drifting away from efficient regulatory mechanisms and 
competitiveness. This leaves less space for multilateral legal regimes and for 
foreign and private multinational companies to operate in Russia. This also ap-
plies to the Energy Charter Treaty, which at the time of signing was a trade-off 
so Russia could gain access to European markets. 
THE FOREIGN pOLITICS OF ENERGy COOpERATION
Management of energy interdependence, then, seems to mean limiting external 
dependence to a minimum. From its position of strength, Russia may compen-
sate for dependence by applying political and economic power bilaterally. The 
assumption is, thus, that energy will allow Russia to turn further towards bi-
lateralism as its preferred foreign-policy modus operandi. Russia holds the key 
to cooperation in the North. Interests in maintaining sovereign control over 
strategic resources do not per se imply a policy that eschews international coop-
eration. But this requires a positive-sum approach to energy cooperation, and 
it is an open question whether the region is there yet. Interdependence is a dif-
ficult concept to make operational in politico-economic practice. The underlying 
question is how Norway (and the West) and Russia can establish and manage 
mutually binding energy relations. 
Russia’s present penchant for “sovereigntism” emerges as a preventive 
strategy; to rein in and control the dynamics of interdependence, be they with 
Europe or Central Asia. Until gas flows from Shtokman, possibly by 2015, but 
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more likely closer to 2020, concern about Russia as a reliable supplier of gas to 
Europe is ironically less a question of Moscow and Gazprom’s intentions and 
more of the sustainability of Russia’s political relations with the countries of 
Central Asia. Despite tightening internal control, Russia is, in its own fashion, 
opening up to the outside world. Moscow does not seem overly interested in 
joining the West’s political structures and institutions, not with the current cost 
in terms of institutional integration. Such institutions have so far furnished Rus-
sia with less influence than it can gain for itself by having a strong market posi-
tion. But due to its foreign economic engagement, Russia is getting more deeply 
embedded in energy cooperation with the West. There is, however, legitimate 
concern about the way in which and to what extent energy is used to spearhead 
the Kremlin’s foreign-policy interests. This poses a challenge to Europe, which 
ponders whether the continued liberalisation of its energy markets, including 
through the policy of unbundling, is indeed the best way to handle energy co-
operation with Russia. One may ask what the strongest force will be: Russia’s 
anxieties over letting the outside world in; or the EU’s fear of having Gazprom 
own large shares in its energy retail and distribution network. The danger is, for 
instance, that Gazprom/Russia may succeed in re-bundling what Europe has just 
unbundled. Apparently, Moscow is pursuing the very same strategies and aims 
abroad that it is adamantly blocking for foreign and even private domestic inves-
tors within Russia. While investing aggressively abroad, Russia is engaging in an 
internal re-fighting of old battles from its new position of strength. Through the 
economic muscle of Gazprom, and assisted by the Russian bureaucracy and the 
judiciary, Russia has regained control over Sakhalin (II) from Shell and over the 
joint venture in Kovykta between TNK-BP. It seems part of a revanchist strategy, 
aimed at redressing old agreements concluded at a time when Russia felt that it 
was bargaining from a weak position. In effect, Russia may be pursuing a policy 
to right old wrongs. Being closely associated with Russia’s more assertive for-
eign policy, energy may bring pivotal changes to the entire Murmansk region. 
The way in which the military and the energy sector may differently perceive 
issues of cooperation in the North is what I shall look at next.
SECURITy AND ENERGy INTERESTS IN NORTHWEST RUSSIA
The military is still a force to be reckoned with in Russia.208 Analyses show that 
the introduction of a new national security agenda with less emphasis on mili-
tary threats is a slow process.209 There may be several reasons for this, typically 
tied to residual notions of territorial security and sovereignty.210 The energy-
military relationship in Northwest Russia will among other things impact on 
international energy cooperation in the North. Reconciling energy and military 
interests is thus also a question of whether Russia will attend more to economic 
development through cooperation and be less preoccupied with military secu-
rity. 
How the military and the energy sector should learn to coexist in Northwest 
Russia is an open question. Put bluntly, will the military securitise the energy 
business, or will energy desecuritise the military? The preceding analysis hints at 
the answer to this, but a closer regional look is still warranted. Chances are that 
the footprint of the energy sector will get so heavy that it may strain the relation-
ship with the military. Both sectors are sensitive to external pressures. Little is 
publicly known about the military’s preferences in matters of the construction 
and location of energy infrastructure in Northwest Russia. It may therefore be 
helpful to try and map out converging and conflicting military and energy inter-
ests. I shall therefore single out some specific issues of petroleum development 
and see which actors are involved and assess their interests. I assume that this 
may provide insights into who has the final say in strategic deliberations. 
The military-energy nexus in Murmansk
As with other great powers, the military still enjoys particular respect and stand-
ing in the Russian state apparatus. In terms of assuring Russia’s global signifi-
208 Aatland, Russisk nordområdepolitikk etter den kalde krigen;Shevtsova, Putin’s 
Russia. Kristian Aatland, Tor Bukkvoll, Morten Jeppesen & Iver Johansen, Hvor går 
Russland? Fem scenarier om Russland og norsk sikkerhet i 2030 [Where is Russia 
heading? Five scenarios on Russia and Norwegian security in 2030] (Oslo: Abstrakt           
forlag, 2005). Stephen J. Cimbala and Peter Jacob Rainow, Russia and Postmodern 
Deterrence: Military Power and Its Challenges for Security (Washington, D.C.: 
Potomac Books, 2007).
209 Nikita Lomagin, “Forming a new security identity”, in Russia as a Great Power. 
Dimensions of security under Putin, Jakob Hedenskog et al. (London: Routledge, 
2005), pp. 257–277. See also Tor Bukkvoll, Russian Military Corruption – Scale and 
Causes, FFI/Report-2005/038 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 
2005).
210 Williams, The Ethics of Territorial Borders, p. 116.
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interests is thus also a question of whether Russia will attend more to economic 
development through cooperation and be less preoccupied with military secu-
rity. 
How the military and the energy sector should learn to coexist in Northwest 
Russia is an open question. Put bluntly, will the military securitise the energy 
business, or will energy desecuritise the military? The preceding analysis hints at 
the answer to this, but a closer regional look is still warranted. Chances are that 
the footprint of the energy sector will get so heavy that it may strain the relation-
ship with the military. Both sectors are sensitive to external pressures. Little is 
publicly known about the military’s preferences in matters of the construction 
and location of energy infrastructure in Northwest Russia. It may therefore be 
helpful to try and map out converging and conflicting military and energy inter-
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cance, only the energy sector can match the military. The energy sector is impos-
ing itself as provider of economic and social security to Russian society. One may 
therefore expect the energy sector to challenge the military’s standing and power 
to define issues of national interest. Indeed, in the northern regional oblasts en-
ergy interests are encroaching on a territory where, physically and functionally, 
the military has enjoyed hegemony. Moreover, petroleum revenues ultimately 
pay for the increases in spending that the military is currently enjoying. 
The regional administration, in particular the office of the governor of 
Murmansk Oblast, is somehow situated in the narrow space between the in-
terests of the energy and military sectors. Being a presidential appointee, the 
governor of the Murmansk Region is not without power and may in fact be 
a rising political factor. But it would nonetheless be wrong to expect him to 
hold much sway over energy or military interests. Regional heads probably lost 
more real power than they gained through the de-regionalisation process under 
Putin.211 Difficult issues are as a rule dealt with and solved in Moscow, not in 
Murmansk.212 The governor tends to sympathise with the energy industry, and 
the federal centre takes a direct interest when questions of energy and security 
are broached.213 Although not much is documented in open sources about the 
security overlay for Russia’s strategic energy considerations in the North, look-
ing at the outcome of instances when the interests of energy and security have 
met provides some clues. 
The overall impact of industrial and infrastructural developments for ener-
gy will challenge the military’s habitual desire for secrecy. Whether an increased 
international presence will be acceptable to the military and the security services 
remains to be seen. Chances are that either the military will have to lower it 
requirements for secrecy, or that the energy sector will gradually be securitised. 
Capacity building related to energy involves converting military areas and in-
frastructure as well as starting huge new construction projects close to military 
bases and facilities. The choice is either to co-locate and convert certain oil 
terminals and refineries to civilian use, or to operate separate civilian and mili-
tary facilities. Notably, there are concrete plans to demilitarise and construct a 
civilian terminal at Lavna on the western side of the Kola Bay, and to open up 
for civilian use of the military infrastructure at Mokhnatkina Pakhta.21 Both 
211 Vilhelm Konnander, “What prospects for Russia in the Baltic Sea region? Cooperation 
or isolation?” in Russia as a Great Power. Dimensions of security under Putin, 
Hedenskog et al. (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 109–129.
212 Interview, Regional Administration, Murmansk, 21 June 2007.
213 Ibid.
21 Ibid. and Aatland,   Russisk nordområdepolitikk etter den kalde krigen, respectively.
locations are close to Murmansk city. On land, several large-scale energy-related 
infrastructure projects are envisaged: the construction of a deep-water crude oil 
terminal, including reloading and storage facilities, an oil refinery and a natural 
gas liquefaction (LNG) plant. They are directly tied to the ambition of making 
Murmansk a major petroleum outlet to international markets. For the port of 
Murmansk itself, the plan is to modernise and establish a special economic free 
zone. The LNG plant, for the gas from Shtokman, was initially to be located at 
Vidyaevo on the Barents Sea coast some forty-eight kilometres from Murmansk. 
But due to conflicting military interests, it will be relocated to the more remote 
settlement at Teriberka.215 
The ambition to make Murmansk an energy export hub was at one stage 
politically linked to the US-Russia energy dialogue, and symbolised the positive 
turn in their bilateral relations. Russia’s focus was on acquiring better access to 
crude markets worldwide, and the US in particular. Later, delivery of LNG to 
the US market was added as an ambition.216 Their reciprocal interest in closer 
energy cooperation was also security-driven. It originated in part from the US’s 
desire for greater diversification of supply to lessen its reliance on the Middle 
East post 9/11. Energy cooperation was a central topic at the US-Russia summit 
of May 2002, and was followed by the bilateral “energy summit” in Houston 
later the same year. This cooperation soon ran short of political steam, however, 
and energy development projects in Murmansk suffered a loss of impetus. Since 
2006, and linked to the strategic decisions about the Shtokman development, at-
tention has shifted towards the European gas market and to pipelines. The plan 
for a liquefaction facility in the Murmansk area for the gas from Shtokman has 
not been discarded, although it was originally intended to serve the US market. 
It is improbable that the recent downturn in US-Russia relations will be allowed 
to stand in the way of mutually beneficial energy relations for very long. To 
Russia, the commercial arguments in favour of exporting gas to American and 
European markets are too important to be ignored. The world market for lique-
fied gas is expected to grow considerably and Russia will need to diversify both 
its means and routes of exportation. In autumn 2006, when Gazprom apparent-
ly shifted its priorities from LNG for the US to piping gas directly to European 
markets, it was most probably acting on instructions from the Kremlin.217 The 
implication of the decision is that Russia will not ship LNG from Shtokman to 
the US within the timeframe and in the volume earlier intended. Possibly a silent 
215 Interview, Regional Administration, Murmansk, 21 June 2007.
216 Brunstad et al.,   Big Oil Playground …, pp. 81–88.
217 Moe, “Sjtokman-beslutningen”. 
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But due to conflicting military interests, it will be relocated to the more remote 
settlement at Teriberka.215 
The ambition to make Murmansk an energy export hub was at one stage 
politically linked to the US-Russia energy dialogue, and symbolised the positive 
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desire for greater diversification of supply to lessen its reliance on the Middle 
East post 9/11. Energy cooperation was a central topic at the US-Russia summit 
of May 2002, and was followed by the bilateral “energy summit” in Houston 
later the same year. This cooperation soon ran short of political steam, however, 
and energy development projects in Murmansk suffered a loss of impetus. Since 
2006, and linked to the strategic decisions about the Shtokman development, at-
tention has shifted towards the European gas market and to pipelines. The plan 
for a liquefaction facility in the Murmansk area for the gas from Shtokman has 
not been discarded, although it was originally intended to serve the US market. 
It is improbable that the recent downturn in US-Russia relations will be allowed 
to stand in the way of mutually beneficial energy relations for very long. To 
Russia, the commercial arguments in favour of exporting gas to American and 
European markets are too important to be ignored. The world market for lique-
fied gas is expected to grow considerably and Russia will need to diversify both 
its means and routes of exportation. In autumn 2006, when Gazprom apparent-
ly shifted its priorities from LNG for the US to piping gas directly to European 
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acknowledgement of the fact that they would not be able to honour their com-
mitments was part of the motivation.218 However, the decision could also reflect 
Russia’s reluctance to rely too heavily on the US gas market, given the politicised 
nature of their energy relations, and that Russia wanted a stronger foothold in 
Europe too. In any case, the Shtokman decision signals an orientation towards 
Europe as Gazprom’s chief energy partner. It may further reflect nervousness 
in Gazprom about the huge task of producing gas for domestic consumption 
while still managing to supply European and even US markets. Yulia Tymosh-
enko makes this case, saying that “[i]mpending shortages (..) may explain why 
Gazprom abandoned its plan to send gas from the Shtokman field (..) to the US 
market as liquefied natural gas and diverted it to Europe instead. The decision 
(..) may actually have been a sign of desperation: sending Shtokman gas to Eu-
rope would free up Siberian output for domestic consumption.” 219 
Murmansk is emerging as an important gateway to international markets, 
the open seas and military strategic staging areas. Putin’s visit to Murmansk in 
May 2007 was the signal to start working on a comprehensive Russian policy 
for the North. To enhance the capacity for coordinating Russian policies for the 
North, it was reportedly decided to set up a Russian “National Arctic Council”, 
consisting of the most relevant ministries and state organs, including the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, Defence, the Federal Security Service (FSB) and regional 
administrations. This may indicate the added importance that Moscow now 
seems to put on a more coherent Russian policy-making for the North. While 
the idea of a Russian National Arctic Council resonates well with general na-
tional priorities of security and sovereignty, it is unclear what specific role and 
mandate it is to be given in international cooperation in the North, if any.220 
If the council is not established, some of the ambitions behind it will surely be 
taken care of by the forthcoming Russian strategy for the Arctic, although this 
would probably accord regional authorities even less influence.
218 Yulia Tymoshenko, “Containing Russia”, Foreign Affairs, May/June (2007): 69–82.
219 Ibid: 78–79. 
220 Interview, Regional Administration, Murmansk, 21 June 2007. When this question 
was raised, the Regional Administration seemed unenthusiastic about the council, 
letting it be understood that it was a Moscow idea in which they had little ownership. 
They were not familiar with any specific mandate, and had doubts that the council 
would ever materialise. 
The changing identity of Murmansk
New infrastructure is critical if Murmansk is to develop into a petroleum capi-
tal and major export hub. Currently, and until a large-scale reloading capacity 
on land becomes a reality, a super-tanker (the “Belokamenka”) operated by 
Rosneft and lying at anchor in the Kola Bay is the oil terminal. Tankers ship oil 
from the Timan-Pechora province and western Siberia to Murmansk and load it 
directly onto the single-hulled “Belokamenka”: from there it is shipped further 
on to international markets.221 This is symptomatic of the situation. The com-
mercial potential of Murmansk and other ports in the region is underutilised, 
chiefly due to the dilapidated port infrastructure and the poorly developed rail-
way connection between ports and inland areas. Regional and federal authori-
ties are increasingly concerned that too much of the goods shipped out of Russia 
are exited via foreign ports, such as those in the Baltic states. 
At the time of writing, Medvedev has not yet visited Murmansk as president. 
Putin, accompanied by a large governmental entourage, was the last president 
to visit on 2 May 2007. The visit was centred on the Kremlin’s interest in de-
veloping maritime transport and energy-related infrastructure in the Murmansk 
region.222 While unspecific about the start-up of construction projects, Putin said 
that by 2015 export of petroleum products from Murmansk would increase 
considerably: he thus indicated a date for Shtokman to go on-stream. Between 
2015 and 2025, the development of the Timan-Pechora and Yamal fields will 
similarly increase the need for modern petroleum export facilities in Murmansk. 
Putin emphasised the need to upgrade ports to meet international standards and 
prioritised the port of Murmansk and near-by oil terminals. The strategic vision 
for the Murmansk region is integration in the global maritime transportation 
system by meeting the demands generated by petroleum activity off-shore, and 
by developing port infrastructure to make the Northern Sea Route commercially 
attractive. Putin ended his visit by reminding those present of the need to secure 
Russia’s strategic interests in the region, and the Arctic as a whole, in particular 
by reconciling economic, scientific and military interests.223
221 The environmental hazards involved in such reloading at sea, instead of from a 
land-based terminal, are debated. Not all environmental NGOs are worried. The 
environmental dimension of energy development was addressed by Putin when he 
visited Murmansk on 2 May 2007; interviews with the Murmansk offices of Bellona 
and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), 19–20 June 2007.
222 Cf. Vladimir Putin, “О р��з�итии ин�р���тру�туры ��р����� тр��н�п�рт�� Р���и�������      
Фе��ер��ции” [On the development of maritime transportation infrastructure in the 
Russian Federation], 2 May 2007, President of the Russian Federation [online].
223 Ibid. 
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Russia’s reluctance to rely too heavily on the US gas market, given the politicised 
nature of their energy relations, and that Russia wanted a stronger foothold in 
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May 2007 was the signal to start working on a comprehensive Russian policy 
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administrations. This may indicate the added importance that Moscow now 
seems to put on a more coherent Russian policy-making for the North. While 
the idea of a Russian National Arctic Council resonates well with general na-
tional priorities of security and sovereignty, it is unclear what specific role and 
mandate it is to be given in international cooperation in the North, if any.220 
If the council is not established, some of the ambitions behind it will surely be 
taken care of by the forthcoming Russian strategy for the Arctic, although this 
would probably accord regional authorities even less influence.
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was raised, the Regional Administration seemed unenthusiastic about the council, 
letting it be understood that it was a Moscow idea in which they had little ownership. 
They were not familiar with any specific mandate, and had doubts that the council 
would ever materialise. 
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New infrastructure is critical if Murmansk is to develop into a petroleum capi-
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At the time of writing, Medvedev has not yet visited Murmansk as president. 
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to visit on 2 May 2007. The visit was centred on the Kremlin’s interest in de-
veloping maritime transport and energy-related infrastructure in the Murmansk 
region.222 While unspecific about the start-up of construction projects, Putin said 
that by 2015 export of petroleum products from Murmansk would increase 
considerably: he thus indicated a date for Shtokman to go on-stream. Between 
2015 and 2025, the development of the Timan-Pechora and Yamal fields will 
similarly increase the need for modern petroleum export facilities in Murmansk. 
Putin emphasised the need to upgrade ports to meet international standards and 
prioritised the port of Murmansk and near-by oil terminals. The strategic vision 
for the Murmansk region is integration in the global maritime transportation 
system by meeting the demands generated by petroleum activity off-shore, and 
by developing port infrastructure to make the Northern Sea Route commercially 
attractive. Putin ended his visit by reminding those present of the need to secure 
Russia’s strategic interests in the region, and the Arctic as a whole, in particular 
by reconciling economic, scientific and military interests.223
221 The environmental hazards involved in such reloading at sea, instead of from a 
land-based terminal, are debated. Not all environmental NGOs are worried. The 
environmental dimension of energy development was addressed by Putin when he 
visited Murmansk on 2 May 2007; interviews with the Murmansk offices of Bellona 
and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), 19–20 June 2007.
222 Cf. Vladimir Putin, “О р��з�итии ин�р���тру�туры ��р����� тр��н�п�рт�� Р���и�������      
Фе��ер��ции” [On the development of maritime transportation infrastructure in the 
Russian Federation], 2 May 2007, President of the Russian Federation [online].
223 Ibid. 
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Energy development could decisively transform the identity of Murmansk 
from military bastion to petroleum capital. For the military, there are both op-
portunities and challenges involved in this. As noted above, it is difficult to 
know how the regional military leadership and the Ministry of Defence in Mos-
cow view large-scale energy development in the Murmansk area: is it a threat or 
something to be encouraged? The impact of security on political deliberations 
seems to be as influential as it is difficult to assess. One analytical point of depar-
ture is that the military and energy sectors are somehow fated to coexist in the 
North. The very same reasons that make Murmansk suitable for the Northern 
Fleet – ice-free ports, waterways deep enough for large surface vessels, direct ac-
cess to the Atlantic and so forth – explain its attractiveness to the energy indus-
try – in addition to the fact that it is off-shore and on-shore in Northwest Russia 
that the next generation of important petroleum deposits is located. 
The opportunities of the North started to attract the attention of private 
Russian petroleum companies in the early 2000s. Immediately following the 
2002 Houston summit, four Russian companies stated their joint interest in con-
structing an expensive oil pipeline from western Siberia to Murmansk and the 
oil terminal there. The price for the oil terminal was an estimated 300 million 
USD, the pipeline some 3.–.5 billion USD according to the route chosen.22 
The fate of some of these companies indicates that their involvement in pipeline 
policy-making was at a considerable risk. The companies were Lukoil, Yukos, 
Sibneft and the then TNK. The last of these is now TNK-BP; the others have 
either been sold, or have been taken over by or coexist in a non-competitive 
relationship with the state-controlled Russian national champions, Gazprom 
and Rosneft. The Yukos/Khodorkovsky case is still veiled in mystery, and it is 
difficult to find trustworthy information about the authorities’ deeper motives. 
However, in a detailed analysis, the Swedish Defence Research Agency concludes 
that the threat to Putin posed by the political activities of Khodorkovsky was 
not the essential issue.225 Yukos was setting priorities for the Russian oil indus-
try that where perceived as intruding on the Kremlin’s external energy policy. It 
apparently came to the point that the federal centre needed to set an example 
and rein in private economic power, lest others follow in Yukos’ tracks. At the 
time of Khodorkovsky’s arrest, Yukos was pursuing several projects which had 
foreign-policy implications. Of particular importance was Yukos’ ambition to 
tie more of its sales directly to the US oil market and its involvement in pipeline 
22 Aatland, Russisk nordområdepolitikk etter den kalde krigen, p. 18. 
225 Larsson, Russia’s Energy policy, pp. 89–11.
projects to Murmansk (and China) against the wishes of the Kremlin.226 Both of 
the pipeline projects have since been adopted as Moscow’s policy. This indicates 
that Moscow was primarily driven by the urge to make a point, namely that 
“decisions on infrastructure developments are taken by the state, not private 
companies.”227 Equally worrying to the Kremlin, Yukos was engaged in foreign 
acquisitions (including in Norway)228 and was planning to trade off substantial 
shares of its Russian assets. Figures vary, but estimates are that the proposed 
sales to ExxonMobil or Chevron Texaco were in the range of twenty-five to 
forty per cent.229 Documents to this effect were apparently being drawn up, 
making it imperative that the Kremlin act before it was too late. The figures are 
difficult to verify. But the crucial issue is that the foreign shares could very well 
have exceeded the ceilings stipulated in the legislation planned. Such legislation 
would regulate the foreign ownership of natural resources and infrastructure for 
distribution of strategic importance to national security.230
Although there are vast open areas in the North, much of the new energy 
infrastructure and many of the facilities will have to be located in areas already 
occupied by the military. While capitalising on the infrastructure already in place 
rather than building new facilities is tempting, practical challenges arise from 
the operational and logistical needs of the Northern Fleet, whose strategic fuel 
reserves are stored at the facility in Mokhnatkina Pakhta. Since the mid 1990s, 
Russian oil companies have enjoyed access: for instance, Lukoil’s arctic tankers 
have been able to use the facilities, and a deep-water pier have been constructed 
to support operations. But opening up the naval terminal to foreign commercial 
companies would be a big step for the military. As the Russian state has assumed 
ownership of strategic networks for transportation and distribution, concerns 
over sovereign control and security on land should be less acute. As to off-shore 
installations the picture is mixed. The Barents Sea is primarily a transit area for 
the Northern Fleet’s strategic arm. Their deployment areas lie further towards 
the north, under the ice cap. There is little reason to expect that rigs and sub-sea 
pipelines would seriously hinder the fleet’s movements, although the noise the 
pipelines generate might affect submarine operations. Due to the generally high 
level of military control over the area, it seems improbable that such installa-
tions could be used for hostile intelligence gathering or surveillance. But security 
226 Ibid, p. 106.
227 Ibid.
228 In 2001, Yukos made a bid for a stake in the Norwegian companies Kværner 
Hydrocarbons and Kværner Process Technology. The deal was never concluded.
229 Olcott, “Vladimir Putin and the Geopolitics of Oil”, p. 13. See also Larsson, Russia’s 
Energy policy. 
230 Cf. Patterson and Morozova, Russia’s Strategic Industries Law. See supra note 206. 
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Energy development could decisively transform the identity of Murmansk 
from military bastion to petroleum capital. For the military, there are both op-
portunities and challenges involved in this. As noted above, it is difficult to 
know how the regional military leadership and the Ministry of Defence in Mos-
cow view large-scale energy development in the Murmansk area: is it a threat or 
something to be encouraged? The impact of security on political deliberations 
seems to be as influential as it is difficult to assess. One analytical point of depar-
ture is that the military and energy sectors are somehow fated to coexist in the 
North. The very same reasons that make Murmansk suitable for the Northern 
Fleet – ice-free ports, waterways deep enough for large surface vessels, direct ac-
cess to the Atlantic and so forth – explain its attractiveness to the energy indus-
try – in addition to the fact that it is off-shore and on-shore in Northwest Russia 
that the next generation of important petroleum deposits is located. 
The opportunities of the North started to attract the attention of private 
Russian petroleum companies in the early 2000s. Immediately following the 
2002 Houston summit, four Russian companies stated their joint interest in con-
structing an expensive oil pipeline from western Siberia to Murmansk and the 
oil terminal there. The price for the oil terminal was an estimated 300 million 
USD, the pipeline some 3.–.5 billion USD according to the route chosen.22 
The fate of some of these companies indicates that their involvement in pipeline 
policy-making was at a considerable risk. The companies were Lukoil, Yukos, 
Sibneft and the then TNK. The last of these is now TNK-BP; the others have 
either been sold, or have been taken over by or coexist in a non-competitive 
relationship with the state-controlled Russian national champions, Gazprom 
and Rosneft. The Yukos/Khodorkovsky case is still veiled in mystery, and it is 
difficult to find trustworthy information about the authorities’ deeper motives. 
However, in a detailed analysis, the Swedish Defence Research Agency concludes 
that the threat to Putin posed by the political activities of Khodorkovsky was 
not the essential issue.225 Yukos was setting priorities for the Russian oil indus-
try that where perceived as intruding on the Kremlin’s external energy policy. It 
apparently came to the point that the federal centre needed to set an example 
and rein in private economic power, lest others follow in Yukos’ tracks. At the 
time of Khodorkovsky’s arrest, Yukos was pursuing several projects which had 
foreign-policy implications. Of particular importance was Yukos’ ambition to 
tie more of its sales directly to the US oil market and its involvement in pipeline 
22 Aatland, Russisk nordområdepolitikk etter den kalde krigen, p. 18. 
225 Larsson, Russia’s Energy policy, pp. 89–11.
projects to Murmansk (and China) against the wishes of the Kremlin.226 Both of 
the pipeline projects have since been adopted as Moscow’s policy. This indicates 
that Moscow was primarily driven by the urge to make a point, namely that 
“decisions on infrastructure developments are taken by the state, not private 
companies.”227 Equally worrying to the Kremlin, Yukos was engaged in foreign 
acquisitions (including in Norway)228 and was planning to trade off substantial 
shares of its Russian assets. Figures vary, but estimates are that the proposed 
sales to ExxonMobil or Chevron Texaco were in the range of twenty-five to 
forty per cent.229 Documents to this effect were apparently being drawn up, 
making it imperative that the Kremlin act before it was too late. The figures are 
difficult to verify. But the crucial issue is that the foreign shares could very well 
have exceeded the ceilings stipulated in the legislation planned. Such legislation 
would regulate the foreign ownership of natural resources and infrastructure for 
distribution of strategic importance to national security.230
Although there are vast open areas in the North, much of the new energy 
infrastructure and many of the facilities will have to be located in areas already 
occupied by the military. While capitalising on the infrastructure already in place 
rather than building new facilities is tempting, practical challenges arise from 
the operational and logistical needs of the Northern Fleet, whose strategic fuel 
reserves are stored at the facility in Mokhnatkina Pakhta. Since the mid 1990s, 
Russian oil companies have enjoyed access: for instance, Lukoil’s arctic tankers 
have been able to use the facilities, and a deep-water pier have been constructed 
to support operations. But opening up the naval terminal to foreign commercial 
companies would be a big step for the military. As the Russian state has assumed 
ownership of strategic networks for transportation and distribution, concerns 
over sovereign control and security on land should be less acute. As to off-shore 
installations the picture is mixed. The Barents Sea is primarily a transit area for 
the Northern Fleet’s strategic arm. Their deployment areas lie further towards 
the north, under the ice cap. There is little reason to expect that rigs and sub-sea 
pipelines would seriously hinder the fleet’s movements, although the noise the 
pipelines generate might affect submarine operations. Due to the generally high 
level of military control over the area, it seems improbable that such installa-
tions could be used for hostile intelligence gathering or surveillance. But security 
226 Ibid, p. 106.
227 Ibid.
228 In 2001, Yukos made a bid for a stake in the Norwegian companies Kværner 
Hydrocarbons and Kværner Process Technology. The deal was never concluded.
229 Olcott, “Vladimir Putin and the Geopolitics of Oil”, p. 13. See also Larsson, Russia’s 
Energy policy. 
230 Cf. Patterson and Morozova, Russia’s Strategic Industries Law. See supra note 206. 
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concerns remain important. There is a theoretical possibility of a terrorist at-
tack, but this risk would be low since the waters are constantly patrolled and 
control easily maintained. But the mere physical existence of installations in the 
Barents Sea may induce the military to play the security card to strengthen its 
hold over the energy sector, the FSB and the area as a whole. Formally, the FSB 
is in charge inside the 200-mile economic zone. The military will be responsible 
for the security of installations on the Russian shelf outside of the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, including Shtokman. 
Military and energy interests – collision or coincidence?
There seem to be four overall areas of consideration for the military as far as 
establishing a large-scale petroleum industry in the Murmansk area is con-
cerned.231 They may be grouped according to the following interest variables: 
business-oriented and partly coinciding with energy interests; rooted in local 
security concerns and partly colliding; practical and possible to reconcile; rooted 
in global security concerns and overriding all other concerns. One may expect 
that solutions at the practical and largely pragmatic end of the scale will push 
towards desecuritisation. In contrast, solutions lying at the power-political and 
largely symbolic end of the scale will pull towards securitisation. In all four ar-
eas there are push and pull factors. By “boxing” them together according to the 
real issues being discussed, it may be possible to get a general impression of the 
direction Northwest Russia is taking in the short to medium term: 
First, assets and resources raise questions of actor rationality and of per-
ceptions of economic interest. Business-oriented interests may make the military 
want to up the market value of their possessions and assets. During Putin’s 
working visit to Murmansk 2 May 2007, the governor of the Murmansk Re-
gion, Yevdokimov, used the occasion to solicit help from the federal centre to 
speed up the conversion of land areas from military to civilian use, so that a 
new oil terminal at Lavna in the Kola Bay could be constructed. He lamented 
the military’s reluctance to release land plots of little military value, but which 
were needed for energy and development.232 Evidently, this reluctance is rooted 
in the military’s problems of status, identity and purpose after the Cold War. But 
also, one may suspect, the military is becoming aware of the rising value of the 
territory and facilities under its control and is seeking to optimise the situation. 
231 See also Aatland,   Russisk nordområdepolitikk etter den kalde krigen, pp. 18–19, for a 
thorough discussion.
232 Interview, Regional Administration, Murmansk, 21 June 2007. Yevdokimov’s pleas 
were also reflected in the news coverage of Putin’s visit.
The potential sale of valuable land and assets to energy interests probably also 
leads to some corruption.233 The question of status is symbolic to the extent that 
it illustrates the post-Cold War deterioration of the military sector as a whole. 
Again, this is why the military is the first to recognise the practical importance 
of energy development for Russia’s great power ambitions, and that the energy 
industry provides the financial backbone needed to retain strategic naval power. 
The tragic loss of the K-11 Kursk nuclear submarine in August 2000 came to 
symbolise the “sinking” of the image of the Northern Fleet, which had been 
neglected and suffered financial cut-backs throughout the 1990s. Thus, status is 
a practical question too, and opens up a field of coinciding interests. The emerg-
ing opportunities of doing business locally represent a way for the military to 
regain importance, and to situate itself closer to the sources of financial and 
economic power. As early as 1999, Lukoil and the Murmansk regional adminis-
tration signed a protocol on the construction of an oil refinery in Mokhnatkina 
Pakhta.23 Construction should have started by the year 2000, but the Ministry 
of Defence succeeded in stalling the project.235 Military presence in the North 
may serve the interests of the oil companies too. Apparently Lukoil director 
Alekperov approached the General Command in Moscow as early as in 2002 
with proposals of cooperation. He referred to how the US used its military to 
defend the commercial interests of US companies. Alekperov may in fact have 
taken his views to the Duma and the Kremlin to argue for more money for the 
Northern Fleet.236 The petroleum industry and the military could thus be en-
gaged in identifying common interests. This process was given added purchase 
thanks to Lukoil’s formal cooperation agreement in April 2007 with the Russian 
Foreign Ministry. This agreement, which is to remain in force until 2012, could 
have important foreign-policy connotations. Through Lukoil, the Russian state 
will be allowed more access to and control over international operations. Re-
portedly, state-owned Rosneft is poised to take control over Lukoil’s national oil 
resources through a joint venture arrangement, while Lukoil, with the assistance 
of the Foreign Ministry, will seek to engage further in upstream and downstream 
activities internationally. Such agreement with the federal centre may, however, 
be considerably easier to achieve than finding suitable arrangements to resolve 
concrete local problems. 
Second, therefore, there is the instrumental side of local cooperation in-
volving facilities and assets being shared. Terminals, refineries and an LNG 
233 See Bukkvoll, Russian Military Corruption …
23 Aatland, Russisk nordområdepolitikk etter den kalde krigen, p. 19.
235 Ibid.
236 Ibid, p. 26.
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concerns remain important. There is a theoretical possibility of a terrorist at-
tack, but this risk would be low since the waters are constantly patrolled and 
control easily maintained. But the mere physical existence of installations in the 
Barents Sea may induce the military to play the security card to strengthen its 
hold over the energy sector, the FSB and the area as a whole. Formally, the FSB 
is in charge inside the 200-mile economic zone. The military will be responsible 
for the security of installations on the Russian shelf outside of the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, including Shtokman. 
Military and energy interests – collision or coincidence?
There seem to be four overall areas of consideration for the military as far as 
establishing a large-scale petroleum industry in the Murmansk area is con-
cerned.231 They may be grouped according to the following interest variables: 
business-oriented and partly coinciding with energy interests; rooted in local 
security concerns and partly colliding; practical and possible to reconcile; rooted 
in global security concerns and overriding all other concerns. One may expect 
that solutions at the practical and largely pragmatic end of the scale will push 
towards desecuritisation. In contrast, solutions lying at the power-political and 
largely symbolic end of the scale will pull towards securitisation. In all four ar-
eas there are push and pull factors. By “boxing” them together according to the 
real issues being discussed, it may be possible to get a general impression of the 
direction Northwest Russia is taking in the short to medium term: 
First, assets and resources raise questions of actor rationality and of per-
ceptions of economic interest. Business-oriented interests may make the military 
want to up the market value of their possessions and assets. During Putin’s 
working visit to Murmansk 2 May 2007, the governor of the Murmansk Re-
gion, Yevdokimov, used the occasion to solicit help from the federal centre to 
speed up the conversion of land areas from military to civilian use, so that a 
new oil terminal at Lavna in the Kola Bay could be constructed. He lamented 
the military’s reluctance to release land plots of little military value, but which 
were needed for energy and development.232 Evidently, this reluctance is rooted 
in the military’s problems of status, identity and purpose after the Cold War. But 
also, one may suspect, the military is becoming aware of the rising value of the 
territory and facilities under its control and is seeking to optimise the situation. 
231 See also Aatland,   Russisk nordområdepolitikk etter den kalde krigen, pp. 18–19, for a 
thorough discussion.
232 Interview, Regional Administration, Murmansk, 21 June 2007. Yevdokimov’s pleas 
were also reflected in the news coverage of Putin’s visit.
The potential sale of valuable land and assets to energy interests probably also 
leads to some corruption.233 The question of status is symbolic to the extent that 
it illustrates the post-Cold War deterioration of the military sector as a whole. 
Again, this is why the military is the first to recognise the practical importance 
of energy development for Russia’s great power ambitions, and that the energy 
industry provides the financial backbone needed to retain strategic naval power. 
The tragic loss of the K-11 Kursk nuclear submarine in August 2000 came to 
symbolise the “sinking” of the image of the Northern Fleet, which had been 
neglected and suffered financial cut-backs throughout the 1990s. Thus, status is 
a practical question too, and opens up a field of coinciding interests. The emerg-
ing opportunities of doing business locally represent a way for the military to 
regain importance, and to situate itself closer to the sources of financial and 
economic power. As early as 1999, Lukoil and the Murmansk regional adminis-
tration signed a protocol on the construction of an oil refinery in Mokhnatkina 
Pakhta.23 Construction should have started by the year 2000, but the Ministry 
of Defence succeeded in stalling the project.235 Military presence in the North 
may serve the interests of the oil companies too. Apparently Lukoil director 
Alekperov approached the General Command in Moscow as early as in 2002 
with proposals of cooperation. He referred to how the US used its military to 
defend the commercial interests of US companies. Alekperov may in fact have 
taken his views to the Duma and the Kremlin to argue for more money for the 
Northern Fleet.236 The petroleum industry and the military could thus be en-
gaged in identifying common interests. This process was given added purchase 
thanks to Lukoil’s formal cooperation agreement in April 2007 with the Russian 
Foreign Ministry. This agreement, which is to remain in force until 2012, could 
have important foreign-policy connotations. Through Lukoil, the Russian state 
will be allowed more access to and control over international operations. Re-
portedly, state-owned Rosneft is poised to take control over Lukoil’s national oil 
resources through a joint venture arrangement, while Lukoil, with the assistance 
of the Foreign Ministry, will seek to engage further in upstream and downstream 
activities internationally. Such agreement with the federal centre may, however, 
be considerably easier to achieve than finding suitable arrangements to resolve 
concrete local problems. 
Second, therefore, there is the instrumental side of local cooperation in-
volving facilities and assets being shared. Terminals, refineries and an LNG 
233 See Bukkvoll, Russian Military Corruption …
23 Aatland, Russisk nordområdepolitikk etter den kalde krigen, p. 19.
235 Ibid.
236 Ibid, p. 26.
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plant close to the naval base and its logistics facilities could hamper the North-
ern Fleet’s freedom of action and even pose a security risk. In addition, military 
activity and weaponry could pose a risk to shipping, handling, storing, liquefy-
ing and refining petroleum products. It might also be difficult to reconcile the 
navy’s need for military secrecy with an international presence and commercial 
activity. It will prove impossible to turn the region into an important trade out-
let for energy and commodities without considerably easing current restrictions 
on access for foreigners and Russians alike. An issue which may prove decisive 
in determining who has the last word, the military or energy and regional in-
terests, is the future location of a planned LNG plant. As mentioned above, its 
economic importance is unquestionable. The location of the liquefaction facil-
ity determines the reception point for the pipelines from the Shtokman field. 
A decision was initially made to place the plant at the settlement of Vidyaevo, 
situated in the Kolsky district of the Murmansk oblast. The problem with this 
location, however, was that Vidyaevo is situated close to the naval bases of the 
Ura Bay (Ura Guba) and the neighbouring Ara Bay (Ara Guba). The bases are 
still operational, including for nuclear submarines. In the Ara Bay, the most 
important military-strategic base, there are also nuclear storage facilities. The 
bay serves several classes of nuclear submarines: the Akula, Sierra and Oscar II 
classes. Vidyaevo (Ara Bay) was the home base of the K-11 Kursk (Oscar II). 
Preparatory work at Vidyavo encountered repeated set-backs due to security 
restrictions, in particular access for foreigners. In 2007 Hydro was suddenly 
stopped from entering Vidyaevo to conduct work commissioned by Gazprom.237 
The assignment includes the use of sophisticated technological instruments for 
monitoring conditions in the ground and on the seabed, and is necessary for 
the construction of pipeline facilities for the liquefaction plant. Other locations 
would make the large-scale export of LNG by ship cumbersome and impracti-
cal: in fact there was only one other realistic location, at a settlement east of the 
mouth of the Kola Bay, called Teriberka.238 Teriberka was the military’s choice. 
It was for some time considered a likely candidate for the LNG plant, but had 
eventually been rejected. The energy interests preferred Vidyaevo, since it is more 
favourably situated in terms of access from the sea and from Murmansk. An ad-
ditional factor was that the inhabitants of Teriberka, a small fishing village, had 
objected to an LNG plant being built there. Finally, however, the decision to go 
for Vidyaevo was reversed due to the military’s objections.239 While it is risky 
237 Interview, Hydro, 30 May 2007. 
238 Ibid. Confirmed in interview with the Regional Administration, Murmansk, 21 June 
2007.
239 Interview, Murmansk Regional Administration, 21 June 2007.
to generalise from one particular incident, the Vidyaevo case is telling in terms 
of assessing whose interests are structurally given precedence when military and 
energy interests collide.20 
Third, the military may feel crowded out of a region where it has tradition-
ally been in charge of a whole set of complex civil-military activities, and been 
recognised as the most influential state institution. It may be loath to let go of 
its long-standing exclusive rights over land, facilities and infrastructure. It may 
fear that more supertanker traffic in the approaches to the Kola Peninsula will 
place practical limitations on the fleet’s freedom of navigation in the same water-
ways. The risk of congestion in the approaches to Murmansk, however, should 
only be a minor issue for the military, since the Northern Fleet rarely depends 
on navigating the Kola Bay as all its important bases are located elsewhere. 
Unproblematic are probably the plans to construct an inter-connector pipeline 
linking Shtokman gas via Teriberka to the Nord Stream gas highway supplying 
Europe. Gas from Shtokman not intended for liquefaction could then be piped 
directly to the European market, thereby providing Gazprom with more oppor-
tunities for diversifying export. But such plans, although already on the draw-
ing-board, are not known publicly in full detail. Due to the decision to relocate 
the liquefaction plant and therefore also the gas reception facility for the gas 
from Shtokman to Teriberka, a new inter-connector trajectory will have to be 
drawn up. The pipeline must be expected to pass alongside Murmansk city and 
further to the south. Here the military security problems are minor compared 
to those involved in laying the pipeline inter-connector further on from the Ara 
Bay. Another problem, though, is the newly established fifteen-kilometre wide 
security zone controlled by the FSB (covering the border areas and the coastal 
belt, including the locations of both Vidyaevo and Teriberka).21 Any access to 
the zone, for Russian nationals and foreigners alike, has to be reported to the 
FSB in advance. In addition, the military will impose security checks on foreign 
ships approaching the LNG plant or Murmansk port. None of this augurs well 
for the commercial attractiveness of Teriberka for foreign LNG tankers. Nei-
20 Representatives of the Murmansk Regional Administration were outspoken and 
forthright in their frustration over the “conservatism of the military” and the 
difficulties that the regional authorities consistently met in coming to terms with the 
leadership of the Northern Fleet on regional development plans and on the conversion 
of unused military real estate to civilian purposes. Interestingly, this impression 
was corroborated by FSB officials in a separate meeting, and demonstrates the tight 
relations between the FSB and the Regional Administration. It was unfortunately not 
possible to interview officials from the Northern Fleet or other military staff. 
21 For a long period, the general impression was that the zone was to be twenty-five 
kilometres wide. This was rectified by Russian authorities in the summer of 2007. Cf. 
interview with the FSB in Murmansk 19 June 2007.
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plant close to the naval base and its logistics facilities could hamper the North-
ern Fleet’s freedom of action and even pose a security risk. In addition, military 
activity and weaponry could pose a risk to shipping, handling, storing, liquefy-
ing and refining petroleum products. It might also be difficult to reconcile the 
navy’s need for military secrecy with an international presence and commercial 
activity. It will prove impossible to turn the region into an important trade out-
let for energy and commodities without considerably easing current restrictions 
on access for foreigners and Russians alike. An issue which may prove decisive 
in determining who has the last word, the military or energy and regional in-
terests, is the future location of a planned LNG plant. As mentioned above, its 
economic importance is unquestionable. The location of the liquefaction facil-
ity determines the reception point for the pipelines from the Shtokman field. 
A decision was initially made to place the plant at the settlement of Vidyaevo, 
situated in the Kolsky district of the Murmansk oblast. The problem with this 
location, however, was that Vidyaevo is situated close to the naval bases of the 
Ura Bay (Ura Guba) and the neighbouring Ara Bay (Ara Guba). The bases are 
still operational, including for nuclear submarines. In the Ara Bay, the most 
important military-strategic base, there are also nuclear storage facilities. The 
bay serves several classes of nuclear submarines: the Akula, Sierra and Oscar II 
classes. Vidyaevo (Ara Bay) was the home base of the K-11 Kursk (Oscar II). 
Preparatory work at Vidyavo encountered repeated set-backs due to security 
restrictions, in particular access for foreigners. In 2007 Hydro was suddenly 
stopped from entering Vidyaevo to conduct work commissioned by Gazprom.237 
The assignment includes the use of sophisticated technological instruments for 
monitoring conditions in the ground and on the seabed, and is necessary for 
the construction of pipeline facilities for the liquefaction plant. Other locations 
would make the large-scale export of LNG by ship cumbersome and impracti-
cal: in fact there was only one other realistic location, at a settlement east of the 
mouth of the Kola Bay, called Teriberka.238 Teriberka was the military’s choice. 
It was for some time considered a likely candidate for the LNG plant, but had 
eventually been rejected. The energy interests preferred Vidyaevo, since it is more 
favourably situated in terms of access from the sea and from Murmansk. An ad-
ditional factor was that the inhabitants of Teriberka, a small fishing village, had 
objected to an LNG plant being built there. Finally, however, the decision to go 
for Vidyaevo was reversed due to the military’s objections.239 While it is risky 
237 Interview, Hydro, 30 May 2007. 
238 Ibid. Confirmed in interview with the Regional Administration, Murmansk, 21 June 
2007.
239 Interview, Murmansk Regional Administration, 21 June 2007.
to generalise from one particular incident, the Vidyaevo case is telling in terms 
of assessing whose interests are structurally given precedence when military and 
energy interests collide.20 
Third, the military may feel crowded out of a region where it has tradition-
ally been in charge of a whole set of complex civil-military activities, and been 
recognised as the most influential state institution. It may be loath to let go of 
its long-standing exclusive rights over land, facilities and infrastructure. It may 
fear that more supertanker traffic in the approaches to the Kola Peninsula will 
place practical limitations on the fleet’s freedom of navigation in the same water-
ways. The risk of congestion in the approaches to Murmansk, however, should 
only be a minor issue for the military, since the Northern Fleet rarely depends 
on navigating the Kola Bay as all its important bases are located elsewhere. 
Unproblematic are probably the plans to construct an inter-connector pipeline 
linking Shtokman gas via Teriberka to the Nord Stream gas highway supplying 
Europe. Gas from Shtokman not intended for liquefaction could then be piped 
directly to the European market, thereby providing Gazprom with more oppor-
tunities for diversifying export. But such plans, although already on the draw-
ing-board, are not known publicly in full detail. Due to the decision to relocate 
the liquefaction plant and therefore also the gas reception facility for the gas 
from Shtokman to Teriberka, a new inter-connector trajectory will have to be 
drawn up. The pipeline must be expected to pass alongside Murmansk city and 
further to the south. Here the military security problems are minor compared 
to those involved in laying the pipeline inter-connector further on from the Ara 
Bay. Another problem, though, is the newly established fifteen-kilometre wide 
security zone controlled by the FSB (covering the border areas and the coastal 
belt, including the locations of both Vidyaevo and Teriberka).21 Any access to 
the zone, for Russian nationals and foreigners alike, has to be reported to the 
FSB in advance. In addition, the military will impose security checks on foreign 
ships approaching the LNG plant or Murmansk port. None of this augurs well 
for the commercial attractiveness of Teriberka for foreign LNG tankers. Nei-
20 Representatives of the Murmansk Regional Administration were outspoken and 
forthright in their frustration over the “conservatism of the military” and the 
difficulties that the regional authorities consistently met in coming to terms with the 
leadership of the Northern Fleet on regional development plans and on the conversion 
of unused military real estate to civilian purposes. Interestingly, this impression 
was corroborated by FSB officials in a separate meeting, and demonstrates the tight 
relations between the FSB and the Regional Administration. It was unfortunately not 
possible to interview officials from the Northern Fleet or other military staff. 
21 For a long period, the general impression was that the zone was to be twenty-five 
kilometres wide. This was rectified by Russian authorities in the summer of 2007. Cf. 
interview with the FSB in Murmansk 19 June 2007.
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ther does it bode well for the economic viability of the terminal at Lavna and a 
modernised port of Murmansk, unless restrictions are managed in flexible and 
expedite ways. Taking into account the Russian penchant for securitisation and 
general administrative sluggishness, this seems unlikely. 
A fourth overarching security factor is the strained relations between Russia 
and the United States and how this may impact on the general political climate 
in the High North. In this respect, the future importance of the Barents Sea to 
the Russian military should not be underestimated. The relative importance of 
Russia’s strategic submarine capability in the North has increased as a conse-
quence of the federal budget’s reduced spending on conventional arms over the 
last ten to fifteen years. Another reason is that nuclear parity with the US is still 
fundamental to Russia’s self-image as a great power. Russia’s nuclear ambition 
acquired new political significance due to the US’s unilateral retraction from the 
ABM treaty, resulting in Russia’s subsequent retreat from START-II. With the 
introduction of the new nuclear-powered ballistic submarine, the Borei class, 
fitted with the new Bulava missiles, and the upgrading of the Northern Fleet, 
Russia remains a strategic player second only to the US. According to current 
plans, the first three new submarines will be deployed in 2010, and a total of 
five are planned for 2015. The Bulava programme may, however, be delayed due 
to a series of test failures. Strategic security considerations will ultimately trump 
all other interests in the foreseeable future, including lower-level security or eco-
nomic interests. To the Russian military, the US’s plans to deploy interceptor 
missiles in Europe – i.e. the plans for a radar installation in the Czech Republic 
and the missile facility in Poland – must have been a decisive factor in its pri-
oritisation of the nuclear capacity of the Northern Fleet, and this influenced the 
reversal of the original decision to construct the LNG plant at Vidyaevo. 
The general impression, then, is that of a gradual securitisation of energy 
interests in the North. This development is probably partly unintentional, in the 
sense that it is not part of any grand design. The general lack of an authoritative 
policy coordination forum for the region as a whole gives the military consider-
able freedom of action within its local sphere of interest. A policy instrument 
for the North could, theoretically, follow the call for a Russian Arctic Council, 
which was meant to shape an overall Russian policy for the North. But it is 
highly uncertain whether it will ever overcome the first major hurdle, which is to 
constitute itself in a meaningful way as a coordinating instrument amidst all the 
regional and federal interests related to energy, security and sovereignty. So far it 
does not seem to exist even on paper. Events thus vindicate the negative presen-
timents voiced concerning the future of the council by the Murmansk regional 
administration. For the time being, therefore, it is the responsibility of the Secu-
rity Council in Moscow to formulate, coordinate and implement Russia’s poli-
cies for the Arctic as a whole. Unless a broad policy forum including regional 
interests is established, the most likely outcome is a continuation of the present 
narrowly defined administrative practices. If politico-administrative inertia ulti-
mately prevails, the Russian government’s capacity for cohesive policies and the 
implementation of such in and for the Arctic will be additionally reduced. Who 
would then be the driving force behind the coordination of Russian policy for 
the North if not the federal centre itself? The most likely alternative is the energy 
sector, namely Gazprom and possibly Rosneft in unison. But indecision seems 
the more realistic option. Most likely the military will still have a foot on the 
brakes, whoever is in the driver’s seat. In this respect, the influence of geopoliti-
cal sentiments must be expected to be brought more to the fore.
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ABM treaty, resulting in Russia’s subsequent retreat from START-II. With the 
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fitted with the new Bulava missiles, and the upgrading of the Northern Fleet, 
Russia remains a strategic player second only to the US. According to current 
plans, the first three new submarines will be deployed in 2010, and a total of 
five are planned for 2015. The Bulava programme may, however, be delayed due 
to a series of test failures. Strategic security considerations will ultimately trump 
all other interests in the foreseeable future, including lower-level security or eco-
nomic interests. To the Russian military, the US’s plans to deploy interceptor 
missiles in Europe – i.e. the plans for a radar installation in the Czech Republic 
and the missile facility in Poland – must have been a decisive factor in its pri-
oritisation of the nuclear capacity of the Northern Fleet, and this influenced the 
reversal of the original decision to construct the LNG plant at Vidyaevo. 
The general impression, then, is that of a gradual securitisation of energy 
interests in the North. This development is probably partly unintentional, in the 
sense that it is not part of any grand design. The general lack of an authoritative 
policy coordination forum for the region as a whole gives the military consider-
able freedom of action within its local sphere of interest. A policy instrument 
for the North could, theoretically, follow the call for a Russian Arctic Council, 
which was meant to shape an overall Russian policy for the North. But it is 
highly uncertain whether it will ever overcome the first major hurdle, which is to 
constitute itself in a meaningful way as a coordinating instrument amidst all the 
regional and federal interests related to energy, security and sovereignty. So far it 
does not seem to exist even on paper. Events thus vindicate the negative presen-
timents voiced concerning the future of the council by the Murmansk regional 
administration. For the time being, therefore, it is the responsibility of the Secu-
rity Council in Moscow to formulate, coordinate and implement Russia’s poli-
cies for the Arctic as a whole. Unless a broad policy forum including regional 
interests is established, the most likely outcome is a continuation of the present 
narrowly defined administrative practices. If politico-administrative inertia ulti-
mately prevails, the Russian government’s capacity for cohesive policies and the 
implementation of such in and for the Arctic will be additionally reduced. Who 
would then be the driving force behind the coordination of Russian policy for 
the North if not the federal centre itself? The most likely alternative is the energy 
sector, namely Gazprom and possibly Rosneft in unison. But indecision seems 
the more realistic option. Most likely the military will still have a foot on the 
brakes, whoever is in the driver’s seat. In this respect, the influence of geopoliti-
cal sentiments must be expected to be brought more to the fore.
Figure 3: Military and fuel installations on the Kola Peninsula. (Image: Bellona.) 
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GEOpOLITICS AND SOVEREIGNTy 
bilateral considerations and sovereignty issues 
There are, as noted before, two principal issues of sovereignty between Norway 
and Russia; the question of the status of the 200-mile zone and the shelf around 
the Svalbard archipelago, and the delimitation of the sea and shelf in the dis-
puted parts of the Barents Sea.22 In the case of Svalbard, Norway stands rela-
tively alone with regard of the other treaty signatories, of which Russia is but 
one. However, Russia’s Arctic history, political weight and physical presence 
provide it with a special position. In the case of the delimitation of the Barents 
Sea shelf, Norway is alone in dealing with Russia. Whether there is a connection 
in Russia’s thinking between the delimitation of the Barents Sea shelf and the 
Svalbard issues is a relatively open question. Legally they are not related; politi-
cally they may very well be. 
Questions of delimitation and the right to exercise national sovereignty 
and authority at sea, as on land, basically boil down to the norms of internation-
al society and the rules of international law. Sovereignty, although rigorously 
material in its territorial sense, is in its institutional sense a social phenomenon 
situated at the centre of the nexus of law and politics in international society. As 
to Svalbard, there are many interested states and stakeholders to take into con-
sideration. Nonetheless, the Norwegian-Russian axis is central to international 
cooperation on Svalbard issues. In this section I shall first discuss how aspects of 
Russia’s “sense of self” as an Arctic nation may impact on the prospect of set-
tling outstanding issues of sovereignty in the High North. Then I look at the two 
cases mentioned above and suggest a political, rather than legal, way forward.
Sovereignty and polarisation
The 1826 border agreement between Norway-Sweden and Russia finally ended 
the mediaeval system of joint territorial possession in the North.23 Modern state 
sovereignty excludes having two sovereigns in the same territorial space. Within 
the logic of modernity, one state’s territorial gain is the other’s loss. For all the 
attention to integrated resource management across borders, ecosystem-based 
22 Norway and Russia have decided that one delimitation line shall be common to both 
zones, cf. Tresselt, “Norsk-sovjetiske forhandlinger …”
23 Jackson and Nielsen, eds, Russia-Norway, p. 63.
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approaches to environmental protection and regional impacts of climate change, 
the High North has not yet reached the age of “late sovereignty”, characterised 
by advanced and mature stages of modernity.2 This is, in a sense, puzzling, at 
a time when current (post-modern) challenges seem to depend on the ability of 
states to turn the zero-sum logic of sovereignty into positive-sum opportunities. 
The explanation for this is that the social structures of globalisation have yet 
to acquire their own international spaces, beyond the territorial and functional 
reaches of states.25 The renewed trend of polarisation will further keep such 
development in check.
States are the primary subjects of international law; no other internation-
al actor holds a similar position in international society. As the international 
challenges associated with globalisation are becoming more complex, states’ 
individual and collective repertoires for managing them are slowly but surely 
enhanced. States change by adaptation, and themselves become more complex, 
but at different speeds.26 This process is driven by the external demands of par-
ticular issue areas, such as energy or climate security. Yet the underlying norms, 
rules and practices of sovereignty are resilient to change as these are embedded 
in the system of the international order. Changes need to be evolutionary and 
incremental lest the harmony of the ordering institutions of international society 
be unsettled. With global politics turning towards a more multipolar order, the 
ocean areas of the Arctic take on added geostrategic significance; as a resource 
area they are not fully developed, and as territorial frontlines they are not fully 
settled. With so much at stake in the Arctic and so many interests involved, the 
Barents Sea, broadly defined, emerges as one of Russia’s last geopolitical spaces. 
When the questions regarding the zone and shelf around Svalbard are finally 
settled, and the delimitation of the Barents Sea is ultimately achieved, then the 
last and absolute borderline between the East and the West will in a sense be de-
marcated too. Stretching all the way to the North Pole, the borderline may carry 
new symbolic meaning. Will the Russians look at it as a line of cooperation 
or as an East-West frontline intended to fence them in in Eurasia? The answer 
probably lies in the quality and character of the future geopolitics of the region. 
2 Neil Walker, “Late Sovereignty in the European Union”, in Sovereignty in Transition, 
ed. Neil Walker (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), pp. 1 and 31, 32. The “pooling” of 
sovereignty characteristic of the EU is, according to Walker, situated within this logic. 
Late sovereignty equals an advanced and mature stage of modernity.
25 See discussion of “transnational societies” in Buzan, From International to World 
Society, pp. 207–212. See also Bardo Fassbender, “Sovereignty and Constitutionalism 
in International Law”, in Sovereignty in Transition, ed. Neil Walker (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2003), pp. 115–13.
26 On the development of the state as an international institution, see Holsti, 200, pp. 
28–72, and Buzan, From International to World Society.
Nurtured by its zero-sum understanding of sovereignty and geopolitics, Russia 
tends to suspect the West of encroaching on its spaces with a view to containing 
it.27 The enlargement of NATO, in particular with the membership of the Baltic 
States, draws a line between the West and Russia of which the northern part, 
from the south of the Barents Sea to the North Pole, now constitutes the missing 
link. It is probably worth noting that Russia feels more tightly encircled now 
than during imperial times and the Soviet era; in other words, not only smaller, 
but also more alone. 
Cooperation with Norway in the North gives Russia an opportunity to 
engage in friendly relations in a geographical and resource area that matters 
much to it. An element of rivalry will exist since not all interests are shared, and 
since Norway is politically and economically tied to Western structures with 
which Russia has ambiguous relations. At present they are strained, with time 
they may stabilise and again become less tense. But some element of rivalry 
seems to be unavoidable in an international system in which power-balancing 
and multipolarity are still core mechanisms of the world order. In this context, 
Norway offers constructive cooperation with which Russia can engage without 
entering into the kind of integration for which it is not ready. In brief, Norway 
offers Russia an opportunity for relatively benign bilateral relations in a north-
ern resource area of high strategic importance to it. This may leave Russia with 
a sense of sovereign comfort, partly due to the power asymmetry and because 
Norway is generally seen as an honest broker. Russia cannot in the foreseeable 
future develop its fields on the shelf and bring the necessary infrastructure into 
place without technologically more advanced foreign partners. This is the instru-
mental side of the argument, and may provide Norway with a regional edge. But 
in addition, Russia prefers to consort with other “friends of multipolarity”, such 
as France and Germany, in a great power management structured to respond 
to European energy interests. This will further provide Russia with the oppor-
tunity to engage in selected activities and arrangements of its own choosing. 
Norway can also benefit from this opportunity. Not only is StatoilHydro large 
and competent enough to be of interest to Russia, but through the company the 
Norwegian state is effectively drawn into a commercial energy partnership with 
complex political implications. 
Russia wants to settle outstanding issues directly with Norway, not via 
multilateral structures. Practical energy cooperation will have only little poten-
tial of redefining Russia’s long-standing positions on issues of sovereignty. On 
27 Oleinik, Вы�тупление пре���е����теля К��итет�� (see previous discussion in chapter 5). 
See also Lavrov, “С��ержи���ние Р���ии  …”: 8–21.
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it.27 The enlargement of NATO, in particular with the membership of the Baltic 
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much to it. An element of rivalry will exist since not all interests are shared, and 
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which Russia has ambiguous relations. At present they are strained, with time 
they may stabilise and again become less tense. But some element of rivalry 
seems to be unavoidable in an international system in which power-balancing 
and multipolarity are still core mechanisms of the world order. In this context, 
Norway offers constructive cooperation with which Russia can engage without 
entering into the kind of integration for which it is not ready. In brief, Norway 
offers Russia an opportunity for relatively benign bilateral relations in a north-
ern resource area of high strategic importance to it. This may leave Russia with 
a sense of sovereign comfort, partly due to the power asymmetry and because 
Norway is generally seen as an honest broker. Russia cannot in the foreseeable 
future develop its fields on the shelf and bring the necessary infrastructure into 
place without technologically more advanced foreign partners. This is the instru-
mental side of the argument, and may provide Norway with a regional edge. But 
in addition, Russia prefers to consort with other “friends of multipolarity”, such 
as France and Germany, in a great power management structured to respond 
to European energy interests. This will further provide Russia with the oppor-
tunity to engage in selected activities and arrangements of its own choosing. 
Norway can also benefit from this opportunity. Not only is StatoilHydro large 
and competent enough to be of interest to Russia, but through the company the 
Norwegian state is effectively drawn into a commercial energy partnership with 
complex political implications. 
Russia wants to settle outstanding issues directly with Norway, not via 
multilateral structures. Practical energy cooperation will have only little poten-
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issues of sovereignty and resource jurisdiction, Russia’s actions generally follow 
a pattern that is well known and rehearsed in a bilateral context. Increased inter-
national attention to the challenges of the Arctic region, which manifests itself 
for example in the EU’s security strategy for the Arctic, in addition to Norway’s 
more assertive stance in the High North, may constitute a set of factors contrib-
uting to Russia’s rummaging for a reciprocal and more elaborate policy of its 
own for the North. In fact, one may ask whether Norway has been so successful 
in calling international attention to the challenges of the High North that it has 
inadvertently contributed to setting in motion a race for similar national strate-
gies, if not for the natural resources of the region.  
Dealing with a “strong” Russia
The disappearance of the Cold War security logic, one could have hoped, would 
have made it easier to deal with issues of sovereignty, for instance by replacing 
interests of security with those of shared responsibility. But in the North, bor-
ders have not lost their traditional meaning. As discussed throughout the pre-
ceding chapters, Russia’s moves to securitise are largely rooted in concerns over 
sovereignty, internal as well as external. Since the relationship between Russia 
and the West is seemingly retreating from the threshold of amity, sentiments of 
rivalry must be expected to impinge on interests related to outstanding issues of 
sovereignty. What, then, will it mean for regional cooperation that Russia once 
again regards itself as strong? Will Russia become an even more demanding 
partner, or will it become more amenable to integration? 
Though feeling economically confident, albeit worried about the impact of 
the financial crisis, one may wonder what it will take for Russia to feel strong 
and how strong it needs to feel. A clue lies in the paradox that Russia’s sense of 
strength is predicated on external rather than internal factors. Fundamentally, 
Russia is economically weak in spite of the still relatively stable macroeconomic 
situation. And politically it may potentially be more unstable than one would 
think. Russian politics invoke a blurry distinction between myth and reality 
and the practices of authoritarian perception management. This leads to anoth-
er question about “strength”: what exactly does Russia need from the outside 
world to feel strong; that is, what are the visible external signs the leadership 
needs in order to portray Russia internally as strong? The answer could lie in 
the degree to which Russia perceives that its interests and preferences are being 
recognised, taken into account and substantiated in the policies of the US and 
the EU. However, with Russia’s new assertiveness comes a greater appetite for 
power. As long as Russia remains comparatively weak inside, irrespective of its 
internal authoritarianism, its feeling of strength will never really take hold, but 
fluctuate with the sense of the way in which Russia perceives it is being treated 
by its Western “defining other”. Many of the most contentious issues with the 
West have to do with geopolitical spaces and regional territorial questions. Ter-
ritories and borders will not become any less important for Russia, since they 
are so visibly and readily associated with aspects of spheres of interest. Being in-
volved and listened to in ways and degrees commensurate with its self-perceived 
great power role in the world makes Russia feel strong again. Two assumptions 
can be made: one – Russia needs to feel strong, not because of what it would like 
to do outside in the world, but because of how it likes to feel inside: hence the 
lack of positive strategy to go with the status; two – Russia likes to be involved, 
but dislikes integration; to be involved is to be visible, to be integrated is some-
how to “disappear”. 
For these reasons, Russia is apparently trapped in the logic of zero-sum 
coexistence, and not inclined to positive-sum cooperation with the West. The 
underlying question then is whether Russia, following its current trajectory, is 
ever going to feel “sufficiently” strong, given that its policies of securitisation 
so clearly feed on and simultaneously reinforce feelings of insecurity. If Nor-
way hopes to reach agreement on issues of sovereignty with Russia any time 
soon, it must take into account that Russia’s current sense of strength may be 
short-lived, and is in any case tenuous. Currently, Russia’s strength rests on its 
capacity for an economisation of foreign policy. Russia’s self-confidence has, in 
a certain sense, been “pegged” to the price per barrel of oil. Likewise, it has de-
pended on the political leadership’s ability to create and manage credible images 
of a new economic and social reality. In sum, this amounts to an unfortunate 
liaison between the concrete and the abstract; similarly, it makes the validation 
of the self-image fluctuate with the oil market. Now that oil prices have slumped 
dramatically, maintaining confidence in the economy takes a great deal of effort, 
reminding one of the perennial unpredictability of Russia’s development, and, 
in turn, why Norway needs to have political backing from Western partners and 
allies in issues of sovereignty with Russia, now as before. But more importantly, 
it hints that Russia will be cautious about concluding any final deals on sover-
eignty in the North, and there are certain historical parallels here to draw on. 
Interestingly, the 1826 border with Norway is sometimes remembered as a deal 
forced on a weak Russia. Alaska is lamented as a sell-out by a cash-strapped 
Russian Tsar. Svalbard is remembered in a similar way, as the Svalbard Treaty 
was concluded at a time when the USSR was still not internationally recognised. 
Soviet leaders were not even invited to the negotiations in Paris. Russia may to 
some extent rightly claim that its hand was forced when the USSR later uncon-
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issues of sovereignty and resource jurisdiction, Russia’s actions generally follow 
a pattern that is well known and rehearsed in a bilateral context. Increased inter-
national attention to the challenges of the Arctic region, which manifests itself 
for example in the EU’s security strategy for the Arctic, in addition to Norway’s 
more assertive stance in the High North, may constitute a set of factors contrib-
uting to Russia’s rummaging for a reciprocal and more elaborate policy of its 
own for the North. In fact, one may ask whether Norway has been so successful 
in calling international attention to the challenges of the High North that it has 
inadvertently contributed to setting in motion a race for similar national strate-
gies, if not for the natural resources of the region.  
Dealing with a “strong” Russia
The disappearance of the Cold War security logic, one could have hoped, would 
have made it easier to deal with issues of sovereignty, for instance by replacing 
interests of security with those of shared responsibility. But in the North, bor-
ders have not lost their traditional meaning. As discussed throughout the pre-
ceding chapters, Russia’s moves to securitise are largely rooted in concerns over 
sovereignty, internal as well as external. Since the relationship between Russia 
and the West is seemingly retreating from the threshold of amity, sentiments of 
rivalry must be expected to impinge on interests related to outstanding issues of 
sovereignty. What, then, will it mean for regional cooperation that Russia once 
again regards itself as strong? Will Russia become an even more demanding 
partner, or will it become more amenable to integration? 
Though feeling economically confident, albeit worried about the impact of 
the financial crisis, one may wonder what it will take for Russia to feel strong 
and how strong it needs to feel. A clue lies in the paradox that Russia’s sense of 
strength is predicated on external rather than internal factors. Fundamentally, 
Russia is economically weak in spite of the still relatively stable macroeconomic 
situation. And politically it may potentially be more unstable than one would 
think. Russian politics invoke a blurry distinction between myth and reality 
and the practices of authoritarian perception management. This leads to anoth-
er question about “strength”: what exactly does Russia need from the outside 
world to feel strong; that is, what are the visible external signs the leadership 
needs in order to portray Russia internally as strong? The answer could lie in 
the degree to which Russia perceives that its interests and preferences are being 
recognised, taken into account and substantiated in the policies of the US and 
the EU. However, with Russia’s new assertiveness comes a greater appetite for 
power. As long as Russia remains comparatively weak inside, irrespective of its 
internal authoritarianism, its feeling of strength will never really take hold, but 
fluctuate with the sense of the way in which Russia perceives it is being treated 
by its Western “defining other”. Many of the most contentious issues with the 
West have to do with geopolitical spaces and regional territorial questions. Ter-
ritories and borders will not become any less important for Russia, since they 
are so visibly and readily associated with aspects of spheres of interest. Being in-
volved and listened to in ways and degrees commensurate with its self-perceived 
great power role in the world makes Russia feel strong again. Two assumptions 
can be made: one – Russia needs to feel strong, not because of what it would like 
to do outside in the world, but because of how it likes to feel inside: hence the 
lack of positive strategy to go with the status; two – Russia likes to be involved, 
but dislikes integration; to be involved is to be visible, to be integrated is some-
how to “disappear”. 
For these reasons, Russia is apparently trapped in the logic of zero-sum 
coexistence, and not inclined to positive-sum cooperation with the West. The 
underlying question then is whether Russia, following its current trajectory, is 
ever going to feel “sufficiently” strong, given that its policies of securitisation 
so clearly feed on and simultaneously reinforce feelings of insecurity. If Nor-
way hopes to reach agreement on issues of sovereignty with Russia any time 
soon, it must take into account that Russia’s current sense of strength may be 
short-lived, and is in any case tenuous. Currently, Russia’s strength rests on its 
capacity for an economisation of foreign policy. Russia’s self-confidence has, in 
a certain sense, been “pegged” to the price per barrel of oil. Likewise, it has de-
pended on the political leadership’s ability to create and manage credible images 
of a new economic and social reality. In sum, this amounts to an unfortunate 
liaison between the concrete and the abstract; similarly, it makes the validation 
of the self-image fluctuate with the oil market. Now that oil prices have slumped 
dramatically, maintaining confidence in the economy takes a great deal of effort, 
reminding one of the perennial unpredictability of Russia’s development, and, 
in turn, why Norway needs to have political backing from Western partners and 
allies in issues of sovereignty with Russia, now as before. But more importantly, 
it hints that Russia will be cautious about concluding any final deals on sover-
eignty in the North, and there are certain historical parallels here to draw on. 
Interestingly, the 1826 border with Norway is sometimes remembered as a deal 
forced on a weak Russia. Alaska is lamented as a sell-out by a cash-strapped 
Russian Tsar. Svalbard is remembered in a similar way, as the Svalbard Treaty 
was concluded at a time when the USSR was still not internationally recognised. 
Soviet leaders were not even invited to the negotiations in Paris. Russia may to 
some extent rightly claim that its hand was forced when the USSR later uncon-
OF_1_2009_innhold.indd   99 26-02-09   12:14:56
100 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty 1/2009 NOr�e�IaN fOreI�N �O�Icy IN t�e �I�� NOrt�      
ditionally accepted the treaty.28 It is likely that the negotiations would have un-
folded differently and led to a different text if the Soviet Union had been present. 
The point here is not to make a counterfactual argument, but to draw attention 
to the potent meaning of borders to Russia and to its collective recollections of 
periods of greatness and weakness in terms of territorial space. To overlook this 
factor could be to ignore an important politico-cultural circumstance, irrespec-
tive of its legal irrelevance. 
A “strong” Russia arriving at a compromise is probably the only recipe 
for any sustainable settlement in the North. But throughout history Russia has 
made territorial concessions only at times of weakness.29 This does not rule out 
that a Russia which feels strong and which settles into this idea of itself will be 
able to conclude a compromise with Norway in the Barents Sea. But any realistic 
course of action to resolve Norway’s outstanding issues concerning Svalbard has 
to depart from an analysis of the interests of Russia and of the interests of the 
West regarding Russia and the North. In the future, Svalbard may become an 
even more important factor in defining Norway’s political, military and interest-
based fields of action in the North. Norway’s interests may be best served by the 
ability to communicate a realistic and convincing reading of Russia’s interests to 
Western partners and allies. It is reasonable to make two general assumptions 
about Russia’s interests in sovereignty issues in the High North. The first is that 
Russia will resist piecemeal and selective settlements and maintain a holistic 
view on interlinkages with its other interests elsewhere and in the Arctic. Mos-
cow will take care not to enter into any agreement that could prejudice other 
outcomes or jeopardise its future interests in the Arctic as a whole. Russia is 
preparing to make considerable territorial claims in the Arctic and expects these 
to overlap with future claims from Canada, the US and Denmark. Norway’s 
future claims regarding the extension of its continuous shelf will not overlap 
with Russia’s in the area. The second assumption is that Russia, irrespective of 
the larger picture, is looking at Svalbard and the delimitation in the Barents Sea 
as interlocked issues, and will seek to deal with them as comprehensively as the 
28 Fleischer, “The New International Law of the Sea and Svalbard”, p. 3. It may be 
recalled that the Soviet Union only turned from opposing the Svalbard Treaty, to 
which it was not a signatory until 1935 (following the US’s formal recognition of the 
USSR), to declaring bilaterally to Norway its intention of becoming a signatory on the 
existing treaty terms in 192. This was a “package deal” whereby Norway agreed, 
the very first state to do so, to fully recognise the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union 
needed the ‘first’ recognition to make a breakthrough and gain formal recognition 
from other (Western) states, cf. Sven G. Holtsmark, Høyt spill. Svalbard-spørsmålet 
1944–47 [High stakes. The Svalbard question 19–7], Forsvarsstudier, no. 1 (Oslo: 
Notrwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 200), pp. 12–2.
29 Rieber, “How Persistent are Persistent Factors?” p. 226 ff.
situation allows. To Russia, it must be reasonable to expect that Svalbard is-
sues are more uncertain, and considered more precarious than agreement on the 
Barents Sea shelf. Thus, what are legally two separate issues, could for political 
reasons merit closer consideration as a whole. So far, Norway and Russia have 
had relatively more to gain from managing the status quo than from forcing 
through an early resolution. Perhaps Russia is more at ease with the situation 
than is Norway. Consequently, Norway has focused on establishing practical 
arrangements and policies intended to manage the situation “as it is”, without 
precluding any outcomes. The point here is that Russia and Norway, each in 
its own way, for slightly different reasons and with varying enthusiasm, have 
somehow specialised in living with the current situation; they have learned to 
live without a settlement. 
Maritime zones
Over time, Norway and Russia have developed institutionalised, entrenched na-
tional positions. When looking for continuity in Russian interest formation, a 
general pattern is discernable. This is normal in such negotiations, as any signs 
of discontinuity with earlier patterns could signal the advent of new priorities. 
In the end, it takes more political and administrative effort to decide to change a 
line of policy than it does to decide to stick to an existing one. As the focus shifts 
from security to energy, new interests may infuse the negotiations with a sense of 
pragmatism, though only slightly, as the strategic interests of securing sovereign 
control over resources and territory remain fundamental. 
The argument in the following has two main points: first, regarding Sval-
bard; applying the treaty in the maritime zones, and in particular on the shelf 
around Svalbard, would open up many problems with which the treaty and the 
Mining Code are ill equipped to tackle. And reinterpreting or rewriting these 
would be a daunting task. Second, and concerning delimitation in the Barents 
Sea; it can hardly be Russia’s agenda to make concessions on the Svalbard is-
sue so as to gain on the delimitation issue. The Grey Zone Agreement provides 
Russia with most of the opportunities it needs in the Barents Sea, except for 
access to the oil and gas deposits in the disputed areas. But these deposits are 
small compared to the ones Russia is already developing on its undisputed shelf. 
Moreover, they are almost as technologically demanding, and would in any case 
not be up and running before Shtokman. A sensible trade-off would instead be 
for Russia to get something on Svalbard or in the maritime zones around for 
agreeing on the delimitation issue. The problem is that even if Norway were to 
consider offering something of this kind to Russia unilaterally, which in theory 
could be envisaged since Norway argues that the shelf around Svalbard is part 
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ditionally accepted the treaty.28 It is likely that the negotiations would have un-
folded differently and led to a different text if the Soviet Union had been present. 
The point here is not to make a counterfactual argument, but to draw attention 
to the potent meaning of borders to Russia and to its collective recollections of 
periods of greatness and weakness in terms of territorial space. To overlook this 
factor could be to ignore an important politico-cultural circumstance, irrespec-
tive of its legal irrelevance. 
A “strong” Russia arriving at a compromise is probably the only recipe 
for any sustainable settlement in the North. But throughout history Russia has 
made territorial concessions only at times of weakness.29 This does not rule out 
that a Russia which feels strong and which settles into this idea of itself will be 
able to conclude a compromise with Norway in the Barents Sea. But any realistic 
course of action to resolve Norway’s outstanding issues concerning Svalbard has 
to depart from an analysis of the interests of Russia and of the interests of the 
West regarding Russia and the North. In the future, Svalbard may become an 
even more important factor in defining Norway’s political, military and interest-
based fields of action in the North. Norway’s interests may be best served by the 
ability to communicate a realistic and convincing reading of Russia’s interests to 
Western partners and allies. It is reasonable to make two general assumptions 
about Russia’s interests in sovereignty issues in the High North. The first is that 
Russia will resist piecemeal and selective settlements and maintain a holistic 
view on interlinkages with its other interests elsewhere and in the Arctic. Mos-
cow will take care not to enter into any agreement that could prejudice other 
outcomes or jeopardise its future interests in the Arctic as a whole. Russia is 
preparing to make considerable territorial claims in the Arctic and expects these 
to overlap with future claims from Canada, the US and Denmark. Norway’s 
future claims regarding the extension of its continuous shelf will not overlap 
with Russia’s in the area. The second assumption is that Russia, irrespective of 
the larger picture, is looking at Svalbard and the delimitation in the Barents Sea 
as interlocked issues, and will seek to deal with them as comprehensively as the 
28 Fleischer, “The New International Law of the Sea and Svalbard”, p. 3. It may be 
recalled that the Soviet Union only turned from opposing the Svalbard Treaty, to 
which it was not a signatory until 1935 (following the US’s formal recognition of the 
USSR), to declaring bilaterally to Norway its intention of becoming a signatory on the 
existing treaty terms in 192. This was a “package deal” whereby Norway agreed, 
the very first state to do so, to fully recognise the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union 
needed the ‘first’ recognition to make a breakthrough and gain formal recognition 
from other (Western) states, cf. Sven G. Holtsmark, Høyt spill. Svalbard-spørsmålet 
1944–47 [High stakes. The Svalbard question 19–7], Forsvarsstudier, no. 1 (Oslo: 
Notrwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 200), pp. 12–2.
29 Rieber, “How Persistent are Persistent Factors?” p. 226 ff.
situation allows. To Russia, it must be reasonable to expect that Svalbard is-
sues are more uncertain, and considered more precarious than agreement on the 
Barents Sea shelf. Thus, what are legally two separate issues, could for political 
reasons merit closer consideration as a whole. So far, Norway and Russia have 
had relatively more to gain from managing the status quo than from forcing 
through an early resolution. Perhaps Russia is more at ease with the situation 
than is Norway. Consequently, Norway has focused on establishing practical 
arrangements and policies intended to manage the situation “as it is”, without 
precluding any outcomes. The point here is that Russia and Norway, each in 
its own way, for slightly different reasons and with varying enthusiasm, have 
somehow specialised in living with the current situation; they have learned to 
live without a settlement. 
Maritime zones
Over time, Norway and Russia have developed institutionalised, entrenched na-
tional positions. When looking for continuity in Russian interest formation, a 
general pattern is discernable. This is normal in such negotiations, as any signs 
of discontinuity with earlier patterns could signal the advent of new priorities. 
In the end, it takes more political and administrative effort to decide to change a 
line of policy than it does to decide to stick to an existing one. As the focus shifts 
from security to energy, new interests may infuse the negotiations with a sense of 
pragmatism, though only slightly, as the strategic interests of securing sovereign 
control over resources and territory remain fundamental. 
The argument in the following has two main points: first, regarding Sval-
bard; applying the treaty in the maritime zones, and in particular on the shelf 
around Svalbard, would open up many problems with which the treaty and the 
Mining Code are ill equipped to tackle. And reinterpreting or rewriting these 
would be a daunting task. Second, and concerning delimitation in the Barents 
Sea; it can hardly be Russia’s agenda to make concessions on the Svalbard is-
sue so as to gain on the delimitation issue. The Grey Zone Agreement provides 
Russia with most of the opportunities it needs in the Barents Sea, except for 
access to the oil and gas deposits in the disputed areas. But these deposits are 
small compared to the ones Russia is already developing on its undisputed shelf. 
Moreover, they are almost as technologically demanding, and would in any case 
not be up and running before Shtokman. A sensible trade-off would instead be 
for Russia to get something on Svalbard or in the maritime zones around for 
agreeing on the delimitation issue. The problem is that even if Norway were to 
consider offering something of this kind to Russia unilaterally, which in theory 
could be envisaged since Norway argues that the shelf around Svalbard is part 
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of the continuous mainland shelf, this would most probably raise a commotion 
among the Svalbard Treaty’s other contracting parties and lead to accusations 
of disrespect for the treaty’s principle of non-discrimination. Admittedly, the 
observations above may seem self-serving and supportive of Norway’s positions. 
In addition, they build on a premise, which cannot be conclusively confirmed: 
that Russia is seeking some kind of comprehensive settlement involving aspects 
of issues related to Svalbard and the Barents Sea shelf (i.e. a package deal). 
With these caveats in mind, an attempt shall be made to explore the argument 
further. If the observations can be argued convincingly then it would seem that 
Norway could have good reason to include considerations regarding the zone 
and shelf around Svalbard more firmly in its diplomatic dialogues on the High 
North with its Western partners and allies in NATO and the EU. With the cur-
rent Russian record of securitised sovereigntism, the geostrategic significance of 
the Barents Sea will increase rather than decrease with the advent of large-scale 
energy production. 
SVALbARD’S MARITIME zONES
Article 1 of the Svalbard Treaty accords “full and absolute” sovereignty over 
the Svalbard archipelago (and its territorial waters) to Norway.250 From a legal 
point of view, the first question to ask is whether the Svalbard archipelago may 
generate its own maritime zones; i.e., a 200-mile exclusive economic zone and 
a continental shelf. Provided that Svalbard does legally generate its own zones, 
the second question is whether the Svalbard Treaty should indeed extend to, and 
its provisions apply in, its maritime zones.251 There is nothing in the treaty itself 
that restricts Norway’s competence to claim such zones under the sovereignty 
accorded to Norway by the treaty. However, the official Norwegian position is 
that the Svalbard shelf, according to geological criteria, is not a distinct and sep-
arate shelf, but part of the continuous continental shelf extending from the Nor-
wegian mainland.252 The right to claim the 200-mile fisheries zone comes from 
the principle that “the competence of a state to claim maritime zones (..) derives 
from its sovereignty over [the] territory”.253 When the Soviet Union formally rec-
ognised Norway’s sovereignty over Svalbard in 192, it did so unconditionally. 
250 But subject to certain stipulations defined in the treaty. Norway is obliged to accord 
certain rights to the other contracting parties, cf. Fleischer, “The New International 
Law of the Sea and Svalbard”, p. 2. 
251 MFA, “Svalbard and the Surrounding Maritime Areas …”, pp. 18–26.
252 Ibid.
253 Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, pp. 38–0.
Neither Russia nor any of the other signatories have questioned Svalbard’s legal 
ability to generate maritime zones. 
The contentious issue is whether the treaty’s provisions should extend to 
and apply in the maritime zones around Svalbard, which has been debated by 
international lawyers and the contracting parties to the Treaty.25 Nothing in 
the text evokes the application of the treaty outside the territorial waters of 
25 Ibid; Geir Ulfstein, The Svalbard Treaty. Carl August Fleischer, Petroleumsrett 
[Petroleum Law] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1983); Fleischer “Svalbards sokkel og 
sone”; Fleischer, “The New International Law of the Sea and Svalbard”. Cf. also 
Report to the Storting Nr. 30 (200-2005).
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of the continuous mainland shelf, this would most probably raise a commotion 
among the Svalbard Treaty’s other contracting parties and lead to accusations 
of disrespect for the treaty’s principle of non-discrimination. Admittedly, the 
observations above may seem self-serving and supportive of Norway’s positions. 
In addition, they build on a premise, which cannot be conclusively confirmed: 
that Russia is seeking some kind of comprehensive settlement involving aspects 
of issues related to Svalbard and the Barents Sea shelf (i.e. a package deal). 
With these caveats in mind, an attempt shall be made to explore the argument 
further. If the observations can be argued convincingly then it would seem that 
Norway could have good reason to include considerations regarding the zone 
and shelf around Svalbard more firmly in its diplomatic dialogues on the High 
North with its Western partners and allies in NATO and the EU. With the cur-
rent Russian record of securitised sovereigntism, the geostrategic significance of 
the Barents Sea will increase rather than decrease with the advent of large-scale 
energy production. 
SVALbARD’S MARITIME zONES
Article 1 of the Svalbard Treaty accords “full and absolute” sovereignty over 
the Svalbard archipelago (and its territorial waters) to Norway.250 From a legal 
point of view, the first question to ask is whether the Svalbard archipelago may 
generate its own maritime zones; i.e., a 200-mile exclusive economic zone and 
a continental shelf. Provided that Svalbard does legally generate its own zones, 
the second question is whether the Svalbard Treaty should indeed extend to, and 
its provisions apply in, its maritime zones.251 There is nothing in the treaty itself 
that restricts Norway’s competence to claim such zones under the sovereignty 
accorded to Norway by the treaty. However, the official Norwegian position is 
that the Svalbard shelf, according to geological criteria, is not a distinct and sep-
arate shelf, but part of the continuous continental shelf extending from the Nor-
wegian mainland.252 The right to claim the 200-mile fisheries zone comes from 
the principle that “the competence of a state to claim maritime zones (..) derives 
from its sovereignty over [the] territory”.253 When the Soviet Union formally rec-
ognised Norway’s sovereignty over Svalbard in 192, it did so unconditionally. 
250 But subject to certain stipulations defined in the treaty. Norway is obliged to accord 
certain rights to the other contracting parties, cf. Fleischer, “The New International 
Law of the Sea and Svalbard”, p. 2. 
251 MFA, “Svalbard and the Surrounding Maritime Areas …”, pp. 18–26.
252 Ibid.
253 Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, pp. 38–0.
Neither Russia nor any of the other signatories have questioned Svalbard’s legal 
ability to generate maritime zones. 
The contentious issue is whether the treaty’s provisions should extend to 
and apply in the maritime zones around Svalbard, which has been debated by 
international lawyers and the contracting parties to the Treaty.25 Nothing in 
the text evokes the application of the treaty outside the territorial waters of 
25 Ibid; Geir Ulfstein, The Svalbard Treaty. Carl August Fleischer, Petroleumsrett 
[Petroleum Law] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1983); Fleischer “Svalbards sokkel og 
sone”; Fleischer, “The New International Law of the Sea and Svalbard”. Cf. also 
Report to the Storting Nr. 30 (200-2005).
Figure : The maritime zones off the Norwegian coast and around Svalbard. (Image: Norwegian 
Military Geographic Service.)
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Svalbard. To counter the argument that the drafters of the treaty could not 
reasonably have later foreseen developments in the international Law of the 
Sea, Norway argues that it is futile to hypothesise about the possible intentions 
of the drafters, and that even when the treaty was drafted there was a well es-
tablished principle of treaty law that treaties pertaining to sovereignty are not 
interpreted dynamically, but restrictively. To Norway, the question is not about 
the geographical extension of the non-discrimination rule and of the Svalbard 
tax regime and other relevant stipulations, but how Norway chooses to exercise 
national authority in the ocean areas under its jurisdiction.255 Norway could 
decide to let treaty-like provisions apply if it so chooses, and is indeed doing 
just this in the fisheries zone, but the treaty does not bind one to this. Russia 
and other treaty signatories reject the legal validity of the 200-mile Fisheries 
Protection Zone. Since Norway’s view is contested, jurisdiction in the Fisheries 
Protection Zone is on a non-discriminatory basis. Escalation of the controversy 
over the geographical scope of the Svalbard Treaty has been avoided so far.256 
Though Norway was guided in 1976 by prudence when it chose to establish the 
protection zone instead of an exclusive economic zone, the question is whether 
Norway today, by continuing this practice, is causing confusion. 
Related to the question of whether the treaty extends to the two maritime 
zones around Svalbard, is the question of whether the same regime ought to ap-
ply to both zones. The Norwegian position is that they are different, since the 
shelf around Svalbard is geologically part of the continuous continental shelf of 
mainland Norway. If there were no Svalbard archipelago the question would not 
even arise, since the extension northwards of the seabed (beyond the location of 
Svalbard) meets all legal qualifications as a continuous shelf. The 200-mile fish-
eries zone, however, must legally derive from Norway’s sovereignty over Sval-
bard, since Svalbard is located beyond the 200-mile economic zone extending 
from mainland Norway. Norway has chosen to claim sovereignty over the shelf 
independently of the treaty. This is an issue with lawyers who argue the need for 
legal clarity and “integration of sovereign rights to the continental shelf and the 
waters within 200 miles.”257 The integration aspect makes it difficult, they main-
tain, to claim two maritime zones in the same ocean area from different territo-
255 MFA, “Svalbard and the Surrounding Maritime Areas …”, p. 23.
256 Robin R. Churchill, “Claims to Maritime Zones in the Arctic – Law of the Sea 
Normality or Polar peculiarity?”, in The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime 
Delimitation and Jurisdiction, eds, Alex G. Oude Elferink and Donald R. Rothwell, 
Publications on Ocean Development (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), 
pp. 105–12, 118. See also MFA, “Svalbard and the Surrounding Maritime Areas …”
257 Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, p. 0. (Emph. added.)
rial standpoints. Whether legally debatable or not, this is where the politically 
charged contention with other contracting parties to the treaty really emerges. 
I shall not consider the legal debate any further, but try to formulate a po-
litical argument. Most treaty signatories, including Russia, maintain that Sval-
bard “has the ability under international law to generate a continental shelf”.258 
This makes it possible for them to argue that Svalbard has its own continental 
shelf, and to claim that the treaty provisions should apply. Understandably, no 
Norwegian government has wanted to press the matter by opening up for any 
exploration or extraction activities on any part of the seabed that could pos-
sibly be regarded as belonging to Svalbard’s continental shelf.259 Russia’s exact 
thinking is difficult to assess. Rejecting Norway’s right to claim the Fisheries 
Protection Zone, Russia is still vague about which regime should apply instead. 
Vylegzhanin mentions two possibilities: either zones and a legal regime “(a) 
similar to the regime of the territorial waters of Spitzbergen; [or] (b) a different 
regime.”260 With the latter, he seems to have in mind a bilateral condominium-
like arrangement for the maritime zones, inspired by the pre-1920 Svalbard re-
gime. On the one hand, Russia argues in favour of applying the treaty in both 
maritime zones around Svalbard, on the other it is mindful not to preclude a 
more favourable outcome, i.e. based on the recognition of historical and special 
Russian rights.261 Russia already enjoys preferential treatment in the fisheries 
zone, although this is hard to reconcile with a strict application of the non-
discrimination principle enshrined in the Svalbard Treaty. 
Why has this practice been allowed to become institutionalised, so that it 
may today be difficult to change? There are several reasons, some linked to the 
advantages of managing straddling stock together with Russia. But the main 
reason at the time was that of security. The lesson from the political and diplo-
matic handling of Svalbard right after World War II was that the Soviet Union 
was easiest to placate if its interests were taken seriously by Norway and recog-
nised as such by Western powers – not unlike the situation today. For this reason 
it may not be desirable for Norway to ignore Russia’s claims altogether, just as 
258 Ibid, p. 1. 
259 Churchill “Claims to Maritime Zones”, p. 11. Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine 
management …, p. 50.
260 Vylegzhanin, “Future problems of International law …”, p. 0. 
261 Also in the 1970s the Soviet Union argued along the lines of applying the treaty on the 
‘Svalbard shelf’, see Traavik and Østreng, “Security and Ocean Law”: 36. See also 
Alex G. Oude Elferink, “The Law and Politics of the Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
of the Russian Federation: Part 2”, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 
vol. 12, no. 1 (1997): 5–35.
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Svalbard. To counter the argument that the drafters of the treaty could not 
reasonably have later foreseen developments in the international Law of the 
Sea, Norway argues that it is futile to hypothesise about the possible intentions 
of the drafters, and that even when the treaty was drafted there was a well es-
tablished principle of treaty law that treaties pertaining to sovereignty are not 
interpreted dynamically, but restrictively. To Norway, the question is not about 
the geographical extension of the non-discrimination rule and of the Svalbard 
tax regime and other relevant stipulations, but how Norway chooses to exercise 
national authority in the ocean areas under its jurisdiction.255 Norway could 
decide to let treaty-like provisions apply if it so chooses, and is indeed doing 
just this in the fisheries zone, but the treaty does not bind one to this. Russia 
and other treaty signatories reject the legal validity of the 200-mile Fisheries 
Protection Zone. Since Norway’s view is contested, jurisdiction in the Fisheries 
Protection Zone is on a non-discriminatory basis. Escalation of the controversy 
over the geographical scope of the Svalbard Treaty has been avoided so far.256 
Though Norway was guided in 1976 by prudence when it chose to establish the 
protection zone instead of an exclusive economic zone, the question is whether 
Norway today, by continuing this practice, is causing confusion. 
Related to the question of whether the treaty extends to the two maritime 
zones around Svalbard, is the question of whether the same regime ought to ap-
ply to both zones. The Norwegian position is that they are different, since the 
shelf around Svalbard is geologically part of the continuous continental shelf of 
mainland Norway. If there were no Svalbard archipelago the question would not 
even arise, since the extension northwards of the seabed (beyond the location of 
Svalbard) meets all legal qualifications as a continuous shelf. The 200-mile fish-
eries zone, however, must legally derive from Norway’s sovereignty over Sval-
bard, since Svalbard is located beyond the 200-mile economic zone extending 
from mainland Norway. Norway has chosen to claim sovereignty over the shelf 
independently of the treaty. This is an issue with lawyers who argue the need for 
legal clarity and “integration of sovereign rights to the continental shelf and the 
waters within 200 miles.”257 The integration aspect makes it difficult, they main-
tain, to claim two maritime zones in the same ocean area from different territo-
255 MFA, “Svalbard and the Surrounding Maritime Areas …”, p. 23.
256 Robin R. Churchill, “Claims to Maritime Zones in the Arctic – Law of the Sea 
Normality or Polar peculiarity?”, in The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime 
Delimitation and Jurisdiction, eds, Alex G. Oude Elferink and Donald R. Rothwell, 
Publications on Ocean Development (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), 
pp. 105–12, 118. See also MFA, “Svalbard and the Surrounding Maritime Areas …”
257 Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, p. 0. (Emph. added.)
rial standpoints. Whether legally debatable or not, this is where the politically 
charged contention with other contracting parties to the treaty really emerges. 
I shall not consider the legal debate any further, but try to formulate a po-
litical argument. Most treaty signatories, including Russia, maintain that Sval-
bard “has the ability under international law to generate a continental shelf”.258 
This makes it possible for them to argue that Svalbard has its own continental 
shelf, and to claim that the treaty provisions should apply. Understandably, no 
Norwegian government has wanted to press the matter by opening up for any 
exploration or extraction activities on any part of the seabed that could pos-
sibly be regarded as belonging to Svalbard’s continental shelf.259 Russia’s exact 
thinking is difficult to assess. Rejecting Norway’s right to claim the Fisheries 
Protection Zone, Russia is still vague about which regime should apply instead. 
Vylegzhanin mentions two possibilities: either zones and a legal regime “(a) 
similar to the regime of the territorial waters of Spitzbergen; [or] (b) a different 
regime.”260 With the latter, he seems to have in mind a bilateral condominium-
like arrangement for the maritime zones, inspired by the pre-1920 Svalbard re-
gime. On the one hand, Russia argues in favour of applying the treaty in both 
maritime zones around Svalbard, on the other it is mindful not to preclude a 
more favourable outcome, i.e. based on the recognition of historical and special 
Russian rights.261 Russia already enjoys preferential treatment in the fisheries 
zone, although this is hard to reconcile with a strict application of the non-
discrimination principle enshrined in the Svalbard Treaty. 
Why has this practice been allowed to become institutionalised, so that it 
may today be difficult to change? There are several reasons, some linked to the 
advantages of managing straddling stock together with Russia. But the main 
reason at the time was that of security. The lesson from the political and diplo-
matic handling of Svalbard right after World War II was that the Soviet Union 
was easiest to placate if its interests were taken seriously by Norway and recog-
nised as such by Western powers – not unlike the situation today. For this reason 
it may not be desirable for Norway to ignore Russia’s claims altogether, just as 
258 Ibid, p. 1. 
259 Churchill “Claims to Maritime Zones”, p. 11. Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine 
management …, p. 50.
260 Vylegzhanin, “Future problems of International law …”, p. 0. 
261 Also in the 1970s the Soviet Union argued along the lines of applying the treaty on the 
‘Svalbard shelf’, see Traavik and Østreng, “Security and Ocean Law”: 36. See also 
Alex G. Oude Elferink, “The Law and Politics of the Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
of the Russian Federation: Part 2”, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 
vol. 12, no. 1 (1997): 5–35.
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before.262 The political significance of the legal issues resides not least in the 
interests generated by the petroleum resources. Churchill and Ulfstein point to 
the general insufficiency of treaty provisions and the “unsuitability of the Min-
ing Code” as regulatory frameworks for the extraction of hydrocarbons, tak-
ing into account the “strategic implications of large-scale activity on Svalbard’s 
continental shelf”.263 They draw the conclusion that from a “political point of 
view a solution based on full Norwegian sovereignty (i.e. non-application of 
the [Svalbard] Treaty (..)) is to be preferred.”26 This conclusion is based on 
a concern about the risk of tension and conflict caused by a lack of clarity in 
the application of the treaty and the Mining Code on the shelf. Only applica-
tion of Norwegian law, they maintain, would enable an effective regulatory and 
enforcement regime. Otherwise one would end up with a legal and regulatory 
environment that the treaty was not cut out to handle. This, in turn, could lead 
to an enforcement and security environment that Norway would be ill equipped 
to deal with alone. One may assume that national environmental regulations, 
having already been the object of political controversies with Russia on Sval-
bard proper, may cause renewed controversy.265 To be sure, the shelf demands 
a regulatory framework of a different calibre than the treaty can offer. If the 
level of Russia’s protest against the new environmental regulations for Svalbard 
is indicative of what Norway is potentially up against, were the shelf subject to 
treaty application, the task is overwhelming. Thus, there are sound arguments 
why the treaty cannot apply on the shelf. It is possible that a majority of the 
other signatories could find them convincing too.
There is, as argued above, little reason to believe that Russia’s geopolitical 
reflexes have changed significantly. Guided by its zero-sum thinking on sover-
eignty, Russia will jealously guard its current privileged position in the fisheries 
zone and strongly object if Norway were to transform it into an exclusive eco-
nomic zone. Russia also claims non-discriminatory rights on the shelf around 
Svalbard. But in this instance, it can claim no historical rights. In the hypothetical 
case of Norway joining the EU in the future, the Svalbard regime would remain 
outside of the European Union. Thus, a regime for the zone and shelf incorpo-
rated into the legal scope of the treaty would be in Russia’s interest. If promising 
262 Vylegzhanin warns that Russia may engage in “retaliatory measures directed towards 
a return to the position reflected in the [Swedish-Norwegian and Russian] 1872 
Agreement”, Vylegzhanin, “Future problems of International law …”, p. 2. 
263 Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, pp. 3, 159 and 59, 60 referring to 
Fleischer, Petroleumsrett, pp. 223–22.
26 Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, pp. 53.
265 The new environmental legislation (Law of 15 June 2001 nr. 79) entered into force on 
1 June 2002.
deposits are found in the structures extending into the shelf around Svalbard, 
the stakes of the legal debate over how to interpret the Svalbard Treaty will rise. 
The principal explanation why the other contracting state parties have not yet 
made specific claims or brought a case against Norway before the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) is probably that there is as of yet no clarity as to what the 
seabed holds and no clear position among them, either legally or politically. A 
meeting, initiated by the British, in London on Svalbard issues in 2006 was in-
conclusive in this regard.266 The signatories do not form a united front, but meet 
with national preferences. In addition, history more than suggests that Russia 
does not consider itself an equal partner among the signatories, but sees itself in 
a position to make special claims.
MARITIME bOUNDARy DELIMITATION IN THE bARENTS SEA
Originally initiated by Norway in the late 1960s, formal negotiations, in the 
guise of “consultations”, commenced in the mid-1970s and have continued 
since with varying rhythm and progress.267 Security was always the dominant 
factor in the Barents Sea. But security interests never played a role in Norway’s 
argument about where to draw the delimitation boundary line.268 Norway has 
consistently conducted a strictly legal argument. The Soviet side, however, at an 
early stage introduced security as one of the “special circumstances” relevant to 
where the Barents Sea should be delimited, in addition to the shape and length 
of the coastline, geological conditions, ice, size of population, economic interests 
related to fisheries, shipping and transportation.269 Generally, the impression 
was that the Soviets used security to prop up their legal argument. The legal 
grounds for special circumstances derive from the 1958 UN Continental Shelf 
Convention (CSC). The convention was from the very beginning agreed upon as 
the basis for the negotiations concerning delimitation. Article 6 states that “un-
less another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is 
the median line.”270 These circumstances, the Soviet Union argued, implied that 
a delimitation boundary line would need to follow the “sector line”, i.e. the line 
266 Interviews, FCO, London, 9 November 2006 and 23 May 2007. Norway was not 
invited, which provoked a sharp diplomatic reaction from the Norwegian foreign 
minister. No follow-up meeting has been arranged or is being planned (at the time of 
the latest interview, 23 May 2007).
267 Tresselt, “Norsk-sovjetiske forhandlinger …”: 79.    
268 Churchill and Ulfstein,   Marine management …, p. 83.
269 Tresselt, “Norsk-sovjetiske forhandlinger …”: 79–80. Elferink, “The Law and Politics          
…”: p. 6, also makes particular mention of the USSR’s strategic interests. 
270 CS Convention citation from Ingrid Kvalvik, “Assessing the Delimitation Negotiations 
between Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia”, Acta Borealis, no. 1 (200): 55–78, 
56 (emp. added).
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before.262 The political significance of the legal issues resides not least in the 
interests generated by the petroleum resources. Churchill and Ulfstein point to 
the general insufficiency of treaty provisions and the “unsuitability of the Min-
ing Code” as regulatory frameworks for the extraction of hydrocarbons, tak-
ing into account the “strategic implications of large-scale activity on Svalbard’s 
continental shelf”.263 They draw the conclusion that from a “political point of 
view a solution based on full Norwegian sovereignty (i.e. non-application of 
the [Svalbard] Treaty (..)) is to be preferred.”26 This conclusion is based on 
a concern about the risk of tension and conflict caused by a lack of clarity in 
the application of the treaty and the Mining Code on the shelf. Only applica-
tion of Norwegian law, they maintain, would enable an effective regulatory and 
enforcement regime. Otherwise one would end up with a legal and regulatory 
environment that the treaty was not cut out to handle. This, in turn, could lead 
to an enforcement and security environment that Norway would be ill equipped 
to deal with alone. One may assume that national environmental regulations, 
having already been the object of political controversies with Russia on Sval-
bard proper, may cause renewed controversy.265 To be sure, the shelf demands 
a regulatory framework of a different calibre than the treaty can offer. If the 
level of Russia’s protest against the new environmental regulations for Svalbard 
is indicative of what Norway is potentially up against, were the shelf subject to 
treaty application, the task is overwhelming. Thus, there are sound arguments 
why the treaty cannot apply on the shelf. It is possible that a majority of the 
other signatories could find them convincing too.
There is, as argued above, little reason to believe that Russia’s geopolitical 
reflexes have changed significantly. Guided by its zero-sum thinking on sover-
eignty, Russia will jealously guard its current privileged position in the fisheries 
zone and strongly object if Norway were to transform it into an exclusive eco-
nomic zone. Russia also claims non-discriminatory rights on the shelf around 
Svalbard. But in this instance, it can claim no historical rights. In the hypothetical 
case of Norway joining the EU in the future, the Svalbard regime would remain 
outside of the European Union. Thus, a regime for the zone and shelf incorpo-
rated into the legal scope of the treaty would be in Russia’s interest. If promising 
262 Vylegzhanin warns that Russia may engage in “retaliatory measures directed towards 
a return to the position reflected in the [Swedish-Norwegian and Russian] 1872 
Agreement”, Vylegzhanin, “Future problems of International law …”, p. 2. 
263 Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, pp. 3, 159 and 59, 60 referring to 
Fleischer, Petroleumsrett, pp. 223–22.
26 Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, pp. 53.
265 The new environmental legislation (Law of 15 June 2001 nr. 79) entered into force on 
1 June 2002.
deposits are found in the structures extending into the shelf around Svalbard, 
the stakes of the legal debate over how to interpret the Svalbard Treaty will rise. 
The principal explanation why the other contracting state parties have not yet 
made specific claims or brought a case against Norway before the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) is probably that there is as of yet no clarity as to what the 
seabed holds and no clear position among them, either legally or politically. A 
meeting, initiated by the British, in London on Svalbard issues in 2006 was in-
conclusive in this regard.266 The signatories do not form a united front, but meet 
with national preferences. In addition, history more than suggests that Russia 
does not consider itself an equal partner among the signatories, but sees itself in 
a position to make special claims.
MARITIME bOUNDARy DELIMITATION IN THE bARENTS SEA
Originally initiated by Norway in the late 1960s, formal negotiations, in the 
guise of “consultations”, commenced in the mid-1970s and have continued 
since with varying rhythm and progress.267 Security was always the dominant 
factor in the Barents Sea. But security interests never played a role in Norway’s 
argument about where to draw the delimitation boundary line.268 Norway has 
consistently conducted a strictly legal argument. The Soviet side, however, at an 
early stage introduced security as one of the “special circumstances” relevant to 
where the Barents Sea should be delimited, in addition to the shape and length 
of the coastline, geological conditions, ice, size of population, economic interests 
related to fisheries, shipping and transportation.269 Generally, the impression 
was that the Soviets used security to prop up their legal argument. The legal 
grounds for special circumstances derive from the 1958 UN Continental Shelf 
Convention (CSC). The convention was from the very beginning agreed upon as 
the basis for the negotiations concerning delimitation. Article 6 states that “un-
less another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is 
the median line.”270 These circumstances, the Soviet Union argued, implied that 
a delimitation boundary line would need to follow the “sector line”, i.e. the line 
266 Interviews, FCO, London, 9 November 2006 and 23 May 2007. Norway was not 
invited, which provoked a sharp diplomatic reaction from the Norwegian foreign 
minister. No follow-up meeting has been arranged or is being planned (at the time of 
the latest interview, 23 May 2007).
267 Tresselt, “Norsk-sovjetiske forhandlinger …”: 79.    
268 Churchill and Ulfstein,   Marine management …, p. 83.
269 Tresselt, “Norsk-sovjetiske forhandlinger …”: 79–80. Elferink, “The Law and Politics          
…”: p. 6, also makes particular mention of the USSR’s strategic interests. 
270 CS Convention citation from Ingrid Kvalvik, “Assessing the Delimitation Negotiations 
between Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia”, Acta Borealis, no. 1 (200): 55–78, 
56 (emp. added).
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demarcating the Western boundary up to the polar point.271 The “psychologi-
cal and political significance” of aspects of the Svalbard Treaty and the sector 
line’s particular standing in Soviet legal and administrative practice were also 
advanced by the USSR as special circumstances.272 For many years negotiations 
mostly went nowhere.
At the end of 1988, a Soviet envoy on an informal visit to Oslo signalled 
that Moscow could consider a modified sector line in the northernmost part of 
the disputed area. These were the first steps towards reconciling the two princi-
pled approaches, thereby making it possible to work for a compromise bound-
ary line. Today, only one third of the boundary line remains to be settled. It is in 
the southern, and most complicated, part, involving the fisheries, hydrocarbons 
and military security. A small step forward was taken in the summer of 2007, 
when agreement was reached on how to delimit the shelf all the way from land 
to the outer extension of the territorial waters. Symbolically this was important, 
and demonstrates that progress is being made. Apart from that, this particular 
agreement does not mean much, as it apparently does not prejudice where and 
how the boundary line will finally be drawn. In parallel with the consultations 
on where to draw the line, an equally important discussion is being conducted 
on how to regulate issues and cooperate across the future line. Principal agree-
ment may already have been reached as to how to deal with straddling fish stock 
and access to historical fishing banks, as well as how to deal with hydrocarbon 
deposits that would straddle a future delimitation line. In fact, military security 
concerns may constitute the single most important explanation why a delimita-
tion agreement is not yet in place.273 However, military concerns are difficult 
to isolate, and they have the ability to expand, blend in with and blur other 
concerns. This may be part of the problem. Residual effects of the lack of trust 
during the Cold War is still a factor, but difficult to measure with any certainty. 
Yet another, security-related, factor lies in the inherent opportunities that such 
open-ended situations provide for the stronger to the detriment of the weaker. 
The Norwegian vision of the future delimitation line between Norway and 
Russia as a “line of cooperation” communicates a pragmatist approach to a dif-
ficult aspect of the delimitation negotiations: how to deal with the oil and gas 
271 The sector line was used by the Soviet Union in 1926 to claim islands to the west 
and the east of the Arctic Ocean, to prevent similar claims from Norway and the US 
respectively, see Elferink, “The Law and Politics …”: p. 8. Churchill and Ulfstein, 
Marine management …; Churchill, “Claims to Maritime Zones”.
272 Tresselt, “Norsk-sovjetiske forhandlinger …”: 81.
273 Other delimitation cases in which the Soviet Union has not claimed security concerns 
have as a rule been settled. Cf. Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, p. 90, 
and Elferink, “The Law and Politics …”: 6.
deposits that run across a future boundary demarcation line. A practical solu-
tion seems to be joint exploitation based on a “unitisation clause”.27 This is not 
tantamount to a condominium-like arrangement. But entering into any such ar-
rangement will represent a further turn towards creating interdependence struc-
tures in Norway’s Russia-politics. The general understanding, however, is that 
cooperation on energy exploration and exploitation cannot start before the legal 
fundamentals are in place. Overall, the Norwegian position has been to prevent 
petroleum considerations from influencing the negotiation process. At present, 
focus is on energy cooperation in the undisputed areas. Whether this may help 
to redefine the problem and break the deadlock remains to be seen. Probably 
it will prove difficult to bring in new elements as a strategy to “define away” 
the central issues. Russia’s interests and preferences can be deduced from the 
preceding discussion. Not least the aforementioned “psychological and politi-
cal significance” of the sector line should be granted some interest. This legally 
dubious term echoes in security terms the wider meaning that Russia attaches to 
its geopolitical entitlements in the North. All of the Barents Sea is important for 
the position Russia envisages for itself in the Arctic.
Svalbard in the diplomatic dialogue
Disputes over issues of sovereignty in the North are fundamentally political. 
Legal approaches can provide solutions to the extent that they support the prob-
lems’ political resolution. In all probability, negotiations on the delimitation of 
the Barents Sea shelf will run their bilateral course for some time yet. Chances 
of progress are best when Russia feels confident. But presumably a strong Russia 
will seek to make a strong bargain. A Russian push for a package deal for Sval-
bard is not wholly unthinkable, and Norway’s ability to resist would partly rely 
on political support from the other contracting parties to the Svalbard Treaty. 
The argument made here is that Norway’s diplomatic dialogue on the High 
North with Western partners could possibly be opened up for discussions of a 
wider set of Svalbard issues, including related political aspects of the Barents 
Sea shelf and delimitation issues in the Arctic as a whole. It is, for instance, in 
Europe’s and the US’s interest that outstanding sovereignty issues of the entire 
27 Arild Moe, “Oil and Gas: Future Role of the Barents Region, in The Barents Region. 
Cooperation in Arctic Europe, eds Olav Skram Stokke and Ola Tunander (London: 
Sage, 199), pp. 131–1, 133.Cf. interview with former Minster of Petroleum and 
Energy Einar Stensnæs in Dagens Næringsliv, 1 March 2003: The parties may be 
working on schemes through which licences will be awarded on a reciprocal 51/9 per 
cent basis on either side of deposits that straddle a future delimitation line.
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demarcating the Western boundary up to the polar point.271 The “psychologi-
cal and political significance” of aspects of the Svalbard Treaty and the sector 
line’s particular standing in Soviet legal and administrative practice were also 
advanced by the USSR as special circumstances.272 For many years negotiations 
mostly went nowhere.
At the end of 1988, a Soviet envoy on an informal visit to Oslo signalled 
that Moscow could consider a modified sector line in the northernmost part of 
the disputed area. These were the first steps towards reconciling the two princi-
pled approaches, thereby making it possible to work for a compromise bound-
ary line. Today, only one third of the boundary line remains to be settled. It is in 
the southern, and most complicated, part, involving the fisheries, hydrocarbons 
and military security. A small step forward was taken in the summer of 2007, 
when agreement was reached on how to delimit the shelf all the way from land 
to the outer extension of the territorial waters. Symbolically this was important, 
and demonstrates that progress is being made. Apart from that, this particular 
agreement does not mean much, as it apparently does not prejudice where and 
how the boundary line will finally be drawn. In parallel with the consultations 
on where to draw the line, an equally important discussion is being conducted 
on how to regulate issues and cooperate across the future line. Principal agree-
ment may already have been reached as to how to deal with straddling fish stock 
and access to historical fishing banks, as well as how to deal with hydrocarbon 
deposits that would straddle a future delimitation line. In fact, military security 
concerns may constitute the single most important explanation why a delimita-
tion agreement is not yet in place.273 However, military concerns are difficult 
to isolate, and they have the ability to expand, blend in with and blur other 
concerns. This may be part of the problem. Residual effects of the lack of trust 
during the Cold War is still a factor, but difficult to measure with any certainty. 
Yet another, security-related, factor lies in the inherent opportunities that such 
open-ended situations provide for the stronger to the detriment of the weaker. 
The Norwegian vision of the future delimitation line between Norway and 
Russia as a “line of cooperation” communicates a pragmatist approach to a dif-
ficult aspect of the delimitation negotiations: how to deal with the oil and gas 
271 The sector line was used by the Soviet Union in 1926 to claim islands to the west 
and the east of the Arctic Ocean, to prevent similar claims from Norway and the US 
respectively, see Elferink, “The Law and Politics …”: p. 8. Churchill and Ulfstein, 
Marine management …; Churchill, “Claims to Maritime Zones”.
272 Tresselt, “Norsk-sovjetiske forhandlinger …”: 81.
273 Other delimitation cases in which the Soviet Union has not claimed security concerns 
have as a rule been settled. Cf. Churchill and Ulfstein, Marine management …, p. 90, 
and Elferink, “The Law and Politics …”: 6.
deposits that run across a future boundary demarcation line. A practical solu-
tion seems to be joint exploitation based on a “unitisation clause”.27 This is not 
tantamount to a condominium-like arrangement. But entering into any such ar-
rangement will represent a further turn towards creating interdependence struc-
tures in Norway’s Russia-politics. The general understanding, however, is that 
cooperation on energy exploration and exploitation cannot start before the legal 
fundamentals are in place. Overall, the Norwegian position has been to prevent 
petroleum considerations from influencing the negotiation process. At present, 
focus is on energy cooperation in the undisputed areas. Whether this may help 
to redefine the problem and break the deadlock remains to be seen. Probably 
it will prove difficult to bring in new elements as a strategy to “define away” 
the central issues. Russia’s interests and preferences can be deduced from the 
preceding discussion. Not least the aforementioned “psychological and politi-
cal significance” of the sector line should be granted some interest. This legally 
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Svalbard in the diplomatic dialogue
Disputes over issues of sovereignty in the North are fundamentally political. 
Legal approaches can provide solutions to the extent that they support the prob-
lems’ political resolution. In all probability, negotiations on the delimitation of 
the Barents Sea shelf will run their bilateral course for some time yet. Chances 
of progress are best when Russia feels confident. But presumably a strong Russia 
will seek to make a strong bargain. A Russian push for a package deal for Sval-
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on political support from the other contracting parties to the Svalbard Treaty. 
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North with Western partners could possibly be opened up for discussions of a 
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Sea shelf and delimitation issues in the Arctic as a whole. It is, for instance, in 
Europe’s and the US’s interest that outstanding sovereignty issues of the entire 
27 Arild Moe, “Oil and Gas: Future Role of the Barents Region, in The Barents Region. 
Cooperation in Arctic Europe, eds Olav Skram Stokke and Ola Tunander (London: 
Sage, 199), pp. 131–1, 133.Cf. interview with former Minster of Petroleum and 
Energy Einar Stensnæs in Dagens Næringsliv, 1 March 2003: The parties may be 
working on schemes through which licences will be awarded on a reciprocal 51/9 per 
cent basis on either side of deposits that straddle a future delimitation line.
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Barents Sea are settled, so that regional energy cooperation can be developed 
further. As to Svalbard issues, it is important to keep in mind the interests of the 
EU and Norway regarding a possible future EU membership. Conversely, it is in 
Russia’s interest to make sure that Svalbard’s maritime zones are formally tied 
to the treaty provisions lest it has to deal not with Oslo, but with Brussels over 
future disputes over sovereignty rights and questions of jurisdiction and enforce-
ment. Irrespective of the EU dimension, Russia’s security needs and concerns 
in the Barents Sea need to be taken into account, while attempts at institution-
alisation of privileged rights in the maritime zones around Svalbard should be 
discouraged. As long as Svalbard is perceived by Moscow as a relatively “open”’ 
issue, the chances of reaching agreement on delimitation of the Barents Sea shelf 
is probably slim. Since it is in the northern part of the Barents Sea, for instance 
north of Svalbard, that the potentially large unproven fields are supposedly lo-
cated, this area could very well be economically and politically more significant 
than the seabed and subsoil under the disputed “Grey Zone”. Thus, there are 
good reasons for maintaining a regime involving national law to govern Norwe-
gian as well as international interests in the maritime zones around Svalbard.
CONCLUSION 
While the advanced economies of the world are turning towards new forms 
of economic production, it is important to recognise that this development is 
largely enabled by stable access to energy at affordable prices. Energy coopera-
tion between Russia and the West faces two paradoxes. First, energy presents 
favourable interdependence opportunities to Russia, which, however, the Rus-
sian leadership is reluctant to seize. Second, if it continues to reject integration, 
Russia will be turning away from its only certain way of reconstituting itself in 
the world as a power of global significance. Russia’s choice, or more precisely, its 
reluctance to make a binding choice, is nonetheless understandable. 
When rejecting integration, Russia is turning its back on the very path 
towards cooperation that Norway wishes to advance in the North. One may 
therefore ask; if cooperation leading to functional and institutional integration is 
not part of a realistic solution, then what is? If energy cooperation only enables 
Russia to turn further away from integration, what new forms of relations are 
advisable and indeed available? What kind of interests should they be premised 
on; those of security or sovereignty alone? And are such uncertainties what the 
resort to “pragmatic realism” is ultimately for? Such questions are increasingly 
acute now that energy cooperation is changing gear and the Shtokman project is 
starting up with French and Norwegian participation. But it is difficult to say ex-
actly how it may affect the quality and robustness of relations. Norway may be 
heading into an unprecedented degree of bilateralism with Russia. It now seems 
that this development is coming at an awkward moment, as it coincides with 
strained relations between Russia and the West and with increasing concern 
over domestic developments in Russia. In both respects, it reignites nervousness 
about where Russia may be heading and about Russia as international partner. 
Russia will remain an unpredictable partner and dominant power in the North. 
Now, another set of unpredictable factors accompanies the financial crisis and 
the expected downturn in global economic development. Oil prices will prob-
ably remain low for some time, and so will Russia’s ability to attract foreign 
investments. Both factors will crucially impact on Russia’s ability to develop 
new and the existing fields in the North. 
There is reason to believe that Russia’s policies of centralisation and 
(re)securitisation will continue in the short to medium term, as there are no 
liberal political or economic forces left to challenge them. The voice of moder-
ate political opposition has been muted. Attempts to promote democracy and 
human rights are regarded with suspicion and have been rendered largely impo-
tent. This is tied to the concept and practices of sovereign democracy, and has 
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up to now been sustained by Russia’s energy-driven economic up-turn. As long 
as most Russians experience some measure of economic and social progress, 
democracy, market economics, the rule of law and political and human rights 
will struggle. But in the long run, Russia’s centrally managed sovereign democ-
racy model will prove unmanageable in its present form. Either there will be a 
reversal towards more democracy, or authoritarianism will run its course to a 
logical end. As Russia is sliding towards securitisation at the risk of stagnation, 
stifling stabilisation will sooner or later (again) undermine the system’s power 
base and authority. At the same time, internal securitisation plays into the sphere 
of foreign policy. It is inconceivable that securitisation of internal sovereignty 
should not be similarly reflected in perceptions of external sovereignty. In fact, 
the borderline between internal and external sovereignty is blurry, except by 
very formal criteria. Through a combination of inner compulsion and percep-
tions of external threats, attention is drawn towards securing Russia’s “rightful” 
place in the world. This means that Russia’s interests will be less focused on 
the High North as a region of energy cooperation for the sake of cooperation, 
but more on how the resources of the region may contribute to the economisa-
tion of its great power designs. Russia’s interests are overall statist, and as such 
tightly interlinked with the most profound purposes of security and territorial 
sovereignty. 
One must expect that Norway is regarded as something between partner 
and pawn in the North. Where does this leave Norway’s interest-based approach 
to cooperation with Russia? The study has sought to develop this question by 
splitting it in three: first, how relations with Russia in the High North are shaped 
by interests of energy cooperation; second, how certain value-based interests 
seem to sustain a security-driven sovereigntism in Russia; third, how interests 
and identity may fuel the High North with geopolitical significance for Russia, 
and the scope for bringing questions of sovereignty into a more political and less 
legalistic dialogue between Norway and its Western partners and allies.  
Interest or value-based cooperation?
An interest-based policy must depart from a fairly clear understanding of one’s 
own and other states’ goals and strategic preferences. What states seek is gener-
ally some combination of security, power and wealth. Gaining prestige is also 
considered an interest of the state. But it is unclear how states know what they 
want, or if what they want is really in their own best interest. While having just 
shed its Soviet skin, Russia has not changed its address – reasons of power and 
wealth are persistently argued in the language of security. 
Russia’s energy-driven economic upturn since the turn of the millennium 
has largely coincided with a qualitative downturn in relations with the West 
in general and the US in particular. With the EU, relations are partly strained 
because of Russia’s inclination to deal bilaterally with EU countries and a disin-
clination to take the European Commission seriously. Just when energy is pro-
pelling it to the centre stage as a world economic and political power, Russia 
seems unable to seize the moment. Russia insists on being involved, but shies 
away from integration. Just as the rising importance of energy and the oppor-
tunities of interdependence should be making institutional convergence a wel-
coming option, the opposite may in fact be happening. Energy seems to charge 
Russia’s determination to resist structures of dependence. Polarisation, not glo-
balisation, is winning the day. Cooperation is nominally welcomed, but largely 
seen in a zero-sum perspective. Mindful of this gap in the meaning and purposes 
of cooperation, one may argue that relations with Russia must be interest-based 
and pragmatic rather than founded on common values. The level of commonal-
ity of values between Russia and the West is in itself too “thin” for robust co-
operation, according to this way of thinking. It is inferred that cooperation with 
Russia, if it is to succeed, must rest on selectively defined, reciprocal interests.
Russia has never contested the core principles of international society, em-
bedded in the institutions of sovereignty, non-intervention and the territorial 
integrity of states. Although the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is 
messy in this regard, Russia, as the Soviet Union before it, is traditionally one 
of international society’s staunchest supporters of these very institutions. But 
Russia’s apparent desire for an international security order stands in the way 
of its adherence to the more advanced conceptions of sovereignty stemming 
from the opportunities and challenges of globalisation. One may understand 
the political gap (re)opening between Russia and the West thus: the most basic, 
pluralist, norms of international society are shared, but the more advanced, soli-
daristic, ones are not. This explains the still fairly modest capacity for interac-
tion and disappointing level of convergence in the system of states as a whole. 
Moreover, it shows that the West and Russia are moving at different speeds, if 
not in different directions. An important point though, is that Russia is in the 
mainstream if world trends are considered. Vanguard liberal institutions are not 
equally shared by all, and are by some, Russia included, looked upon with a 
measure of suspicion. This brings me to the questions that have structured the 
inquiries of the study. 
1. How are relations with Russia in the High North shaped by energy co-
operation? 
In chapters four and five I sought to explore the conditions for energy co-
operation in the High North. The vision of an emerging energy province seeks 
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up to now been sustained by Russia’s energy-driven economic up-turn. As long 
as most Russians experience some measure of economic and social progress, 
democracy, market economics, the rule of law and political and human rights 
will struggle. But in the long run, Russia’s centrally managed sovereign democ-
racy model will prove unmanageable in its present form. Either there will be a 
reversal towards more democracy, or authoritarianism will run its course to a 
logical end. As Russia is sliding towards securitisation at the risk of stagnation, 
stifling stabilisation will sooner or later (again) undermine the system’s power 
base and authority. At the same time, internal securitisation plays into the sphere 
of foreign policy. It is inconceivable that securitisation of internal sovereignty 
should not be similarly reflected in perceptions of external sovereignty. In fact, 
the borderline between internal and external sovereignty is blurry, except by 
very formal criteria. Through a combination of inner compulsion and percep-
tions of external threats, attention is drawn towards securing Russia’s “rightful” 
place in the world. This means that Russia’s interests will be less focused on 
the High North as a region of energy cooperation for the sake of cooperation, 
but more on how the resources of the region may contribute to the economisa-
tion of its great power designs. Russia’s interests are overall statist, and as such 
tightly interlinked with the most profound purposes of security and territorial 
sovereignty. 
One must expect that Norway is regarded as something between partner 
and pawn in the North. Where does this leave Norway’s interest-based approach 
to cooperation with Russia? The study has sought to develop this question by 
splitting it in three: first, how relations with Russia in the High North are shaped 
by interests of energy cooperation; second, how certain value-based interests 
seem to sustain a security-driven sovereigntism in Russia; third, how interests 
and identity may fuel the High North with geopolitical significance for Russia, 
and the scope for bringing questions of sovereignty into a more political and less 
legalistic dialogue between Norway and its Western partners and allies.  
Interest or value-based cooperation?
An interest-based policy must depart from a fairly clear understanding of one’s 
own and other states’ goals and strategic preferences. What states seek is gener-
ally some combination of security, power and wealth. Gaining prestige is also 
considered an interest of the state. But it is unclear how states know what they 
want, or if what they want is really in their own best interest. While having just 
shed its Soviet skin, Russia has not changed its address – reasons of power and 
wealth are persistently argued in the language of security. 
Russia’s energy-driven economic upturn since the turn of the millennium 
has largely coincided with a qualitative downturn in relations with the West 
in general and the US in particular. With the EU, relations are partly strained 
because of Russia’s inclination to deal bilaterally with EU countries and a disin-
clination to take the European Commission seriously. Just when energy is pro-
pelling it to the centre stage as a world economic and political power, Russia 
seems unable to seize the moment. Russia insists on being involved, but shies 
away from integration. Just as the rising importance of energy and the oppor-
tunities of interdependence should be making institutional convergence a wel-
coming option, the opposite may in fact be happening. Energy seems to charge 
Russia’s determination to resist structures of dependence. Polarisation, not glo-
balisation, is winning the day. Cooperation is nominally welcomed, but largely 
seen in a zero-sum perspective. Mindful of this gap in the meaning and purposes 
of cooperation, one may argue that relations with Russia must be interest-based 
and pragmatic rather than founded on common values. The level of commonal-
ity of values between Russia and the West is in itself too “thin” for robust co-
operation, according to this way of thinking. It is inferred that cooperation with 
Russia, if it is to succeed, must rest on selectively defined, reciprocal interests.
Russia has never contested the core principles of international society, em-
bedded in the institutions of sovereignty, non-intervention and the territorial 
integrity of states. Although the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is 
messy in this regard, Russia, as the Soviet Union before it, is traditionally one 
of international society’s staunchest supporters of these very institutions. But 
Russia’s apparent desire for an international security order stands in the way 
of its adherence to the more advanced conceptions of sovereignty stemming 
from the opportunities and challenges of globalisation. One may understand 
the political gap (re)opening between Russia and the West thus: the most basic, 
pluralist, norms of international society are shared, but the more advanced, soli-
daristic, ones are not. This explains the still fairly modest capacity for interac-
tion and disappointing level of convergence in the system of states as a whole. 
Moreover, it shows that the West and Russia are moving at different speeds, if 
not in different directions. An important point though, is that Russia is in the 
mainstream if world trends are considered. Vanguard liberal institutions are not 
equally shared by all, and are by some, Russia included, looked upon with a 
measure of suspicion. This brings me to the questions that have structured the 
inquiries of the study. 
1. How are relations with Russia in the High North shaped by energy co-
operation? 
In chapters four and five I sought to explore the conditions for energy co-
operation in the High North. The vision of an emerging energy province seeks 
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to replace security concerns with petroleum reserves as the rationale for coop-
eration with Russia and for Western political attention to the Barents Sea. But 
if the vision is Norwegian, the resources are largely Russian. It is Russia that 
holds the key to deeper interdependence through energy cooperation. My find-
ings indicate that the institutional foundation for an energy community across 
the former security divide is shaky. Not all interests are geared towards those on 
which the premise of cooperation is predicated. Some interests, intertwined with 
the interests of security and sovereignty, point in other directions. This, I find, is 
linked to political and historical circumstances particular to the region. Another 
finding is that Norway is not only facing Russia in the North, but is also in need 
of soliciting Western political and security support that it cannot take entirely 
for granted. The uncertainty related to unsettled delimitation issues and the sta-
tus of maritime areas in the Barents Sea, including the zones around Svalbard, 
stands in the way of deeper, positive-sum, energy cooperation. The emerging 
international cooperation on developing the Shtokman field is a marriage of 
convenience, necessitated by Russia’s lack of indigenous advanced technology 
and project managerial and organisational skills. 
Norway’s relations with Russia in the North are also shaped by interna-
tional political circumstances. It is barely surprising that national interests are 
now resurfacing and manifesting themselves in discussions about natural re-
sources and property rights. The precursors to such sentiments are known from 
long-standing disagreements over sovereign rights in the ocean areas of the re-
gion. Given the current strained relations between Russia and the West, chances 
are that the energy province will have only limited chances of being restructured 
around a novel, shared interest in energy and climate security. Norway may, 
thus, remain “alone with Russia” in the North for a long time still. First, the 
sense of community between Norway and Russia is still weak. The idea of a 
Russo-Norwegian “Pomor” community of the north is largely talked up and 
politically (re)invented. Moreover, the people-to-people aspect of cooperation, 
although much celebrated, is of little consequence to the unfolding of signifi-
cant matters of state, such as energy and the related interests of security and 
sovereignty. Second, the security community of the West may not be as robust 
as one might think now that the security dimension is less acute. Urgent glo-
bal challenges are brought together in the geographically close context of the 
north. Bilateral energy relations between Norway and Russia do not evolve in a 
vacuum. Norway is struggling with redefining its policies towards a Russia bus-
ily redefining its role in world politics and national sense of self with regard to 
the West as a whole. 
2. How do national interests and values affect securitisation and sover-
eigntism in Russia?
In chapters six and seven I looked into domestic circumstances in Russia, 
particularly at how developments intrinsic to Russian society may define 
Russia’s approaches to cooperation with individual states in the West. Resur-
gent security awareness accompanies a greater assertiveness in Russian external 
politics. Russia is living through a period of political centralisation and tight-
ening control over the state’s strategic resources and assets, leading irrevoca-
bly to (re)securitisation. Securitisation of natural resources is running parallel 
to similar securitising control over human resources. This dual development 
is encapsulated in the state-sponsored policy of sovereign democracy. The two 
strands of the policy seem mutually reinforcing. What this signifies is a gradual 
securitisation of all things sovereign – and even of the concept of sovereignty 
itself. It also implies a blurring of the internal and external dimensions of sover-
eignty, making all things Russian into one sovereign space – distinctly delimited 
from the world outside. Rather than functioning as a facilitator of cooperation 
geared towards greater interdependence, energy feeds interests of this securitisa-
tion of sovereignty. Essentially, the vast energy revenues have made it possible 
for Russia to hold the forces of interdependence at bay. This has taught Russia 
how to ignore the bindings of institutional integration. Russia no longer needs 
to comply, but can define the rules. The situation has played into the hands 
of securitising agents and institutions. Since the institutional decision-making 
system is beyond public deliberation and popular control, the easily communi-
cable “triad of national values” – sovereign democracy, economic strength and 
military power – effectively crowd out policies requiring greater refinement and 
complexity. 
It is doubtful whether the general economic downturn and falling petrole-
um revenues will do much to make the current leadership change their politico-
economic ways. In fact, it is hardly conceivable that system change can come 
about without changes at the top. As there are no built-in checks and balances at 
the top, the system is prone to letting domestic and foreign security urges influ-
ence economic and commercial considerations. Economic policy is employed to 
serve internal and external power-political purposes through what may be per-
ceived as an economisation of politics. This is also the case in Northwest Russia, 
where diverse interests of security, energy and sovereignty meet and have to be 
reconciled. It may in part explain the prolonged decision-making process over 
the Shtokman project, before the French and Norwegian partners were finally 
designated. In the Russian north, the military seems to have regained some of 
its former influence and power, not least due to its quasi-monopoly on defining 
external threats. The military’s situation is reinforced by current tensions in the 
global security environment and strengthened further by the rising significance 
of oil and gas as a foreign policy-tool. While the military and federal security 
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eration with Russia and for Western political attention to the Barents Sea. But 
if the vision is Norwegian, the resources are largely Russian. It is Russia that 
holds the key to deeper interdependence through energy cooperation. My find-
ings indicate that the institutional foundation for an energy community across 
the former security divide is shaky. Not all interests are geared towards those on 
which the premise of cooperation is predicated. Some interests, intertwined with 
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for granted. The uncertainty related to unsettled delimitation issues and the sta-
tus of maritime areas in the Barents Sea, including the zones around Svalbard, 
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international cooperation on developing the Shtokman field is a marriage of 
convenience, necessitated by Russia’s lack of indigenous advanced technology 
and project managerial and organisational skills. 
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tional political circumstances. It is barely surprising that national interests are 
now resurfacing and manifesting themselves in discussions about natural re-
sources and property rights. The precursors to such sentiments are known from 
long-standing disagreements over sovereign rights in the ocean areas of the re-
gion. Given the current strained relations between Russia and the West, chances 
are that the energy province will have only limited chances of being restructured 
around a novel, shared interest in energy and climate security. Norway may, 
thus, remain “alone with Russia” in the North for a long time still. First, the 
sense of community between Norway and Russia is still weak. The idea of a 
Russo-Norwegian “Pomor” community of the north is largely talked up and 
politically (re)invented. Moreover, the people-to-people aspect of cooperation, 
although much celebrated, is of little consequence to the unfolding of signifi-
cant matters of state, such as energy and the related interests of security and 
sovereignty. Second, the security community of the West may not be as robust 
as one might think now that the security dimension is less acute. Urgent glo-
bal challenges are brought together in the geographically close context of the 
north. Bilateral energy relations between Norway and Russia do not evolve in a 
vacuum. Norway is struggling with redefining its policies towards a Russia bus-
ily redefining its role in world politics and national sense of self with regard to 
the West as a whole. 
2. How do national interests and values affect securitisation and sover-
eigntism in Russia?
In chapters six and seven I looked into domestic circumstances in Russia, 
particularly at how developments intrinsic to Russian society may define 
Russia’s approaches to cooperation with individual states in the West. Resur-
gent security awareness accompanies a greater assertiveness in Russian external 
politics. Russia is living through a period of political centralisation and tight-
ening control over the state’s strategic resources and assets, leading irrevoca-
bly to (re)securitisation. Securitisation of natural resources is running parallel 
to similar securitising control over human resources. This dual development 
is encapsulated in the state-sponsored policy of sovereign democracy. The two 
strands of the policy seem mutually reinforcing. What this signifies is a gradual 
securitisation of all things sovereign – and even of the concept of sovereignty 
itself. It also implies a blurring of the internal and external dimensions of sover-
eignty, making all things Russian into one sovereign space – distinctly delimited 
from the world outside. Rather than functioning as a facilitator of cooperation 
geared towards greater interdependence, energy feeds interests of this securitisa-
tion of sovereignty. Essentially, the vast energy revenues have made it possible 
for Russia to hold the forces of interdependence at bay. This has taught Russia 
how to ignore the bindings of institutional integration. Russia no longer needs 
to comply, but can define the rules. The situation has played into the hands 
of securitising agents and institutions. Since the institutional decision-making 
system is beyond public deliberation and popular control, the easily communi-
cable “triad of national values” – sovereign democracy, economic strength and 
military power – effectively crowd out policies requiring greater refinement and 
complexity. 
It is doubtful whether the general economic downturn and falling petrole-
um revenues will do much to make the current leadership change their politico-
economic ways. In fact, it is hardly conceivable that system change can come 
about without changes at the top. As there are no built-in checks and balances at 
the top, the system is prone to letting domestic and foreign security urges influ-
ence economic and commercial considerations. Economic policy is employed to 
serve internal and external power-political purposes through what may be per-
ceived as an economisation of politics. This is also the case in Northwest Russia, 
where diverse interests of security, energy and sovereignty meet and have to be 
reconciled. It may in part explain the prolonged decision-making process over 
the Shtokman project, before the French and Norwegian partners were finally 
designated. In the Russian north, the military seems to have regained some of 
its former influence and power, not least due to its quasi-monopoly on defining 
external threats. The military’s situation is reinforced by current tensions in the 
global security environment and strengthened further by the rising significance 
of oil and gas as a foreign policy-tool. While the military and federal security 
OF_1_2009_innhold.indd   115 26-02-09   12:14:59
116 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty 1/2009 NOr�e�IaN fOreI�N �O�Icy IN t�e �I�� NOrt�      
personnel have much in common, they nonetheless compete for position, sta-
tus and influence in the federal centre and in the regions. Sovereignty provides 
meaning and substance to the concept of security. Prioritisation between security 
and cooperation in the North will in all likelihood continue to be characterised 
by shifts and arbitrariness. Security will remain a factor in the High North al-
though the strategic security overlay from the Cold War has shifted altogether. 
Instead of having a de-securitising effect, the presence of natural resources may 
generate another security agenda rooted in considerations of sovereign and ter-
ritorial rights. 
3. How may energy fuel the High North with geopolitical significance and 
what is the scope for bringing questions of sovereignty onto a more political 
track?  
In chapter eight I returned to the unsettled issues of sovereignty in the re-
gion. My approach to the question of the status of the maritime zones around 
Svalbard and the delimitation of the Barents Sea shelf is political, and looked 
at interests not easily perceived in positive-sum perspectives. Due to the im-
peratives of security, Norway’s bilateral relations with Russia have traditionally 
been kept on a practical level and within the scope of selectively chosen issue 
areas. Emphasis on international law has been used to de-politicise issues. Bilat-
eralisation of security was to be avoided. In so doing, Norway has consistently 
insisted that the modern Law of the Sea is broadly enough conceived to tackle 
present and future challenges to the international order and rule of law in ocean 
areas. It is not the body of law itself which is in need of revision and moderni-
sation. Rather, it is the enforcement and compliance structures that need to be 
addressed. By playing the cards of law and pragmatism, it has proved possible 
for Norway to carefully tailor relations with a view to edging cooperation for-
wards and solving even the most complex problems in modest, but workable 
ways. The prudent mix of pragmatism and principled approaches has, not least, 
made it possible for Norway to stay the course in dealing with the still unsettled 
issues of sovereign rights and enforcement of jurisdiction in ocean areas. This 
balancing act, echoing the earlier practice of mixing reassurance and deterrence, 
is still employed and is dubbed “pragmatic realism”. It is a low-key incremental 
approach allowing for gradually deeper and broader cooperation, with energy 
as the latest and most important issue area. Energy embraces both external pil-
lars of the High North strategy, and may actually build bridges between them. 
On the other hand, energy impinges on matters of sovereignty and geopolitics 
and ties one more firmly to the other. If the exact success criteria of pragmatic 
realism remain vague, it still denotes a policy that is flexible yet predictable and 
has achieved results over the years.
One may expect that Russia’s positions in the Arctic will be guided by con-
servatism and is inspired by long-standing preferences (including from the Soviet 
period), and that these are only minimally mitigated by commercial urgencies 
or other sudden needs of the moment. Radically changed positions on issues of 
sovereignty are unlikely. The influential actors will have Russia’s long-term in-
terests in mind. In the global context, these include ensuring a multipolar order 
in the international state system. For this, Russia needs to retain its territorial 
greatness and cannot afford to become “smaller” than it is, and certainly not in 
the North. Having established the geopolitical significance of the High North to 
Russia, I find that sovereignty is an overriding interest on the Russian side, and 
that energy cooperation is relegated to second place. Most likely it is therefore 
not capable of spearheading a breakthrough on outstanding issues of delimita-
tion and sovereign rights. Russia’s interests in Svalbard and its coinciding geo-
political interests in the Arctic may further reduce the scope for settling disputed 
issues. This is based on the assumption that the Russian leadership may fear that 
a delimitation agreement in the Barents Sea would weaken its position regarding 
Svalbard and, by extension, in the Arctic as a whole. Russia’s interest is most 
probably directed towards securing a political hold over Svalbard and the mari-
time zones around it. The reason for this is that a foothold on Svalbard secures 
Russia’s presence in the western Arctic.275 Moreover, Russia’s interests are com-
parably more precarious regarding the unresolved issues pertaining to Svalbard 
than the Barents Sea shelf delimitation, which, seen in isolation, is probably 
within reach. This leads me to ask whether Norway ought to include Svalbard 
issues more broadly in the High North dialogue with Western countries, and 
whether it should consider bringing the question out of its legal confines and 
onto a more politicised track. 
Interests of security, sovereignty and cooperation 
A central aspect of future cooperation in the North is the relative rise of North-
west Russia. An important variable is how Moscow will allow Murmansk to 
progress and develop. There are, on the one hand, no visible signs that Medvedev 
is about to revise the centralisation process that has accompanied Putin’s reign 
since the very start and bolstered it since. But, on the other hand, with the en-
ergy of the North and with the Murmansk area becoming a strategic energy and 
275 In the words of former Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Naryshkin, cf. the visit 
to Svalbard of the delegation headed by Naryshkin in October 2007, supra note 17.
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personnel have much in common, they nonetheless compete for position, sta-
tus and influence in the federal centre and in the regions. Sovereignty provides 
meaning and substance to the concept of security. Prioritisation between security 
and cooperation in the North will in all likelihood continue to be characterised 
by shifts and arbitrariness. Security will remain a factor in the High North al-
though the strategic security overlay from the Cold War has shifted altogether. 
Instead of having a de-securitising effect, the presence of natural resources may 
generate another security agenda rooted in considerations of sovereign and ter-
ritorial rights. 
3. How may energy fuel the High North with geopolitical significance and 
what is the scope for bringing questions of sovereignty onto a more political 
track?  
In chapter eight I returned to the unsettled issues of sovereignty in the re-
gion. My approach to the question of the status of the maritime zones around 
Svalbard and the delimitation of the Barents Sea shelf is political, and looked 
at interests not easily perceived in positive-sum perspectives. Due to the im-
peratives of security, Norway’s bilateral relations with Russia have traditionally 
been kept on a practical level and within the scope of selectively chosen issue 
areas. Emphasis on international law has been used to de-politicise issues. Bilat-
eralisation of security was to be avoided. In so doing, Norway has consistently 
insisted that the modern Law of the Sea is broadly enough conceived to tackle 
present and future challenges to the international order and rule of law in ocean 
areas. It is not the body of law itself which is in need of revision and moderni-
sation. Rather, it is the enforcement and compliance structures that need to be 
addressed. By playing the cards of law and pragmatism, it has proved possible 
for Norway to carefully tailor relations with a view to edging cooperation for-
wards and solving even the most complex problems in modest, but workable 
ways. The prudent mix of pragmatism and principled approaches has, not least, 
made it possible for Norway to stay the course in dealing with the still unsettled 
issues of sovereign rights and enforcement of jurisdiction in ocean areas. This 
balancing act, echoing the earlier practice of mixing reassurance and deterrence, 
is still employed and is dubbed “pragmatic realism”. It is a low-key incremental 
approach allowing for gradually deeper and broader cooperation, with energy 
as the latest and most important issue area. Energy embraces both external pil-
lars of the High North strategy, and may actually build bridges between them. 
On the other hand, energy impinges on matters of sovereignty and geopolitics 
and ties one more firmly to the other. If the exact success criteria of pragmatic 
realism remain vague, it still denotes a policy that is flexible yet predictable and 
has achieved results over the years.
One may expect that Russia’s positions in the Arctic will be guided by con-
servatism and is inspired by long-standing preferences (including from the Soviet 
period), and that these are only minimally mitigated by commercial urgencies 
or other sudden needs of the moment. Radically changed positions on issues of 
sovereignty are unlikely. The influential actors will have Russia’s long-term in-
terests in mind. In the global context, these include ensuring a multipolar order 
in the international state system. For this, Russia needs to retain its territorial 
greatness and cannot afford to become “smaller” than it is, and certainly not in 
the North. Having established the geopolitical significance of the High North to 
Russia, I find that sovereignty is an overriding interest on the Russian side, and 
that energy cooperation is relegated to second place. Most likely it is therefore 
not capable of spearheading a breakthrough on outstanding issues of delimita-
tion and sovereign rights. Russia’s interests in Svalbard and its coinciding geo-
political interests in the Arctic may further reduce the scope for settling disputed 
issues. This is based on the assumption that the Russian leadership may fear that 
a delimitation agreement in the Barents Sea would weaken its position regarding 
Svalbard and, by extension, in the Arctic as a whole. Russia’s interest is most 
probably directed towards securing a political hold over Svalbard and the mari-
time zones around it. The reason for this is that a foothold on Svalbard secures 
Russia’s presence in the western Arctic.275 Moreover, Russia’s interests are com-
parably more precarious regarding the unresolved issues pertaining to Svalbard 
than the Barents Sea shelf delimitation, which, seen in isolation, is probably 
within reach. This leads me to ask whether Norway ought to include Svalbard 
issues more broadly in the High North dialogue with Western countries, and 
whether it should consider bringing the question out of its legal confines and 
onto a more politicised track. 
Interests of security, sovereignty and cooperation 
A central aspect of future cooperation in the North is the relative rise of North-
west Russia. An important variable is how Moscow will allow Murmansk to 
progress and develop. There are, on the one hand, no visible signs that Medvedev 
is about to revise the centralisation process that has accompanied Putin’s reign 
since the very start and bolstered it since. But, on the other hand, with the en-
ergy of the North and with the Murmansk area becoming a strategic energy and 
275 In the words of former Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Naryshkin, cf. the visit 
to Svalbard of the delegation headed by Naryshkin in October 2007, supra note 17.
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commodities export hub, Moscow cannot allow itself to ignore the potential of 
the region. 
A big if, however, is whether the Russian authorities will be able to recon-
cile energy interests with the interests of the military in the North. This question 
will in all probability be decisive for the future aspects of international coopera-
tion in the region. It looks, however, as if the military is gradually regarding with 
less hostility the presence of the energy sector, and has become more accom-
modating with regard to the construction of infrastructure and the localisation 
of facilities. In part, this softening of the military’s stance must be attributable 
to the political significance of Russia’s great power ambitions, behind which 
energy is the main force. But one may also ask if this sense of reconciliation is a 
sign that energy development is increasingly being premised on the needs of the 
military. If this is the case, one must expect a gradual securitisation of the energy 
sector, along the whole chain of petroleum activities in the region: from explora-
tion to construction, extraction and production, distribution and export. This 
will not only affect energy cooperation, but spill over to aspects of sovereignty 
regarding the Northern Sea Route and questions of the status of ocean areas and 
resource management. As a trend, it is reinforced by the combination of military 
might and energy as instruments of international political power.
During the Cold War, Norway’s most serious challenges in the north were 
provoked by forces exogenous to Norway itself. Geographical coincidence and 
the bipolar order positioned Norway on a strategically important flank, so to 
speak in the middle of the East-West divide of the North. Security policy provid-
ed the interpretive framework within which interests of sovereignty were defined 
and the scope for practical solutions identified. Either by tacit consent or politi-
cal arrangement, Norway’s positions regarding the status of ocean areas in the 
Barents Sea or Svalbard had as a rule Western backing. But take away the Cold 
War and the accompanying security imperative, and certain “persistent” aspects 
of sovereignty seem to re-emerge. Norway has traditionally kept the unsettled 
issues of sovereignty strictly within a legal context in order not to politicise or 
unnecessarily securitise matters in the High North. By bringing political aspects 
of sovereignty to the fore today, Norway could possibly construct a political ar-
gument that Western states (with an interest in Svalbard) would find more con-
vincing than the legal ones. Within the framework of the political High North 
dialogue, Norway should look again at the arguments for keeping the Svalbard 
and the Barents Sea delimitation issues separate from each other. Whereas they 
are legally different cases, politically they could still be linked. Norway consid-
ers itself to be on firm legal ground as to Svalbard’s maritime zones and the 
delimitation of the Barents Sea shelf. This seems plausible, since no one has so 
far seriously sought to bring Norway before the court in Haag on either count. 
But the legal argument may now gradually be getting in the way of a more con-
vincing political argument. To lift the issues out of their legal confines, Norway 
probably needs to identify how the two issues may interrelate in the Russian 
perspective, and to communicate and discuss this within the framework of the 
broader High North dialogue. 
International institutions and law have taken regulatory relations between 
Norway and Russia important steps forward, while the execution of authority 
and stewardship under the new regimes of the Law of the Sea have at times 
strained bilateral political relations. The overall effect has, however, been posi-
tive. Multilateral and bilateral regimes of resource management have as a rule 
enjoyed authority and respect. They have in turn gained cooperative momentum 
and spread to new areas, checked only by security concerns. As such, one may in 
fact speak of the international Law of the Sea as a gentle civiliser of the North.276 
Revolutions in technology have contributed to the restructuring of the interna-
tional Law of the Sea. It grants considerable rights to individual coastal states, 
but forces them to act collectively through cooperation. Two acknowledgements 
are essential: first that the riches of the ocean areas are not inexhaustible, and 
second that the sea can be ruined by the activities of man. The onus is on coastal 
states to give the necessary attention to the environment, since the sea is part 
of humankind’s common heritage. The regimes, and the practices and institu-
tional arrangements that they embody, have contributed to shifting the logic of 
relations in the North from coexistence towards cooperation. Yet, they still fall 
short of a convergence of interests. 
Norway’s main political challenge in the High North continues to be Rus-
sian, as do the main opportunities. Norway’s national challenges in the North 
are strongly affected and influenced by Russia’s global challenges and those it 
faces in the Arctic region as a whole. Norway’s bilateral and regional policy 
orientations, and Russia’s global ambitions and intentions regarding the North, 
cause differences in policy that create challenges of their own. Internal develop-
ments in Russia constitute an important set of factors. Another is the increasing 
urgency of enabling international society to put in place effective regimes for 
responsible and integrated resource management. Consequently, the practical 
question is how closer cooperation with Russia should be organised and to what 
degree it should be bilateral or linked to European institutions and trans-Atlantic 
dimensions. Bringing Europe’s attention to the High North and embedding coop-
eration in the High North with Russia in European structures are possible ways 
to go. Russia’s interests in security and sovereignty in the Arctic could provide 
276 Borrowed from Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. 
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commodities export hub, Moscow cannot allow itself to ignore the potential of 
the region. 
A big if, however, is whether the Russian authorities will be able to recon-
cile energy interests with the interests of the military in the North. This question 
will in all probability be decisive for the future aspects of international coopera-
tion in the region. It looks, however, as if the military is gradually regarding with 
less hostility the presence of the energy sector, and has become more accom-
modating with regard to the construction of infrastructure and the localisation 
of facilities. In part, this softening of the military’s stance must be attributable 
to the political significance of Russia’s great power ambitions, behind which 
energy is the main force. But one may also ask if this sense of reconciliation is a 
sign that energy development is increasingly being premised on the needs of the 
military. If this is the case, one must expect a gradual securitisation of the energy 
sector, along the whole chain of petroleum activities in the region: from explora-
tion to construction, extraction and production, distribution and export. This 
will not only affect energy cooperation, but spill over to aspects of sovereignty 
regarding the Northern Sea Route and questions of the status of ocean areas and 
resource management. As a trend, it is reinforced by the combination of military 
might and energy as instruments of international political power.
During the Cold War, Norway’s most serious challenges in the north were 
provoked by forces exogenous to Norway itself. Geographical coincidence and 
the bipolar order positioned Norway on a strategically important flank, so to 
speak in the middle of the East-West divide of the North. Security policy provid-
ed the interpretive framework within which interests of sovereignty were defined 
and the scope for practical solutions identified. Either by tacit consent or politi-
cal arrangement, Norway’s positions regarding the status of ocean areas in the 
Barents Sea or Svalbard had as a rule Western backing. But take away the Cold 
War and the accompanying security imperative, and certain “persistent” aspects 
of sovereignty seem to re-emerge. Norway has traditionally kept the unsettled 
issues of sovereignty strictly within a legal context in order not to politicise or 
unnecessarily securitise matters in the High North. By bringing political aspects 
of sovereignty to the fore today, Norway could possibly construct a political ar-
gument that Western states (with an interest in Svalbard) would find more con-
vincing than the legal ones. Within the framework of the political High North 
dialogue, Norway should look again at the arguments for keeping the Svalbard 
and the Barents Sea delimitation issues separate from each other. Whereas they 
are legally different cases, politically they could still be linked. Norway consid-
ers itself to be on firm legal ground as to Svalbard’s maritime zones and the 
delimitation of the Barents Sea shelf. This seems plausible, since no one has so 
far seriously sought to bring Norway before the court in Haag on either count. 
But the legal argument may now gradually be getting in the way of a more con-
vincing political argument. To lift the issues out of their legal confines, Norway 
probably needs to identify how the two issues may interrelate in the Russian 
perspective, and to communicate and discuss this within the framework of the 
broader High North dialogue. 
International institutions and law have taken regulatory relations between 
Norway and Russia important steps forward, while the execution of authority 
and stewardship under the new regimes of the Law of the Sea have at times 
strained bilateral political relations. The overall effect has, however, been posi-
tive. Multilateral and bilateral regimes of resource management have as a rule 
enjoyed authority and respect. They have in turn gained cooperative momentum 
and spread to new areas, checked only by security concerns. As such, one may in 
fact speak of the international Law of the Sea as a gentle civiliser of the North.276 
Revolutions in technology have contributed to the restructuring of the interna-
tional Law of the Sea. It grants considerable rights to individual coastal states, 
but forces them to act collectively through cooperation. Two acknowledgements 
are essential: first that the riches of the ocean areas are not inexhaustible, and 
second that the sea can be ruined by the activities of man. The onus is on coastal 
states to give the necessary attention to the environment, since the sea is part 
of humankind’s common heritage. The regimes, and the practices and institu-
tional arrangements that they embody, have contributed to shifting the logic of 
relations in the North from coexistence towards cooperation. Yet, they still fall 
short of a convergence of interests. 
Norway’s main political challenge in the High North continues to be Rus-
sian, as do the main opportunities. Norway’s national challenges in the North 
are strongly affected and influenced by Russia’s global challenges and those it 
faces in the Arctic region as a whole. Norway’s bilateral and regional policy 
orientations, and Russia’s global ambitions and intentions regarding the North, 
cause differences in policy that create challenges of their own. Internal develop-
ments in Russia constitute an important set of factors. Another is the increasing 
urgency of enabling international society to put in place effective regimes for 
responsible and integrated resource management. Consequently, the practical 
question is how closer cooperation with Russia should be organised and to what 
degree it should be bilateral or linked to European institutions and trans-Atlantic 
dimensions. Bringing Europe’s attention to the High North and embedding coop-
eration in the High North with Russia in European structures are possible ways 
to go. Russia’s interests in security and sovereignty in the Arctic could provide 
276 Borrowed from Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. 
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Norway with good reasons to use this course. The domestic condition of Russia, 
and the present strain on relations between Russia and the West, may assist in 
creating a broader international understanding for the multifaceted complexities 
of Norway’s position. With Russia at its side in the High North, Norway may on 
the one hand succeed in filling the region with practical cooperation, and on the 
other in preventing its own marginalisation. Energy cooperation is not in itself 
sufficient to ease the tensions of security and sovereignty in the High North, but 
an indispensable ingredient in any such endeavour. Variables rooted in identity 
and value-related aspects of interest do play a role. Fine-tuning the High North 
policy to the propositions of an informed understanding of the social structur-
ing of material interests is thus, indeed, (just) foreign policy – no more, no less. 
Modern meanings of the purposes and legitimacy of sovereignty and sovereign 
rights, including the responsibilities such invoke, represent a convincing political 
argument that will probably gain in significance and international adherence, 
driven by developments in the High North, in the years to come.
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2. A. bROOKES
Hard European Lessons from the Kosovo Air Campaign.
3. p. FR. I. pHARO
Norge på Balkan 1990–1999. “Lessons learned”.
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Cash and Cannons. Norway, Denmark and the US Aid Programmes 197–
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Striden om landminer. Ottawa-konvensjonens muligheter og begrensninger.
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Nasjon – union – profesjon. Forsvaret på 1800-tallet.
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Brennpunkt. Kald krig, nordområder og storstrategi.
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Amerikansk våpenhjelp til Norge 199–1953.
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The Meaning of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
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De norske partisanene i Finnmark 191– – i skyggen av den kalde krigen.
4. R. bERG
Nordisk samarbeid 191–1918.
5. H.O. SANDNES
“Olav Tryggvason-affæren”.
6. R.G. pATMAN
Securing Somalia : A Comparison of US and Australian Peacekeeping during 
the UNITAF Operation.
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Great Power Guarantees or Small State Cooperation? Atlanticism and European 
Regionalism in Norwegian Foreign Policy, 190–195.
2. O. RISTE OG R. bERG
Isolasjonisme, atlantisk samarbeid og nordpolitikk.
3. F. LILAND
Moral og realpolitikk. Norges forhold til Kina etter 1966.
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5. CHR. COKER
The Future is History.
6. H. MACDONALD
National Separatisms and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia.
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1. F.O. NILSEN
Sovjetisk ubåtvirksomhet i nord – behov og tradisjoner.
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Telemark bataljon. NATOs nye styrkestruktur og Norges deltakelse i IRF.
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The Race for Norwegian Heavy Water, 190–195.
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UN Authorized Use of Force: Recent Changes in UN Practice.
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Den tysk-norske spenningen under første verdenskrig.
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Gamle problemer i ny klesdrakt? EFs utvidelsesproblemer i 1990-årene.
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Fortidens skygger i polsk politikk. Reformprosessens utfordringer etter valget.
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Norway and the Early Cold War: Conditional Atlantic Cooperation.
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Norges møte med Europa, 1950–196.
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United Nations Peacekeeping at a Crossroads. The Challenges of Management 
and Institutional Reform.
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Postwar Security: Universal or Regional?
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Norges hemmelige tjenester under den kalde krigen. Et sammenlignende i 
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3. L. SHEVTSOVA
August 1991. The Attempted Coup and its Consequences.
4. T. KRISTIANSEN
Det fjerne og farlige Baltikum. Norge og det baltiske spørsmål 1918–1922.
5. O. RISTE
Eit “minimumsforsvar” for Norge? FK90 og spørsmålet om alliert assistanse.
6. O. WICKEN
Kald krig i norsk forskning.
7. K. HIRSCH
Den norske klagesaken mot Tyrkia i 1982.
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